Johnson v. Mau
Decision Date | 27 April 1931 |
Docket Number | 5907 |
Citation | 236 N.W. 472,60 N.D. 757 |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied May 19, 1931.
Appeal from the order of the District Court of Ransom County denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, Hutchinson, J.
Reversed and dismissed.
Kvello & Adams, for appellant.
When but one conclusion can reasonably be drawn from conceded facts the question of negligence is a question of law. Ferm v. Great N.R. Co. 53 N.D. 543, 207 N.W. 39; Costello v. Farmers Bank, 34 N.D. 131, 157 N.W. 982.
"Darkness is nature's own warning to arouse the natural instinct of self protection, the first law of nature." Central Pub. House v. Flury (Ohio) 157 N.E. 794.
The duty of exercising reasonable care even to an invitee to keep the premises safe does not extend to such parts of a building as are used for the private purposes of the owner. 33 A.L.R 228, note; Corbett v. Spanos (Cal.) 173 P. 769; Menteer v. Skalzo Fruit Co. (Mo.) 144 S.W. 833; Keeran v. Spurgeon Co. (Iowa) 191 N.W. 99, 27 A.L.R. 579.
In ordinary civil actions a fact at issue is sufficiently proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 38 Cyc. 755; 25 C.J. 12, 14.
"Persons who stray about other people's premises at their own will must look out for their safety in dangerous and unsafe places, or themselves suffer the consequences." Bedell v. Berkey, 76 Mich. 435, 15 Am. St. Rep. 370; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, 12 L. ed. 167, 41 A.L.R. 405.
Charles G. Bangert, for respondent.
". . . An owner or occupant of lands or buildings who directly or by implication invites or induces others to go thereon owes to such persons a duty to have his premises in a reasonably safe condition and to give warning of latent or concealed perils." 20 R.C.L. 55, 57, 66 and 67; Reis v. Abeles, L.R.A.1917E, 747; McCrum v. Weil & Co. 84 N.W. 282; Wilsey v. Jewett Bros. & Co. 98 N.W. 114; Reid v. Linck, 35 A. 849.
This is an action for personal injury. At the close of plaintiff's testimony there was a motion for a directed verdict which was overruled. At the close of all of the testimony there was a motion for a directed verdict and also a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of failure of proof, which motions were overruled and after verdict the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, which motion was overruled and the defendant appeals from the order of the district court denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
Defendant owns and operates a garage at Enderlin, North Dakota, fifty by seventy-five feet. The office is in the northwest corner of the building and there is a freight elevator diagonally across in the southeast corner of the building. On the west side and adjacent to the south end there is a door through which automobiles pass, a distance of thirty feet to the elevator where they are elevated to the second floor for repair. Sometimes the owner of an automobile brought there for repair will drive right into the garage through this door on the west side and on to the elevator, and frequently will stay in the car until it reaches the second floor. This elevator is used for no other purpose except to elevate cars to the second floor for repair and it is always run or operated by the employees at the garage. There are two, two-hundred candle-power electric lights, each with reflectors, for lighting the garage at night. They are about in the center of the garage east and west and one light is from twenty-five to thirty feet from the south end of the garage. The elevator in the garage is enclosed on three sides and on the west end of the elevator and facing the door which was thirty feet away there are double doors and on each side of each door there was a placard upon which appeared in one line "Danger," in another line "Keep Out," and in a third line "Elevator Shaft."
The plaintiff had made arrangements with the defendant for the use of a Ford car and he came to the garage in the evening and found the employees at the garage putting gas and oil in the car. He said:
On cross-examination he testified:
It is the contention of appellant that plaintiff's testimony shows affirmatively that he was guilty of contributory negligence and cannot recover. From his testimony it appears that he went to the garage on the evening of the accident that an employee had the car which plaintiff was to use in front of the garage; that plaintiff was in very much of a hurry and while the defendant's employee was putting gas and oil in the car the plaintiff volunteered to go and get water asking defendant's employee where to find it. He apparently got the proper instructions, picked up the bucket and started for the water going in through the front door. In about the center of the garage he found another employee fixing a tire on a machine; he asked him where to find the water and was directed to a corner of the garage. He could see at that time from the center of the garage to the back end of the garage. He saw the rear door which was...
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