Johnson v. Massey
| Decision Date | 23 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 4:20cv410-MW-MAF |
| Parties | ROBERT JOHNSON, D.O.C. #L10847, Plaintiff, v. CAPTAIN A. MASSEY, SERGEANT A. DOWDEN, and OFFICER BROWN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
SECOND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
In February 2022, a Report and Recommendation, ECF No. 48, was entered on Defendants' first summary judgment motion, ECF No. 45, recommending that the motion be granted as to Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim for the use of excessive force. ECF No. 48. It was further recommended that the case be remanded for further proceedings on Plaintiff's remaining claims for retaliation, failure to protect, and state law claims for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress which were not addressed in the summary judgment motion. ECF No. 28 at 25-26. In March 2022, the Report and Recommendation was rejected, ECF No. 51, and the case was remanded to consider the effect of the chemical agents on Plaintiff, whether there was a question of material fact, and to consider issues related to Plaintiff's damages.[1]
The parties were given leave to file supplemental motions for summary judgment. ECF No. 53. After doing so, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting leave to file an amended civil rights complaint, ECF No. 56. In particular, Plaintiff sought to add a request for compensatory damages. Id. at 2. Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff's motion stating they had no objection to Plaintiff's request to “modify the punitive and nominal damages” request. ECF No. 59 at 2. However, Defendants opposed Plaintiff's effort to request compensatory damages. Id. Plaintiff's motion was ultimately granted and Plaintiff's amended complaint, ECF No. 61, is now the operative pleading.
Plaintiff proceeds against the three named Defendants, each of whom is sued in his or her individual capacity. ECF No. 61 at 1. He asserts five claims: (1) retaliation under the First Amendment; (2) failure to protect under the Eighth Amendment; (3) excessive force under the Eighth Amendment; (4) state law claim for assault and battery; and (5) state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ECF No. 61 at 18. As relief, Plaintiff seeks nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. Id. at 19.
Defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint, ECF No. 64 followed by a second supplemental motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 67. Plaintiff was reminded again of his obligation to respond to the summary judgment motion. ECF No 68. Plaintiff's response, ECF No. 69, was timely filed and the motion is ready for a ruling.[2]
“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Thus, summary judgment is proper “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Here, the parties were given from April 6, 2021, through August 17, 2021, to conduct discovery. ECF Nos. 22, 42.[3]
The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party must then show though affidavits or other Rule 56 evidence “that there is a genuine issue for trial” or “an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2554; Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006).
An issue of fact is “material” if it could affect the outcome of the case. Hickson Corp. v. Northern Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Additionally, “the issue of fact must be ‘genuine'” and the non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (other citations omitted). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)). All reasonable inferences must be resolved in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2020), and the Court must decide “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Hickson Corp., 357 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
“Summary judgment is not a time for fact-finding; that task is reserved for trial.” Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1263 (citing Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-57, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014)). “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511 (quoted in Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019)).
On the morning of July 4, 2018, between 8:30 and 10:00 a.m., Plaintiff was “accosted” by “several unknown inmates” on the recreation yard at Franklin Correctional Institution. ECF No. 61 at 7.[4] Plaintiff reports that the inmates, who were apparently members of different gangs, told Plaintiff that he was making “things hard for them” because Plaintiff had been writing grievances about staff “misconduct.” ECF No. 61 at 7. The inmates told Plaintiff that he had 24 hours to “remove himself from that institution or else they were going to kill him.” Id. Plaintiff alerted his dormitory sergeant to this issue and he was placed in administrative confinement pending placement in “protective management status.” Id.; ECF No. 47 at 47 (Plaintiff's declaration).[5]
On July 28th, Plaintiff was housed in Wing 2 Cell 113 when Defendant Dowden approached his cell between 6:00 - 7:00 p.m. and told Plaintiff that he “was getting a cellmate.” ECF No. 61 at 7-8; ECF No. 47 at 47 (Plaintiff's Declaration). Plaintiff “protested” and informed Defendant Dowden he was in “fear for [his] life because members of security were paying & coercing inmates . . . to threaten & kill him.” ECF No. 47 at 47; see also ECF No. 61 at 8.[6] Defendant Dowden told Plaintiff that he “did not have a choice” about getting a cellmate. ECF No. 61 at 8. Plaintiff asked to speak with the Officer in Charge [“OIC”] and Defendant Massey came to Plaintiff's cell. Id. She told Plaintiff he was getting a cellmate and she did not care if Plaintiff “was in fear for his life or not.” Id.
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, Defendants Massey, Dowden, and Brown returned to Plaintiff's cell with an “unknown white inmate” and ordered Plaintiff to submit to hand restraints. ECF No. 61 at 8. Plaintiff “repeatedly pleaded” to the Defendants, stating again that he was in fear for his life and could not consent to accepting the cellmate. Id. Defendant Massey then threatened Plaintiff with a disciplinary report and the use of chemical agents, causing Plaintiff to submit to hand restraints. Id. at 9. Restraints were placed on Plaintiff by Defendant Dowden, but after the cell door was opened, Plaintiff refused to “back away & permit the inmate to enter the cell with him.” Id. Plaintiff again said he was “in fear for his life.” Id. Plaintiff's door was secured, his hand restraints removed, and Defendants escorted the unknown inmate away. Id.
Moments later, Defendant Massey returned to Plaintiff's cell with Defendant Brown who held a camcorder. ECF No. 61 at 9. Defendant Massey ordered Plaintiff to cease his “disruptive behavior” and advised that if he did not cease, chemical agents would be used. Id. at 9-10. She then directed Defendant Brown to stop the video recording and ordered Plaintiff once again to submit to hand restraints. Id. at 10. Plaintiff complied and Defendants Massey and Brown removed Plaintiff from his cell. Id. Defendant Dowden then escorted the unknown white inmate into Plaintiff's cell. Id. Defendants then escorted Plaintiff to a holding cell outside of Wing 2. Id. Once there, and “away from all audio & video recording devices,” Defendants began threatening and insulting Plaintiff. Id. at 10-11. Defendant Massey told Plaintiff that she knew about a lawsuit he had filed against correctional officers at Calhoun Correctional Institution as well as the “numerous grievances” he had written against staff. Id. at 11. She told Plaintiff that she did not “give a damn if [Plaintiff] was in confinement or on the compound, they were going to get him one way or another because he was in their world [and] there was nothing that he could do about it.” Id.
Defendant Dowden called Plaintiff a “child molestor [sic]” and a “coward mother f-,” and promised that Plaintiff “would never make it...
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