Johnson v. Kan. Emp't Sec. Bd. of Review

• Decision Date: 01 August 2014
• Docket Number: No. 110,275.,110,275.
• Citation: 330 P.3d 1128
• Parties: Demond JOHNSON, Appellee, v. KANSAS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD OF REVIEW, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Court of Appeals

330 P.3d 1128

Demond JOHNSON, Appellee,

v.KANSAS EMPLOYMENT SECURITY BOARD OF REVIEW, Appellant.

No. 110,275.

Court of Appeals of Kansas.

Aug. 1, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–709(i), any action of the Kansas Employment Security Board of Review is subject to review in accordance with the Kansas Judicial Review Act which narrows and defines the proper scope of review pursuant to K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 77–621(c).

2. The burden of proving the invalidity of agency action is on the party asserting invalidity under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 77–621(a)(1).

3. The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. An appellate court must first attempt to ascertain legislative intent through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings.

4. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, an appellate court does not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read into the statute something not readily found it in. Only if the statute's language or text is unclear or ambiguous does the court use canons of construction or legislative history to construe the legislature's intent.

5. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–706 states in relevant part: “An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (a) If the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work or the employer.”

6. When construing statutes to determine legislative intent, an appellate court must consider various provisions of an act in pari materia with a view of reconciling and bringing the provisions into workable harmony if possible. The court must construe statutes to avoid unreasonable or absurd results and presume the legislature does not intend to enact meaningless legislation.

7. K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–705 sets forth the conditions under which an individual is eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits, including the threshold requirement that the individual be “unemployed.” K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–703(m) defines unemployment as “[A]n individual shall be deemed ‘unemployed’ with respect to any week during which such individual performs no services and with respect to which no wages are payable to such individual, or with respect to any week of less than full-time work if the wages payable to such individual with respect to such week are less than such individual's weekly benefit amount.”

Justin McFarland, special assistant attorney general, deputy general counsel, of Kansas Department of Labor, for appellant.

Demond Johnson, appellee pro se.

Before BRUNS, P.J., PIERRON and STANDRIDGE, JJ.

PIERRON, J.

The Kansas Employment Security Board of Review (Board) appeals the district court's decision reinstating Demond Johnson's unemployment compensation benefits. Johnson, who concurrently held a position as a computer programmer with the State of Kansas and a part-time position as a fast food worker at McDonald's, began receiving unemployment compensation benefits after he was separated from his computer programmingposition with the State. The Board contends the district court erred in finding Johnson was not disqualified from receiving these benefits when he later voluntarily left his part-time position at McDonald's. We affirm the district court's ruling.

Johnson began employment as a computer programmer with the State in December 2006. In January 2011, while still employed by the State, Johnson began working part-time at McDonald's. Johnson was separated from his computer programming position in September 2011 and shortly thereafter began receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Johnson continued to work at McDonald's on a part-time basis and duly reported this work and income to the Kansas Department of Labor (KDOL).

In November 2011, Johnson asked the manager at McDonald's to stop scheduling him until further notice. Johnson stated he had decided to go to San Diego to look for suitable work as a computer programmer but he was not sure at that time whether he would stay in San Diego or return to Kansas.

Johnson remained in San Diego and began taking evening classes in January 2012 to earn a degree and improve his computer programming credentials. At the end of January, he submitted a K–Ben 317 form for approval of school attendance to KDOL. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears that KDOL determined Johnson's school attendance did not disqualify him from unemployment compensation benefits.

On February 5, 2012, Johnson informed McDonald's he would not be returning to work. He then informed KDOL that he had formally resigned from his part-time position at McDonald's as of February 5. Johnson told KDOL that his last day of work at McDonald's was in November 2011 and he had moved to California to look for a place to live and check out schools.

An examiner with KDOL notified Johnson he was disqualified from unemployment compensation benefits under the provisions of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–706 because he left work without good cause attributable to the work or the employer. The disqualification began as of February 5, the day Johnson formally resigned from McDonald's. Johnson stopped receiving any benefits as of February 5, although he continued to keep the necessary records and submit weekly unemployment claims.

Johnson appealed the examiner's decision to the KDOL appeals referee. A hearing was held before the appeals referee, at which Johnson appeared as the claimant and McDonald's appeared as the employer. The State did not appear as an employer. At the hearing, Johnson clarified he was not seeking any unemployment compensation benefits related to his job at McDonald's. He argued he should have continued to receive benefits related to the loss of his computer programming position with the State, to which he was clearly entitled. Johnson asked to have those benefits restored, including all back payments.

The referee upheld the examiner's decision disqualifying Johnson from benefits. The referee found Johnson had begun receiving benefits when he separated from his computer programming position and he had properly reported his McDonald's work and income to the KDOL. Johnson then voluntarily left his part-time position at McDonald's. The referee found that under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–706(a), Johnson's voluntary departure from McDonald's without good cause attributable to the work or the employer disqualified Johnson from all benefits, including those he began receiving after he was separated from his computer programming position:

“[Johnson] was eligible to draw unemployment benefits after separating from his state employment. This is despite the fact [Johnson] was still receiving some wages from his other job with McDonalds. But when [Johnson] separated from McDonalds, he was at that time completely separated from employment. That separation from employment triggers a renewed look at [Johnson's] underlying claim for benefits. [Johnson] was properly cleared for benefits following his separation from state employment. But that qualification does not last into perpetuity. Further separations from employment impact the claim.

“Unfortunately, [Johnson] left work without good cause as defined by the employment security law. Choosing to attend school may be a good personal choice on many levels, but Kansas law does not recognize it as being good cause for leaving work and still being qualified to receive unemployment benefits. The choice to obtain more education is not one of the specific exceptions enumerated [in K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–706(a)(1)–(12) ].”

Finally, the referee found Johnson became disqualified for benefits on November 7, 2011, the day after his last actual day of work at McDonald's, rather than on February 5, 2012, the day he gave formal notice that he would not return. The referee amended the disqualification date accordingly. Johnson appealed the referee's decision to the Board, which affirmed the referee's decision in its entirety.

Johnson petitioned for judicial review of the Board's decision by the district court. The district court reversed, finding the Board had interpreted K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–706(a) too broadly in determining that Johnson's voluntary departure from McDonald's also disqualified him from receiving benefits related to his separation from his computer programming position with the State. First, the court considered that such a broad reading was out of line with the statutorily-defined public policy of Kansas Employment Security Law (KESL). Second, the court found that Johnson's position at McDonald's was not suitable work for a computer programmer and therefore his decision to leave such work did not disqualify him from receiving benefits related to the loss of his position as a computer programmer.

The Board appeals the decision of the district court.

The Board first contends that under the plain language of K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–706(a), a claimant who leaves any work, whether or not it is the claimant's primary employment, is subject to disqualification from any and all unemployment compensation benefits if the departure is voluntary and without good cause attributable to the work or the employer. Thus, even a claimant like Johnson who receives benefits while continuing to work a part-time or secondary job may lose those benefits if he or she voluntarily leaves the secondary job.

Johnson argues that his part-time position at McDonald's was not suitable work for his customary occupation as a computer programmer. Therefore, his voluntary departure from his part-time position at McDonald's should not have disqualified him from the benefits he was receiving in relation to his separation from his computer programming position, especially since he left McDonald's to improve his computer programming credentials and seek work in his customary occupation.

Under K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 44–709(i), any action of the Board is subject to review in accordance with...