Johnson v. Johnson

Decision Date04 May 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1907,1907
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals
PartiesLetha M. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Emodene Davis JOHNSON and Ansel J. Johnson, of whom Ansel J. Johnson is also an Appellant, and Emodene Davis Johnson is Respondent. . Heard

H.F. Bell, of Chesterfield, for appellant.

Letha M. Johnson, and Ansel J. Johnson, pro se.

Jack L. Nettles, of Florence, for respondent.

BELL, Judge.

This is an action for an accounting arising from the administration of a decedent's estate. Maxie Johnson died intestate in March, 1982. His heirs at law were his widow, Letha M. Johnson, and his two sons, Malcolm K. Johnson and Ansel J. Johnson. Malcolm Johnson later died testate, leaving his widow, Emodene Davis Johnson, as the sole beneficiary under his will. In June, 1988, Letha Johnson commenced this action for an accounting against Emodene Johnson and Ansel Johnson. At the same time, Letha Johnson and Ansel Johnson brought an action against Emodene Johnson for partition of the real property in Maxie Johnson's estate. Both cases were settled by agreement of the parties. The terms of the settlements were confirmed by the circuit court and set forth in two consent orders entered on January 21, 1989.

The consent order in this case directed certain funds in the decedent's estate to be paid to Letha Johnson. By the order's express terms, once it was complied with, the case would be dismissed as to all parties with prejudice. The money was paid to Letha Johnson and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, the judgment in this case has become final.

Emodene Johnson was not satisfied with the partition of real property made pursuant to the other order and appealed it to the Supreme Court. On motion of Letha Johnson and Ansel Johnson, the Supreme Court remanded the partition suit to the circuit court for further proceedings. At a hearing after remand, all parties consented to reopen the partition suit for a trial on the merits. At the same hearing, Emodene Johnson moved to set aside the consent order in this case on the ground that the two orders were part of one overall settlement requiring the accounting suit to be reopened because the partition suit had been reopened. The circuit court granted the motion and set aside the consent order in this case. Letha Johnson and Ansel Johnson appeal. We affirm.

Ordinarily, where a judgment or order is entered by consent, it is binding and conclusive and cannot be attacked by the parties either by direct appeal or in a collateral proceeding. Jones & Parker v. Webb, 8 S.C. 202 (1876). However, a consent order is an agreement of the parties, under the sanction of the court, and is to be interpreted as an agreement. Id. It can be rescinded by mutual consent in a subsequent court action. See In re Pendergrass' Will, 251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960); State ex rel. North Carolina State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers & Land Surveyors v. Testing Laboratories, Inc., 52 N.C.App. 344, 278 S.E.2d 564 (1981). It cannot, however, be set aside in part so that one party is absolved from the duty imposed by it, while the same party retains the benefit it confers. Jones & Parker v. Webb, supra. Thus, in a case like this one, where the final order in one case is the basis for the...

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19 cases
  • Lanier v. Lanier
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 21 Marzo 2005
    ...conclusive and cannot be attacked by the parties either on direct appeal or in a collateral proceeding." See Johnson v. Johnson, 310 S.C. 44, 46, 425 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Ct.App.1992). Although this is the general rule, consent judgments are subject to attack in particular circumstances, includin......
  • Landry v. Landry
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • 13 Mayo 2020
    ...court of appeals has found exceptional circumstances existed to allow modification under Rule 60(b)(5). See Johnson v. Johnson , 310 S.C. 44, 47, 425 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding if justice so requires, the court may relieve a party of a final consent order if it was based on a va......
  • State v. Elephant, Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 14 Agosto 2019
    ...the consent order was the product of an agreement of the parties, it carries the authority of the court. See Johnson v. Johnson, 310 S.C. 44, 46, 425 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Ct. App. 1992) ("[A] consent order is an agreement of the parties, under the sanction of the court, and is to be interpreted a......
  • State on relation of William Walter Wilkins v. Elephant, Inc.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 14 Agosto 2019
    ... ... While the consent ... order was the product of an agreement of the parties, it ... carries the authority of the court. See Johnson v ... Johnson, 310 S.C. 44, 46, 425 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Ct. App ... 1992) ("[A] consent order is an agreement of the ... parties, ... ...
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