Johnson v. Liquor Control Comm'n
| Decision Date | 28 April 1934 |
| Docket Number | Motion No. 247. |
| Citation | 254 N.W. 557,266 Mich. 682 |
| Parties | JOHNSON v. LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from order of Liquor Control Commission.
Petition by Jesse Johnson for a writ of mandamus to compel the Liquor Control Commission to vacate its order revoking a liquor license issued to him.
Petition denied.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
Clyde W. Ketcham, of Kalamazoo, for plaintiff.
Patrick H. O'Brien, Atty, Gen., and Judson E. Richardson and William L. Brunner, Asst. Attys, Gen., for defendant.
Jesse Johnson, proprietor and owner of the City Hotel, in Allegan, Mich., seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Liquor Control Commission to vacate and set aside its order of March 1, 1934, revoking a liquor license issued to him on May 1, 1933. The revocation was made in accordance with a resolution of the city council of Allegan, requesting the commission to revoke plaintiff's license. Plaintiff does not allege that the action of the common council was either arbitrary or capricious, nor does he raise the question as to whether he would be entitled to resort to the courts were the council's action of that character. However, plaintiff assails the constitutionality of that part of section 17 of Act No. 8, Public Acts 1933, First Extra Session, immediately following the provision in regard to the issuance of licenses, which reads as follows: ‘Provided, however, that all applications for licenses to sell beer and/or wine and/or spirits for consumption on the premises shall be approved by the local legislative body in which said applicant's place of business is located before being granted a license by the commission: Provided further, That upon request of the local legislative body, the commission shall revoke the license of any licensee granted a license to sell beer and/or wine and/or spirits for consumption on the premises: Provided further, That these provisos shall not apply in counties having a population of five hundred thousand or over, according to the last federal census.’
Plaintiff contends that the mandatory direction to the commission to revoke the license of any licensee upon the request of the local legislative body is unconstitutional and void in the following respects: (1) It deprives the Liquor Control Commission of absolute control, and is an illegal delegation of a part of the powers of the commission to another body not contemplated by the constitutional amendment; (2) it impairs the obligations of plaintiff's alleged contract; (3) it deprives him of property without due process of law.
The constitutional amendment adopted at the general election on November 8, 1932, and known as section 11, article 16, of the state Constitution, is as follows: ‘The legislature may be law establish a liquor control commission, who, subject to statutory limitations, shall exercise complete control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within this state,’ etc. It will be noted that the amendment gives to the Legislature the right to impose such limitations as it may deem proper upon the control to be exercised by the commission. Accordingly, the Legislature has provided in section 20 of Act No. 8, supra, that the Liquor Control Commission may revoke licenses for any violation of the provisions of the act, but requires the commission to provide a proceeding by which any licensee claiming to have been aggrieved may have a hearing, etc. In addition, under the statute, the granting of licenses in counties of less than five hundred thousand is subject to the approval of the local legislative body. It is also subject to repeal by the commission upon the demand for revocation by the local legislative body.
We believe that this latter provision is not an invalid delegation of power. It is merely a statutory limitation properly imposed by the Legislature, in accordance with the constitutional mandate, upon the power to be exercised by the commission. A licensee in counties of less than five hundred thousand accepts his license subject to these conditions. The very nature of the liquor business is such that local communities, as a matter of policy, should be permitted to regulate the traffic within their own bounds in the proper exercise of their police powers, subject to the larger control of the Liquor Commission as to those matters wherein the commission is given exclusive powers by the Legislature. While the Legislature, as a general rule, cannot delegate its legislative powers, it may confer upon municipal...
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