Johnson v. K-Mart Corp.
| Decision Date | 07 July 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 20296,K-MART,20296 |
| Citation | 882 P.2d 971,126 Idaho 316 |
| Parties | Doris I. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.CORPORATION, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
James W. Atwood, Coeur d'Alene, argued for appellant.
Quane, Smith, Howard & Hull, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent. Randall R. Adams, argued.
This is a slip and fall case. The question presented on appeal is whether the district court correctly decided, on summary judgment, that the tenant operating a retail store owed no duty to its patrons to maintain the parking lot adjacent to its building in a reasonably safe condition. For the reasons explained below, we vacate the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.
On February 14, 1986, Doris Johnson drove to the K-Mart retail store in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. She parked in the store's parking lot. As she emerged from her vehicle and proceeded toward the store entrance Johnson slipped on ice and fell backward, breaking her wrist. Seeking to recover for her injuries, Johnson brought a negligence action against K-Mart, Inc., 1 alleging that K-Mart had breached its common-law duty of care by failing to warn her of dangerous conditions and by failing to properly inspect and maintain the parking lot. K-Mart denied the allegations and moved for summary judgment on the ground that it did not lease or control the parking lot and therefore owed no duty to Johnson to maintain that portion of the premises in a reasonably safe condition. The district court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we will review the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Tolmie Farms v. J.R. Simplot, Co., 124 Idaho 607, 609, 862 P.2d 299, 301 (1993). Standards applicable to summary judgment require the trial court, and the appellate court on review, to liberally construe all evidentiary facts in the record in favor of the party opposing the motion. Id. Where, as here, a jury has been requested, the nonmoving party also is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from those facts. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P.2d 923, 925 (1982). However, the existence of disputed facts will not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case, on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033 (1986); Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct.App.1992).
Here, K-Mart sought and was granted summary judgment on the basis that Ms. Johnson would not be able to show at trial, that K-Mart owed her a duty of care--an essential element of Johnson's negligence action. See Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175-76, 804 P.2d 900, 904-05 (1991). Specifically, K-Mart averred that it had no control over the parking lot in which Johnson fell, and therefore it owed no legal duty to Johnson to maintain that area in a safe condition or to warn her of the lot's dangerous conditions.
It is well settled in Idaho that owners and occupiers of land owe a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances toward invitees who come upon their premises. Harrison v. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 596, 768 P.2d 1321, 1329 (1989); Otts v. Brough, 90 Idaho 124, 131, 409 P.2d 95, 102 (1965); see also Phillips v. United States, 801 F.Supp. 337, 345 (D.Idaho 1992). Thus, "a tenant or lessee having control of the premises is deemed, so far as third parties are concerned, to be the owner, and in case of injury to third parties occasioned by the condition or use of the premises, the general rule is that the tenant or lessee may be liable for failure to keep the premises in repair." Id., (emphasis added). Accord 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 434, at 204-05 (1968); 49 AM.JUR.2D Landlord and Tenant § 981, at 952 (1970). This duty of care applies even though the landlord also may have some control over the particular facility and is also liable for the injury. 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant, supra, § 436, at 213; see also Harrison, 115 Idaho at 596, 768 P.2d at 1329 (). However, a tenant generally will not be held legally responsible for conditions existing outside the area over which it has possession or control. 62A AM.JUR.2D Premises Liability § 741 (1990). Whether K-Mart had control over the parking lot, and therefore bore legal responsibility for the lot's condition, turns on the operation of K-Mart's lease agreement. Absent ambiguity in the lease agreement, resolution of this issue presents a question of law over which we exercise free review.
Johnson maintains that K-Mart leased the entire 7.2 acre parcel described in the lease, including the parking lot in which she was injured, and that K-Mart therefore owed her a common-law duty to keep those premises in a reasonably safe condition. K-Mart asserts, on the other hand, that it had leased only the building from which its retail store operated, and that it neither leased or possessed nor controlled the adjacent parking lot. In support of its position, K-Mart cites to its lease agreement, submitted with its summary judgment motion, which provides:
Landlord does demise unto Tenant and Tenant does take from Landlord for the term hereinafter provided, and any extension thereof, the following property: Tenant's completed building (designated K mart), together with site improvements to be constructed, as hereinafter specified, by Landlord at its expense on the land comprising no less than seven & 2/10 (7.2) acres described in Exhibit "A", attached hereto and made a part hereof, situated in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, said building to be in the location depicted on Exhibit "B" 2....
K-Mart urges that we construe this language to mean that it did not lease the entire 7.2 acre parcel, but only the completed "building" and "site improvements" located on that land. K-Mart further asserts that "site improvements" do not include the parking areas. We note, however, that the lease agreement explicitly describes the "building" as the store plus an adjacent garden shop; the only other construction...
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