Johnson v. LOCAL UNION NO. 58, INTER. BRO. OF ELEC. WKRS., 19434.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1960
• Docket Number: No. 19434.,19434.
• Citation: 181 F. Supp. 734
• Parties: Edwin L. JOHNSON, Herbert K. Brandon, Irving Taylor, John Lepaule, Wesley Nichols, William R. Brown, Rodger D. Ketterman and Floyd E. Hawkins, Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 58, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Robert Rushford, Daniel Dimond and Joseph Laplante, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

181 F. Supp. 734

Edwin L. JOHNSON, Herbert K. Brandon, Irving Taylor, John Lepaule, Wesley Nichols, William R. Brown, Rodger D. Ketterman and Floyd E. Hawkins, Plaintiffs, v. LOCAL UNION NO. 58, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, Robert Rushford, Daniel Dimond and Joseph Laplante, Defendants.

No. 19434.

United States District Court E. D. Michigan, S. D.

February 10, 1960.

Wallace D. McLay, Houston & McLay, Pontiac, Mich., for plaintiffs.

A. L. Zwerdling, Zwerdling & Zwerdling, Detroit, Mich., for defendants.

FREEMAN, District Judge.

This motion to dismiss the complaint arises out of a suit brought under certain sections of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, P.L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, Chapter 11, Title 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq. In essence, the complaint alleges that the plaintiffs, several of whom appear to be members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers residing in Oakland County, Michigan, have been assembling for the purpose of petitioning the International Brotherhood for a local charter for Oakland County and that the defendants have disturbed such meetings and "have been intimidating and threatening the plaintiffs in their job and personal security." The principal relief prayed for is an injunction restraining the defendants and their agents and representatives, etc., "from attending any of plaintiffs' meetings, loitering in or near the vicinity of plaintiffs' meetings, discriminating against any of the plaintiffs in their job right pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of Local Union No. 58, or threatening or intimidating any of the plaintiffs."

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, supported by thirteen separate grounds. Careful consideration of all these grounds discloses that eight grounds, some of which were not urged on oral argument, are insufficient to support the motion. This leaves for further consideration only the five grounds which, in essence, allege unconstitutionality of § 101(a) (2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 411(a) (2), failure to exhaust internal union remedies, lack of jurisdiction as far as this suit concerns plaintiffs who are not members of a labor organization, failure to allege sufficient facts to support a class action, and failure to allege a cause of action as far as the complaint asks for protection from job-right discrimination.

The argument with regard to the alleged unconstitutionality of § 101(a) (2) is that that section attempts to regulate the internal affairs of a labor organization and therefore is outside the scope of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

The section in issue provides, in pertinent part:

"Every member of any labor organization shall have the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; * * *."

Since § 102 of the same Act gives a cause of action to persons whose rights under § 101 have been infringed, it appears that, in effect, Congress has prohibited undue interference with the freedom of speech and assembly of members of a labor organization. If such interference is brought about by the labor organization, § 101(a) (2) may then correctly be characterized as regulating the "internal affairs" of a labor organization. It is not apparent, however, how such a characterization must ipso facto place § 101(a) (2) outside the scope of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. The test is not how the area regulated may be characterized, but whether the activities or relationships so regulated have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.

No claim was made by the defendants that the labor organization involved in this action is not one engaged in an industry affecting commerce, as defined by § 3(i) of the same Act. The court finds that the defendants have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality attached to a statute passed by the Congress of the United States and further finds that the alleged disturbances of meetings and the alleged threats to plaintiffs' job and personal security in the present action affect interstate commerce in such a manner as to bring the enactment of § 101(a) (2) within the well defined scope of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.

Defendants also claim that this court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter because plaintiffs have failed to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures within the defendant labor organization, contrary to the proviso of § 101(a) (4), which provides:

"Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization, before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such organizations or any officer thereof. * *"

It appears from the oral arguments heard in connection with this motion that the applicable hearing procedures are set forth in the constitution of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (1958). Article XXVII, § 9, of the constitution provides that complaints against a local officer charged with an "offense" must be filed with the International Vice President of the appropriate district. Thereafter, the aggrieved party may appeal to the...