Johnson v. Killian
Citation | 680 F.3d 234 |
Decision Date | 16 May 2012 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 10–4651–pr. |
Parties | Neil JOHNSON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Warden KILLIAN, Rabbi Laskin, Chaplain, D. Wynkoop, Defendants–Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit) |
680 F.3d 234
Neil JOHNSON, Plaintiff–Appellant,
v.
Warden KILLIAN, Rabbi Laskin, Chaplain, D. Wynkoop, Defendants–Appellees.
Docket No. 10–4651–pr.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Submitted: April 26, 2012.
Decided: May 16, 2012.
[680 F.3d 235]
Neil Johnson, Lisbon, OH, Plaintiff–Appellant, pro se.
Li Yu and Benjamin H. Torrance, Assistant United States Attorneys, Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants–Appellees.
Before: CALABRESI, CABRANES, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The question before us is whether the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Naomi Reice Buchwald, Judge ) properly granted summary judgment to defendants-appellees Warden Killian, Rabbi Laskin, and Case Manager Wynkoop 1 (jointly, “defendants”) based on its finding that plaintiff-appellant
[680 F.3d 236]
Neil Johnson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies through the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (the “PLRA”).
Johnson, pro se and incarcerated, appeals the final judgment of the District Court entered August 26, 2010, granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on Johnson's claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), for violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1 (“RFRA”). Because we find that Johnson did indeed exhaust his administrative remedies, we vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We review de novo an order of a district court granting or denying summary judgment. See, e.g., Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir.2010). Summary judgment is warranted only upon a showing “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). In determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact, “we are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137 (2d Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, “conclusory statements or mere allegations [are] not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Davis v. New York, 316 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.2002). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Johnson, a follower of Islam, was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York (“FCI Otisville”) from at least 2005 to August 2007. During that period, FCI Otisville had two wardens—Warden Menifee until early 2007 and Warden Killian starting in April 2007.
Beginning in 2005, there was a policy at FCI Otisville that restricted Muslim inmates' ability to perform regular congregational prayers. Specifically, Johnson's religious beliefs require participation in congregational prayer five times a day. Under the FCI Otisville policy, however, the prison chapel was available only once a day and no other space within the facility was made available to Johnson and others of his faith.2
In February 2005, Johnson filed and exhausted an administrative grievance concerning limitations on congregational prayer at FCI Otisville. Menifee denied Johnson's administrative grievance, and Johnson exhausted his appeals.3 Soon after Johnson exhausted the administrative remedy process as to his 2005 grievance,
[680 F.3d 237]
FCI Otisville substantially ceased enforcing the relevant policy.
In April 2007, Killian replaced Menifee as warden of FCI Otisville. After Killian's arrival, the policy restricting congregational prayer was reimplemented and consistently enforced, limiting Muslim prisoners to performing congregational prayer only one time a day, five days a week, in the chapel. According to the amended complaint, on April 12, 2007, several Muslim inmates, including Johnson, were engaged in congregational prayer in the housing unit when a corrections officer informed them that they could not perform prayer at that location. A few minutes later, Johnson was called to Wynkoop's office, at which time she informed him that if she heard that he was participating in such a congregational prayer again she would write him an incident report. The encounter allegedly prompted Johnson to file the instant suit. Johnson did not file an additional administrative grievance to challenge Killian's renewed enforcement of FCI Otisville's pre-existing policy.
On July 24, 2007, Johnson filed a complaint in the District Court, alleging that his rights under RFRA had been violated. He filed an amended complaint on January 31, 2008, naming eight additional FCI Otisville inmates as plaintiffs. The amended complaint alleged that: “Sometime in 2005, ... the administration at Otisville began enforcing an institutional policy which denied the Muslims the right to perform congregational prayers in the housing unit.... [Defendants] placed a substantial burden on the practicing of a tenet of the Muslims at Otisville, by not allowing them to pray in congregation...
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Part two: case summaries by major topic.
...(District of Columbia Central Detention Facility) U.S. Appeals Court EXHAUSTION PLRA-Prison Litigation Reform Act Johnson v. Killian, 680 F.3d 234 (2nd Cir. 2012). A federal prisoner brought an action against a warden, prison rabbi, and prison chaplain alleging violation of his rights under......