Johnson v. Louisiana Dept. of Labor

• Decision Date: 14 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98 CA 0690.,98 CA 0690.
• Citation: 737 So.2d 898
• Parties: Brenton P. JOHNSON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US

737 So.2d 898

Brenton P. JOHNSON v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION.

No. 98 CA 0690.

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

May 14, 1999.

John B. Lambremont, L. Stephen Rastanis, Frederick A. Stolzle, Jr., Baton Rouge, LA, and John L. Grayson, Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., Houston, TX, for plaintiff-appellant Brenton P. Johnson.

Kim M. Hoffman, Office of Attorney General, Baton Rouge, LA, for defendant-appellee Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation.

Jack M. Alltmont, Raymond P. Ward, Sessions & Fishman, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, for intervenor-appellee SSX, L.C.

BEFORE: LeBLANC, FOGG, and PARRO, JJ.

PARRO, J.

Brenton P. Johnson appeals judgments granting the defendant's peremptory exception of no cause of action,¹ granting the joint motion of defendant and intervenor to quash depositions, granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and dismissing his petition for declaratory judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On October 16, 1995, Johnson filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer, Southern Scrap Material Company, Inc. (Southern Scrap), claiming compensation and medical benefits for alleged job-related exposure to toxic substances. On Friday, August 9, 1996, Johnson filed a motion for leave to supplement his claim to request class certification for all present and former Southern Scrap employees or contract employees with similar claims. On Monday, August 12, 1996, the director of the Office of Workers' Compensation issued an emergency rule providing that no class actions would be permitted in workers' compensation cases in Louisiana.² Relying on this emergency rule, on August 13, 1996, the workers' compensation judge handling Johnson's case denied his motion for leave to file the supplemental petition requesting class action certification.³

On February 24, 1997, Johnson filed this lawsuit against the Louisiana Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC), seeking a declaratory judgment that the emergency rule was invalid, because it was adopted without any imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare, which are the statutory criteria for adoption of emergency rules. He further alleged that the OWC had not met other statutory requirements, because it failed to issue and promulgate a sufficient statement of its reasons for adopting the rule.

The OWC responded to the petition by filing a peremptory exception of no cause of action, claiming the petition should be dismissed because the emergency rule being challenged no longer existed. It had been replaced by a permanent rule to the same effect, which was duly promulgated and published in the January 20, 1997 Louisiana Register as Louisiana Administrative Code 40:2123(D).⁴ The OWC argued that, because Johnson's petition for declaratory judgment was filed after the permanent, final rule had already become effective, his challenge to the "non-existent emergency rule" did not state a cause of action.

In response to this exception, Johnson supplemented and amended his petition to allege the final rule was also invalid, because the regulation exceeded the authority of the OWC, was inconsistent with Louisiana laws permitting class actions, and violated the Louisiana Constitution. The OWC filed a dilatory exception of vagueness, and Johnson particularized his allegations in a second supplemental and amended petition. A petition of intervention was filed by SSX, L.C., the successor in interest to Southern Scrap and past employer of Johnson (hereafter jointly referred to as Southern Scrap), stating it was aligned with the OWC in opposing Johnson's petition for declaratory judgment. After filing an answer, the OWC moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Johnson's petition.

Johnson excepted to the OWC's motion for summary judgment as premature and moved for a continuance so adequate discovery could be had. Johnson had scheduled the depositions of the director and assistant director of the OWC. The OWC and Southern Scrap jointly moved to quash the depositions. Johnson obtained leave of court to file a third supplemental and amending petition, seeking an additional declaration that the newly promulgated rule could not be retroactively applied to his case to deny class action certification.

All of the pending motions and exceptions were heard on December 1, 1997. At that hearing, the court denied Johnson's exception of prematurity and granted the motion to quash the depositions on the basis that there were no relevant facts that could be discovered that would affect the court's ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Because a permanent rule had been adopted, the court granted the OWC's exception of no cause of action as to the emergency rule. The court also granted the OWC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Johnson's petition. In oral reasons for judgment, the judge noted that, although he personally disagreed with the rationale behind the rule, there appeared to be a rational basis for excluding class action procedures in workers' compensation cases, and therefore the rule was not unconstitutional.

This appeal followed. Johnson claims the trial court erred in quashing the depositions and ruling on the motion for summary judgment without allowing him any discovery whatsoever. He also assigns as error the trial court's conclusion that the OWC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Johnson alleges the facts suggest there was ex parte contact between a party to an adversarial adjudication proceeding and the state agency administering the adjudication, and therefore discovery should have been allowed so the existence and nature of any such contact could be determined. He also suggests that, in the interests of due process, the prohibition against certain ex parte contacts found in LSA-R.S. 49:960 should be interpreted as prohibiting contacts between a party to an adjudication and members of the rule-making agency.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether a summary judgment is appropriate. Guillory v. Interstate Gas Station, 94-1767 (La.3/30/95), 653 So.2d 1152, 1155. A motion for summary judgment is properly granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). The summary judgment procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of actions. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2); Robertson v. Northshore Regional Medical Ctr., 97-2068 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/25/98), 723 So.2d 460, 463.

The initial burden of proof is on the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). However, once the mover has made a prima facie showing that the motion should be granted, if the non-movant bears the burden of proof at trial on the issue before the court, the burden shifts to him to present evidence demonstrating that genuine issues of material fact remain. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2); J. Ray McDermott, Inc. v. Morrison, 96-2337 (La. App. 1st Cir.11/7/97), 705 So.2d 195, 202, writs denied, 97-3055, 97-3062 (La.2/13/98), 709 So.2d 753, 754.

DISCUSSION

In briefs and oral argument, Johnson vigorously attacks the sequence of events leading to the adoption of the emergency rule prohibiting the use of class actions in workers' compensation cases. His supplemental petition asking for class certification was filed on a Friday afternoon; by Monday morning, the emergency rule prohibiting the use of such proceedings in workers' compensation litigation had been adopted. The thrust of his arguments is that the rapidity with which this was accomplished strongly suggests that some ex parte communication occurred over that weekend between representatives of Southern Scrap and someone at the OWC, resulting in the adoption of the emergency rule. The depositions that Johnson had scheduled of OWC's director and assistant director were to be directed toward discovery of any such contacts. Johnson contends that if such ex parte communications occurred, those contacts were a violation of statutory law.⁵ His basic premise is that, if the promulgation of the emergency rule was tainted by such irregularities, his rights to due process were violated.

In the context of an administrative proceeding, ex parte communications are discussed in LSA-R.S. 49:960(A), which states:

Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized by law, members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case of adjudication noticed and docketed for hearing shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact or law, with any party or his representative, or with any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of investigative, prosecuting, or advocating functions, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.

In Johnson's brief to this court, he acknowledged that his research did not reveal any jurisprudence interpreting this provision as prohibiting ex parte contacts between a party to an adjudication and persons making rules governing the adjudication process. Our research similarly revealed that the jurisprudence has applied this prohibition to communications involving any issue of...