Johnson v. Lumpkin
| Decision Date | 23 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:19-CV-2310-E |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
| Parties | MATTHEW JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. BOBBY LUMPKIN, Director, Respondent. |
Petitioner Matthew Johnson filed this federal habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his October 2013 Dallas County conviction for capital murder and sentence of death. For the reasons set forth below, Johnson is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief or a Certificate of Appealability from this court. Johnson's motions for recusal will likewise be denied.
On February 28, 2022, Johnson filed an original and an amended motion for recusal (ECF nos. 41 & 42), arguing that this court's denials of his motions for modification of the scheduling order and denials of his motion for stay and abeyance revealed disqualifying judicial bias.
Judicial rulings such as this court's denials of Johnson's motion asking for an indefinite stay of these proceedings until the end of the current Covid-19 epidemic (i.e., his motion for modification of the scheduling order) and his motions requesting a stay and abeyance are the type of rulings which almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion. Liteky v. United States 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). They may be proper grounds for appeal but not for recusal. Id. Procedural rulings made by a trial judge and even admonishments of a party and its counsel do not ordinarily furnish a basis for recusal. Id., at 556; Garcia v. City of Laredo Tex., 702 F.3d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56); Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 540-41 (5th Cir, 2009) ().
Johnson's request for an indefinite stay of all proceedings in this case until such time as Johnson subjectively believed the current respiratory virus pandemic reached sufficient level of control to permit litigation of Johnson's federal habeas corpus claims was rejected by this court for many of the same reasons Judge Sam Lindsay rejected a remarkably similar open-ended motion for an indefinite stay in Brown v. Lumpkin, 2021 WL 3847491, cause no. 3:19CV2301 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2021). As was true in Brown, Johnson cited no governing legal authority recognizing an absolute right on his part to wait until the final day of the applicable one-year statute of limitations established by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), before filing his original federal habeas corpus petition. A federal habeas petitioner possesses no right to wait until the very last day of the applicable one-year statute of limitations before filing his initial federal habeas corpus petition.[1] Such an interpretation of the AEDPA would be inconsistent with the congressional intent underlying its passage. The Supreme Court has recognized the AEDPA was enacted to advance the finality of state court criminal judgments, streamline federal habeas proceedings, and reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276 (2005); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003). Given the limitations on the scope of federal habeas corpus claims available under the AEDPA, this court's refusal to indefinitely stay all proceedings in this cause may furnish Johnson with a basis for appeal but it does not furnish a basis for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56. Likewise, this court's denial of Johnson's motion for stay and abeyance does not furnish a basis for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455. Id.
This court's admonishment to Johnson's counsel of the responsibilities imposed by Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P. also does not furnish a basis for recusal. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556; Garcia, 702 F.3d at 794. This court's warning to Johnson's federal habeas counsel regarding Rule 11 was no different from Judge David Godbey's warning to federal habeas counsel in Williams v. Lumpkin, 339 F.R.D. 383, 386-91 (N.D. Tex. 2021), that asserting claims (challenges to the validity of the Texas capital sentencing statute) which have routinely been rejected on the merits by federal district courts and consistently held to be unworthy of a Certificate of Appealability by the Fifth Circuit could give rise to the imposition of sanctions under Rule 11. It is perfectly legitimate, and consistent with Rule 11, for counsel to raise legal arguments which they know are foreclosed by applicable Circuit authority; in doing so, however, counsel are obligated under Rule 11 to acknowledge the existence of adverse governing Circuit authority. Id.
For example, in Gamboa v. Davis, 2016 WL 4413280, cause no. SA-15-CA-113 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 2016), CoA denied, 728 Fed.Appx. 297 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2019), a federal habeas petitioner presented many of the same clearly meritless challenges to the constitutionality of the Texas capital sentencing statute raised by Johnson in his pleadings in this case. Unlike Johnson's pleadings, however, Gamboa's federal habeas pleadings candidly admitted that governing Fifth Circuit authority foreclosed those claims. More recently, in United States v. Lindsey, 2022 WL 458385 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2022), Lindsey's counsel acknowledged that one of his claims on appeal was foreclosed by the holding in United States v. Herrell, 941 F.3d 172, 182 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Lindsey explained, however, that he was raising the issue to preserve it for further review. Unlike Gamboa and Lindsey, Johnson's federal habeas pleadings do not acknowledge the existence of governing Fifth Circuit authority adverse to Johnson's challenges to the Texas capital sentencing statute. Nor have Johnson's federal habeas counsel explained they raised his claims challenging the Texas capital sentencing statute for the sole purpose of preserving legal challenges for further review. Therefore, this court's reiteration of Judge Godbey's warning regarding Rule 11 was fully appropriate and does not furnish an arguable basis for recusal under Section 455.
The grim facts of Johnson's capital offense are not in genuine dispute. They were recorded on a store surveillance camera and played for the jury at Johnson's capital murder trial. In May 2012, Johnson entered a convenience store and poured a bottle of what was later determined to be lighter fluid over the head of 76-year-old store clerk Nancy Harris. Johnson then demanded money. As Harris attempted to open the cash register, Johnson took two cigarette lighters, two packages of cigarettes, and a ring from Harris' finger. Once Harris opened the cash register, Johnson took the money and then set Harris aflame. As Harris frantically attempted to extinguish herself and her clothing, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion accurately described the video as showing Johnson “calmly” walk out of the store. Ex parte Johnson, WR-87, 574-01, 2019 WL 4317046 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11, 2019).[2] Police officers arrived at the convenience store very quickly and used a fire extinguisher to put out the flaming Harris, who died five days later from her burns. A little more than an hour after setting Harris afire, Johnson was arrested shirtless carrying two new cigarette lighters, two packages of cigarettes, and Harris' ring. Police noted his unusually calm demeanor during his transport to the police station, corroborated by a video which was also played for the jury.
On June 21, 2012, a Dallas County grand jury indicted Johnson on one count of capital murder, i.e., intentionally causing the death of Nancy Harris, on or about May 20, 2012, by setting Harris on fire using a deadly weapon, to wit fire and an accelerant, while in the course of committing and attempting to commit the robbery of Harris.[3]
The guilt-innocence phase of Johnson's capital murder trial began on October 28, 2013. The jury watched the video-only portion of the store surveillance video-recording of Johnson's offense and the video and audio of Johnson's post-arrest ride in a patrol car. Harris' store manager testified that Harris had been trained to cooperate with robbers and that after viewing the store video, it appeared to her that Harris had complied with all of Johnson's requests before Johnson set her afire.[4] Harris's son identified a ring found in Johnson's possession at the time of his arrest as belonging to Harris and testified that Harris was diabetic and had a pacemaker.[5] A resident of the neighborhood where the robbery took place testified that, on the morning of the robbery, he observed a shirtless man pushing a bicycle which was later abandoned on a street corner and he also found a tee shirt inside a garbage bin.[6]
A homeowner testified that minutes after the robbery, Johnson knocked on his front door and then unsuccessfully attempted to force his way inside the man's home.[7] Another local homeowner testified that he encountered Johnson, who was shirtless and wearing glasses, trying to get inside his gate on the morning of the robbery; he retreated inside his home when Johnson approached; and when another person inside his home came to the door, Johnson turned and ran off.[8] A number of police officers and fire personnel testified about their response to Harris exiting her store while aflame and their efforts to chase and arrest Johnson as he attempted to flee from the scene with a bicycle and then on foot.[9] Laboratory examination of the tee shirt recovered by law enforcement officers from a garbage can just blocks from the...
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