Johnson v. Kamminga, 93-1869
| Decision Date | 30 September 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-1869,93-1869 |
| Parties | Anthony JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard KAMMINGA, G. Brown, Lieutenant Dave Conover, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jerold S. Solovy, Barry Sullivan, Kenneth A. Wittenberg (argued), Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.
Jan E. Hughes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), Civil Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for Richard Kamminga, G.E. Brown, Dave Conover.
Terrence T. Rock, Asst. Atty. Gen., Springfield, IL, for Lieutenant Knop, M.J. Ellis, L.L. Grace, Sergeant Michael P. Lane, James H. Thieret.
Before BAUER, WOOD, Jr., and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
This case stems from a civil rights complaint which had languished in the district court for over seven years due, for the most part to the pretrial delays of the plaintiff, Anthony Johnson. After Johnson failed to appear in court on the first day of trial, the district court finally put an end to the delay, dismissing the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Johnson appeals the decision to dismiss. We affirm.
On June 2, 1986, Johnson, then a prisoner at the Menard Correctional Center, filed a civil rights lawsuit against various officials of the Illinois Department of Corrections alleging that the defendants had physically assaulted him. Nearly one year later, on May 29, 1987, the defendants moved for summary judgment. When Johnson failed to reply by October, the district court ordered that Johnson show cause why the motion should not be granted. On November 2, 1987, in response to the order, Johnson's appointed counsel, Richard Erdmann, informed the court of his intent to file an amended complaint within twenty-one days.
When, by September of 1988, Erdmann had yet to file the amended complaint, the magistrate judge overseeing the proceedings recommended that the case be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The district court admonished Johnson and Erdmann for the delay, but finding no prejudice to the defendants, allowed the case to proceed. Based on the amended complaint finally filed in October of 1988, the defendants filed another motion for summary judgment on January 17, 1991. Again, Johnson failed to file a responsive pleading, and on March 6, 1992, the magistrate recommended that the case proceed against four of the eight defendants on two of the six counts. With respect to the other defendants and counts, the magistrate recommended that the motion for summary judgment be granted. Johnson objected to the recommendations because he had not responded to the motion. Observing that the delay was Johnson's own fault, the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations and scheduled the trial to commence on Monday, March 8, 1993.
Although released from prison, Johnson was, nevertheless, absent on the first day of trial, causing Erdmann to request a continuance. According to Erdmann, Johnson had failed to show up for a meeting with Erdmann on the previous day, Sunday, March 7. Erdmann's efforts to contact him were futile until Sunday afternoon, when Johnson called to tell Erdmann that he had injured his knee and had spent the day in the hospital. Johnson claimed that the injury prevented him from driving from Chicago to East St. Louis for the trial. To confirm the story, Erdmann contacted the hospital and discovered that Johnson had come to the hospital for treatment on Saturday and had been released the same day. Erdmann's subsequent attempts to reach Johnson and to discover the identity of Johnson's physician were also in vain. Finding Johnson's story to be of little credibility and given the significant delay already incurred, the court denied the motion for a continuance and dismissed the case with prejudice.
We review the dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute under an abuse of discretion standard. Halas v. Consumer Servs., Inc., 16 F.3d 161, 163 (7th Cir.1994). The district court's findings of fact are reversible only if clearly erroneous. Id. at 164. Because district judges have a better understanding of their litigants and their docket, review of managerial decisions such as this one are appropriately deferential. We presume, therefore, that the district judge acted reasonably and will reverse "only if it is plain either that the dismissal was a mistake or that the judge did not consider factors essential to the exercise of a sound discretion." Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 755 (7th Cir.1993). Johnson argues that the district court's decision constitutes reversible error because there was no evidence of any egregious or contumacious conduct by Johnson and that the court failed to warn Johnson before making such a drastic decision. Johnson adds that the district court should have considered lesser sanctions...
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