Johnson v. Lindsey

Decision Date21 February 1925
PartiesJOHNSON v. LINDSEY, Sheriff.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Error to Circuit Court, Pinellas County; M. A. McMullen, Judge.

Petition by Theodore Johnson for writ of habeas corpus to be directed to W. S. Lindsey, Sheriff of Pinellas County. Judgment sustaining motion to quash writ, and remanding petitioner was rendered, and he brings error.

Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Motion does not lie to quash writ because of defects in petition on which issued; inquiry on habeas corpus is as to legality of alleged detention; on habeas corpus, parties may go outside matters set forth in petition and inquire into any matter affecting legality of detention. We know of no such practice as that of moving to quash a writ of habeas corpus because of defects in the petition upon which it was issued. The inquiry in such cases is not as to the technical formality of the showing made to the court for the issuance of the writ, but as to the legality of the alleged detention of the prisoner. In such inquiry the parties are not limited to the matters specifically set forth in the petition for the writ, but may go outside of these and inquire into any matter that affects the legality of the detention.

Necessary showing by petitioner alleging unlawful detention because of invalidity of process or proceedings, stated; on denial of allegation of petition for habeas corpus because of invalidity of process or proceedings under which prisoner is held, proof of what occurred in former proceedings must be shown by records. If a petitioner in habeas corpus contends that his detention is unlawful because of the invalidity of the process or proceedings under which he is held, copies of such processes or proceedings should be annexed to, or the essential parts thereof set out in, the petition, and it is not necessary for him to attach certified copies or authenticated records of such processes and proceedings; but if the allegations of the petition are denied, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove by the records what occurred in the former proceedings.

When doctrine of res judicata is applicable in habeas corpus proceedings, stated. In habeas corpus proceedings, the doctrine of res adjudicata is not applicable where it is shown on a second application that a state of facts or condition exist different from those that existed at the time the first judgment of discharge was rendered, but it does apply to a judgment discharging a prisoner where no new state of facts or change of conditions is shown.

Lies where original legal detention has become illegal through matters ex post facto; habeas corpus lies to secure release of one who has served sentence under judgment of conviction or when judgment has been reversed; habeas corpus lies where judgment under which defendant in civil action is arrested and confined is thereafter satisfied and prisoner is not promptly released. Habeas corpus will lie where the original detention was legal, but has become illegal by reason of matters ex post facto, as where the prisoner has been pardoned; or where a person is restrained of his liberty under a judgment of conviction containing a sentence which has been served, or when the judgment under which he was imprisoned has been reversed. Likewise, where the judgment under which a defendant in a civil action is arrested and confined is thereafter satisfied, the defendant, if he is not promptly released, may sue out a writ of habeas corpus and obtain his discharge.

COUNSEL

Macfarlane & Pettingill, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.

Rivers Buford, Atty. Gen., and Marvin C. McIntosh, Asst. Atty. Gen for defendant in error.

OPINION

BROWNE J.

Theodore Johnson, convicted in Pinellas county on the 16th of January, 1923, of unlawfully having in his possession intoxicating liquor, was sentenced to pay a fine of $400, and to serve a period of six months in the county jail.

The court added to its sentence, 'but the six (6) months in the county jail be suspended on the good behavior of Theodore Johnson.'

On the 3d day of July, 1924, a commitment was issued upon the judgment and sentence imposed on the 16th of January, 1923, and the sheriff of Hillsborough county took the petitioner in custody. No commitment was issued prior to the 3d day of July, 1924. The defendant Johnson remained continuously in the county of Pinellas, and was not taken in custody nor confined in jail, although the judgment and sentence went into operation on the 16th of January, 1923, when the sentence was imposed.

On the 3d of July, 1924, the sheriff of Pinellas county took the petitioner in custody and delivered him to the sheriff of Hillsborough county, who was to deliver him to the superintendent of convicts of Hillsborough county to work upon the public roads of that county, under an arrangement existing between the county commissioners of Hillsborough and Pinellas counties, whereby a person sentenced to hard labor in the county jail of Pinellas county should be transferred to Hillsborough county to serve his sentence.

The commitment was not issued until nearly 18 months after the sentence of 6 months' imprisonment was imposed, notwithstanding the prisoner remained in Pinellas county all that time, and could have been taken in custody by the sheriff at any time, and confined in jail under the terms of the sentence.

While the prisoner was in the custody of the sheriff of Hillsborough county, he applied for and obtained a writ of habeas corpus.

Prior to a hearing on the writ, notice was given to the state attorney of the Thirteenth circuit for Hillsborough county, that petitioner had applied for and obtained a writ of habeas corpus, and that Hon. F. M. Robles, judge of that court, had ordered the production of the body of Johnson before him on July 9, 1924.

There was a hearing before Judge Robles, at which time it is alleged that C. B. Parkhill, state attorney for the Thirteenth circuit, was present.

The sheriff of Hillsborough county made return to the writ that he was holding Johnson in custody by virtue of a commitment issued out of the county court of Pinellas county, and that Johnson had been delivered to him, together with the commitment, by the sheriff of Pinellas county, with directions that Johnson should be delivered to the superintendent of convicts of Hillsborough county pursuant to an arrangement between the county commissioners of Hillsborough county and Pinellas county, whereby county convicts of Pinellas county are contracted to work on the public roads of Hillsborough county.

A copy of the commitment was attached to the sheriff's return, from which it appeared that it was to enforce the penalty imposed by the county court of Pinellas county on January 16, 1923.

After hearing arguments of counsel for petitioner and the state attorney, the circuit judge found that Johnson had 'fully expiated the sentence imposed upon him by the county court of Pinellas county, Fla., on the 16th day of January, 1923, under and by virtue of which judgment and sentence the commitment in the possession of W. C. Spencer, sheriff of Hillsborough county, was issued under the alleged authority whereof the said Spencer (sheriff) as aforesaid claims to hold petitioner; that the said petitioner, Theodore Johnson, is unlawfully deprived of his liberty within the limits of Hillsborough county, Fla., within the jurisdiction of this court, and no sufficient cause for the detention of Theodore Johnson appearing,' it was 'ordered and adjudged that in view of the expiation of the sentence aforesaid and the unlawful imprisonment of the petitioner Theodore Johnson as aforesaid, that W. C. Spencer, sheriff of Hillsborough county, Fla., the respondent named in said petition, be and he is hereby ordered forthwith to release and discharge said Theodore Johnson from the imprisonment and detention under the commitment aforesaid.'

The petitioner avers that immediately upon the issuance of the order of the circuit judge that he be discharged from custody, he was rearrested by the sheriff of Hillsborough county and delivered to the sheriff of Pinellas county, and by him confined in jail in Pinellas county. Whereupon he applied for and obtained a writ of habeas...

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8 cases
  • Whitney v. State, 65-401
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • March 8, 1966
    ...applicable only to those items Actually raised in the prior proceedings, and not to new grounds. In this connection, see: Johnson v. Lindsey, 89 Fla. 143, 103 So. 419; Washington v. Mayo, Fla.1955, 77 So.2d 620; Piehl v. State, Fla.App.1965, 173 So.2d 723; Weeks v. State, Fla.App.1966, 181 ......
  • Chase v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Florida
    • May 2, 1927
    ...of these and inquire into any matter that affects the legality of the detention. Crooms v. Schad, 51 Fla. 168, 40 So. 497; Johnson v. Lindsey, 89 Fla. 143, 103 So. 419. petition, however, in this case complies with the spirit and meaning of the language of section 3571, and undoubtedly cons......
  • Hall v. Florida State Dept. of Public Welfare
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • July 25, 1969
    ...360; State ex rel. McLean v. Coleman, 1939, 138 Fla. 689, 190 So. 34.14 Matera v. Buchanan, Fla.App.1966, 192 So.2d 18; Johnson v. Lindsey, 1925, 89 Fla. 143, 103 So. 419; Coleman v. State ex rel. Race, 1935, 118 Fla. 201, 159 So. 504.15 State ex rel. Copeland v. Mayo, Fla.1956, 87 So.2d ...
  • Jenrette v. Wainwright, 81-2149
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
    • February 16, 1982
    ...imprisonment claimed to have been rendered invalid by later events, see, e.g., Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So.2d 865 (Fla.1953); Johnson v. Lindsey, 89 Fla. 143, 103 So. 419 (1925), and the proper method of challenging the validity of a presumptive parole release date when the prisoner claims his ent......
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