Johnson v. Kelly, Civ. A. No. 75-3103.
Court | United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania) |
Writing for the Court | Alfred O. Breinig, Jenkintown, Pa., for defendants |
Citation | 436 F. Supp. 155 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 75-3103. |
Decision Date | 11 July 1977 |
Parties | Doris E. JOHNSON et al. v. Robert F. KELLY et al. |
436 F. Supp. 155
Doris E. JOHNSON et al.
v.
Robert F. KELLY et al.
Civ. A. No. 75-3103.
United States District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.
July 11, 1977.
Alfred O. Breinig, Jenkintown, Pa., for defendants.
OPINION
DITTER, District Judge.
I. Introduction
This suit challenges certain tax sales conducted in Delaware County, Pennsylvania, pursuant to the County Return Act, Act of May 29, 1931, P.L. 280, as amended, 72 P.S. § 5971a et seq. The primary constitutional challenges to the Act are that it violates due process: (1) by failing to provide for a prior judicial determination of alleged delinquent property taxes before the tax sale is conducted and (2) by failing to require notice by personal service to the owner prior to sale.1 Although brought in one complaint the suit actually is three separate controversies involving three separate properties.2 The plaintiffs are two individuals
Upon filing this suit plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the imminent eviction of plaintiff Johnson and to enjoin the continuance of quiet title actions against plaintiffs Massey and the Tunstalls. By order of October 31, 1975, I denied the restraining order substantially for the reasons expressed later in this opinion, but counsel for the defendants agreed to proceed no further with the eviction or quiet title actions pending my final disposition of this matter. I also ordered the preliminary injunction motion consolidated with a hearing on the merits, directed the parties to submit a stipulation of uncontested facts, and requested briefs on the abstention issues, the request for class certification, and the merits of the constitutional challenge. Thereafter the parties filed comprehensive stipulations covering most of the relevant facts and I heard testimony over several days on the points in dispute.
I now conclude that in deference to the principles explained in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny the court must abstain from reaching the merits of this controversy and dismiss the complaint.5 Although
II. Factual Setting
A. Doris E. Johnson v. Grace Building Co.
Doris Johnson is an adult who resides at 155 North Ninth Street, Darby Borough, Delaware County, Pennsylvania. On October 27, 1969, this property was sold at a Delaware County Treasurer's Tax Sale for nonpayment of 1967 taxes. Although the fair market value at that time was approximately $10,000., defendant, Grace Building Company, purchased the property for $198.31. The record owner was Central Penn National Bank which held the property as trustee for Irene A. Worlds, the aunt of Mrs. Johnson. Mrs. Worlds had conveyed the property to Central Penn as trustee on January 20, 1965, and from 1965 until her death, Mrs. Worlds had lived with Mrs. Johnson in Camden, New Jersey. Although Mrs. Worlds died in 1968 leaving a will which named Mrs. Johnson as her sole heir, this will was not admitted to probate until November 18, 1969, after the tax sale.
As required by 72 P.S. § 5971g, prior to the tax sale the treasurer's office of Delaware County provided notice by publication and by certified mail to Central Penn. The certified mail notice was received by Central Penn on August 11, 1969, as reflected by the return receipt. Central Penn in turn forwarded this notice to Mrs. Johnson by regular mail letter dated August 18, 1969, but Mrs. Johnson has no recollection of receiving this letter and she did not see the published notice. Although not required by the statute, in accordance with its customary practice, in November, 1969, the treasurer's office notified Central Penn by regular mail of the sale of the property on October 27, 1969, and of the two-year right of redemption, i. e., that at any time for two years following the sale the property could be reclaimed by paying the delinquent taxes and certain costs. This notice was received by Central Penn as evidenced by a copy found in its files. Central Penn in turn forwarded this notice to Mrs. Johnson and her attorney by regular mail letters dated November 13 and 14, 1969, respectively, but again Mrs. Johnson has no recollection of receiving these letters.
After the completion of probate proceedings of Mrs. Worlds' will, Central Penn conveyed all its title in the property (which at this point amounted only to a right of redemption) to Mrs. Johnson by deed dated August 10, 1970. Thereafter, on August 7, 1971, Mrs. Johnson moved into the property and has continued to reside there.
Grace filed a complaint to quiet title and for possession of the premises in question against Mrs. Johnson on January 24, 1972, in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Although personal service of the complaint was made on Mrs. Johnson on February 1, 1972, she did not file an answer or in any way defend and on May 31, 1972, final judgment by default was entered against her. The instant suit was commenced by Mrs. Johnson and the other plaintiffs on October 31, 1975.6 Plaintiffs' counsel did not learn that the default judgment had been entered until after the complaint sub judice was filed. He has since filed a petition to have the default judgment opened,7 which is pending in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas.
B. Joseph L. Tunstall, Jr. and Mary Tunstall v. Curtis Building Company, Inc.
Mr. and Mrs. Tunstall are adults who reside at 67 Upland Road, Havertown, Delaware County, Pennsylvania. On May 31, 1961, the Tunstall's mortgaged this property to Havertown Savings and Loan Association, which has since merged with Penn Federal Savings and Loan Association, Inc. The mortgage provided for the customary escrowing arrangement whereby monthly payments including principal, interest and taxes were forwarded to the mortgagee which in turn was responsible for paying the property taxes each year. Accordingly, tax bills received by the Tunstalls were forwarded to Penn Federal.
Except in 1964 when they apparently had some difficulty, the Tunstalls have made their mortgage payments, including taxes, to the mortgagee since 1961.8 As far as appears herein, with the exception of 1966, tax bills received by the Tunstalls for each year from 1961 to at least 1971 were forwarded to the mortgagee which paid them. For some unexplained reason taxes for the year 1966 allegedly were not paid.9
Because of the nonpayment of 1966 taxes, the property in question was sold at treasurer's tax sale on October 28, 1968. Defendant Curtis Building Company purchased it for $424.44, subject to the balance of the Penn Federal mortgage, approximately $4,000. The property's fair market value as of the commencement of the instant lawsuit was approximately $30,000.
As required by Section 5971g, prior to the tax sale the treasurer's office provided notice by publication and by certified mail to the Tunstalls, the record owners. The certified mail notice was addressed to the Tunstalls at 67 Upland Road, Havertown, Pennsylvania, and the return receipt bears the signature "Mary E. Tunstall" and is dated August 6, 1968, but neither Mr. nor Mrs. Tunstall have any recollection of receiving it nor did they see the published notice. In accordance with its customary procedures on November 13, 1968, the treasurer's office notified the Tunstalls via regular mail that their property had been sold on October 28, 1968, and of their two-year right of redemption. Again, the Tunstalls have no recollection of receiving this notice.
Curtis filed a complaint to quiet title and for possession of the property on May 20, 1971, in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County. Although personal service in the quiet title action was made by leaving a copy of the complaint at the Tunstall's residence with their adult daughter, Elizabeth, on May 27, 1971, the Tunstalls did not defend against this action and a final judgment by default was entered on September 9, 1971. Subsequently the Tunstalls petitioned to have the judgment opened, which was granted on March 21, 1972. An answer was filed, the quiet title action proceeded to trial without a jury, and on September 12, 1972, the court entered a verdict in favor of the Tunstalls.10
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...(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978, 94 S.Ct. 1565, 39 L.Ed.2d 874 (1974); Lynch v. Snepp, supra; tax sales, Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155 (E.D.Pa.1977); an action to recover attorney's fees, Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968,......
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Johnson v. Kelly, No. 77-2225
...principles explained in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny . . . ." Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155, 158 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The named plaintiffs in this proposed class action, Doris E. Johnson, Joseph Massey, and Joseph and Mary Tunstal......
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CORPUS CHRISTI, ETC. v. Tex. Dept. of Human Resources, Civ. A. No. L-79-65.
...Com. v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., supra; Lang v. Berger, 427 F.Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y.1977). See also cases collected in Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155, 163-64 (E.D. Pa.1977). The Johnson case was reversed in Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1978) because the Third Circuit concluded ......
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JOSEPH L. v. Office of Judicial Support, Civ. A. No. 75-3103.
...of this suit. On July 11, 1977, I dismissed the complaint believing the facts fell within the abstention doctrine, Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155 (E.D.Pa.1977). I did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claims or issues concerning class certification. After the court of appeals rever......
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Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford v. Chaucer, Civ. No. H-77-553.
...(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978, 94 S.Ct. 1565, 39 L.Ed.2d 874 (1974); Lynch v. Snepp, supra; tax sales, Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155 (E.D.Pa.1977); an action to recover attorney's fees, Lamb Enterprises, Inc. v. Kiroff, 549 F.2d 1052 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 968,......
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Johnson v. Kelly, No. 77-2225
...principles explained in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny . . . ." Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155, 158 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The named plaintiffs in this proposed class action, Doris E. Johnson, Joseph Massey, and Joseph and Mary Tunstal......
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CORPUS CHRISTI, ETC. v. Tex. Dept. of Human Resources, Civ. A. No. L-79-65.
...Com. v. Nottingham Liquors, Ltd., supra; Lang v. Berger, 427 F.Supp. 204 (S.D.N.Y.1977). See also cases collected in Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155, 163-64 (E.D. Pa.1977). The Johnson case was reversed in Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1978) because the Third Circuit concluded ......
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JOSEPH L. v. Office of Judicial Support, Civ. A. No. 75-3103.
...of this suit. On July 11, 1977, I dismissed the complaint believing the facts fell within the abstention doctrine, Johnson v. Kelly, 436 F.Supp. 155 (E.D.Pa.1977). I did not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claims or issues concerning class certification. After the court of appeals rever......