Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

Decision Date09 June 1981
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. H-79-998.
Citation515 F. Supp. 1287
PartiesRobert W. JOHNSON, August T. Stern, Jr., Thomas C. Doyle, Mitchell Paris, Robert L. Robey and James Lee Porter, Plaintiffs, and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Intervening Plaintiff, v. The MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE and Hyman A. Pressman, as Chairman and Donald D. Pomerleau, Calhoun Bond, Edward C. Heckrotte, Sr., Charles Daugherty, Paul D. Wolman, Jr. and Curt Heinfelder, members of the Board of Trustees, Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of the City of Baltimore, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Paul D. Bekman, William H. Engelman and Kaplan, Heyman, Greenberg, Engelman & Belgrad, P.A., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

Frederick P. Charleston, Trial Atty., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Baltimore, Md., for intervening plaintiff.

Ambrose T. Hartman, Deputy City Sol., and Glenn M. Grossman and L. William Gawlik, Asst. City Sols., Baltimore, Md., for defendants.

ALEXANDER HARVEY, II, District Judge:

In this civil action, the six plaintiffs, who are Baltimore City firefighters, are challenging provisions of the Baltimore City Code which require that certain Fire Department employees retire at the ages of fifty-five and sixty. Plaintiffs contend that this legislation (1) violates provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (the "ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq;1 (2) contravenes 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. As relief, plaintiffs are seeking a declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, back pay for plaintiff Johnson, attorneys' fees and costs.

Five of the six plaintiffs are presently over sixty years of age.2 Had they not filed this suit, each of these five plaintiffs would now have been mandatorily retired, pursuant to applicable provisions of the Baltimore City Code. However, with the consent of the defendants, a Temporary Restraining Order has been entered in this case, permitting these five plaintiffs to retain their jobs and their employment benefits during the pendency of this action. The sixth plaintiff, James Lee Porter, is presently thirty-two years of age. He will be required to retire under the Baltimore City law in question in the year 2003, when he becomes fifty-five.

Named as defendants are the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the Chairman and members of the Board of Trustees of the Fire and Police Employees Retirement System of the City of Baltimore (hereinafter the "FPERS"). Subsequent to the commencement of this action, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was permitted to intervene as a party plaintiff and has filed an intervening complaint. Following extensive pretrial proceedings, this case came on for trial before the undersigned Judge, sitting without a jury. Testimony was heard from expert and other witnesses, and numerous exhibits have been entered in evidence. Findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a), F.R. Civ.P., are contained in this Opinion, whether or not expressly so designated.

I

The challenged provisions of law

Prior to 1962, employees of the Baltimore City Fire Department, like other municipal employees, were covered by the Employees Retirement System of the City of Baltimore (hereinafter the "ERS").3 See Article 22, §§ 1-17, Baltimore City Code (as amended). This pension and retirement system contains a provision for mandatory retirement at age seventy.

Pursuant to enabling legislation enacted by the Maryland State Legislature, the Baltimore City Council, in 1962, approved an ordinance establishing a new retirement system for Fire Department and Police Department employees only, namely the FPERS, which is at issue here. The provisions applicable in this case, as set forth in Article 22, § 34(a), Baltimore City Code (as amended), are as follows:

(2) Any member in service who has attained the age of fifty-five shall be retired on the first day of the next calendar month after attaining such age, except that a member who has attained the rank of Fire Lieutenant or Police Sergeant, or equivalent grade as certified by the Department head and approved by the Board of Trustees, shall be retired when he has attained the age of sixty-five.
* * * * * *
(4) Further, anything in this subtitle to the contrary notwithstanding, any employee covered by this System, under the rank of Fire Lieutenant or Police Sergeant, or equivalent grade, who was in service on July 1, 1962, may be continued in service until attaining age 60.

In this suit, the plaintiffs contend that these provisions which require them to retire at ages fifty-five and sixty violate the ADEA, § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment.

II Facts

Plaintiff Robert W. Johnson commenced his employment with the Baltimore City Fire Department in October of 1943. On April 29, 1979, Johnson attained the age of sixty years. Under § 34(a)(4), Johnson was retired involuntarily on May 1, 1979. This suit was filed on May 29, 1979. Pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order entered by the Court, Johnson was restored to pay status on June 11, 1979.4 In addition to the other relief sought by the other plaintiffs, Johnson seeks back pay from May 1 to June 11, 1979 in the amount of $1,000.00. Plaintiff August T. Stern, Jr. commenced his employment with the Fire Department in February 1946. He became sixty years of age on September 17, 1979. Plaintiff Thomas C. Doyle started working with the Fire Department in March of 1947, and became sixty years of age on October 7, 1979. Plaintiff Mitchell Paris commenced his employment with the Fire Department in December of 1946, and he attained the age of sixty on January 21, 1981. Plaintiff Robert L. Robey started working with the Fire Department on October 10, 1951, and became sixty on March 26, 1981. Plaintiffs Stern, Doyle, Paris and Robey have also been continued as Baltimore City firefighters pursuant to this Court's Temporary Restraining Order. Like plaintiff Johnson, they all desire to continue to work for the Baltimore City Fire Department beyond age sixty. Plaintiffs are not here challenging the right of the defendants to retire them involuntarily at age sixty-five, which is the mandatory retirement age under present law for Lieutenants and other officers of the Fire Department.

Plaintiff James Lee Porter commenced his employment with the Baltimore City Fire Department on May 6, 1969. On October 23, 2003, plaintiff Porter will attain the age of fifty-five. Since he did not become a firefighter until after July 1, 1962, he will be required under the aforementioned § 34(a)(2) and (4) to retire at age fifty-five whether he wishes to or not.

Plaintiffs Johnson, Stern, Doyle, Paris and Robey were all formerly members of the ERS. When the new ordinance establishing the FPERS was adopted by the City Council in 1962, these five plaintiffs, in 1962 or thereafter, chose to be covered by the new retirement system rather than the old.

III The ADEA

When it enacted the ADEA in 1967, Congress included a statement of its findings and purpose in passing this legislation. 29 U.S.C. § 621 provides as follows:

(a) The Congress hereby finds and declares that —
(1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially to regain employment when displaced from jobs;
(2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons;
(3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are great and growing; and their employment problems grave;
(4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce.
(b) It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.

§ 623(a)(1) is as follows:

(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; * * *

As originally enacted in 1967, the ADEA was not applicable to governmental entities. However, in 1974, Congress amended the Act to include states and political subdivisions within its coverage. The term "employer" now includes "a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State * * *" See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).

Certain employer practices were recognized by the Act as being lawful. § 623(f)(1) provides as follows:

(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer * * * (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a) * * * of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age; * * *

As originally enacted in 1967, § 623(f)(2) provided as follows:

(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer * * * (2) to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual;

In 1978, § 623(f)(2) was amended so that it now reads:

(2) to observe the terms of a bona
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • March 2, 1983
    ...to perform a particular job or that it is impossible to test employees on an individual basis, see, e.g., Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F.Supp. 1287, 1299 (D.Md.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944, 102 S.Ct. 1440, 71 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982). In the face of this track record, I find it impossi......
  • Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • January 3, 1983
    ...or impracticable to deal with persons over the age limit on an individual basis." Decision and Order at 9, quoting Johnson v. Baltimore, 515 F.Supp. 1287, 1295 (D.Md.1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1440, 71 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982). Citing this court's decision in Hodgson v. Greyhou......
  • Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
    • March 12, 1982
    ...on Congressional action was inapplicable. See, e.g., Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 515 F.Supp. 1287 (D.Md.1981); Usery v. Board of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 421 F.Supp. 718 (D.Utah In 1981, however, the Supreme Court said in P......
  • Young v. Easter Enterprises, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
    • November 29, 1995
    ...1553, 1558 (N.D.Ind.1986), Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 722 F.Supp. 668, 671-72 (D.Kan.1989), Johnson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 515 F.Supp. 1287, 1301 (D.Md. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.1984), these holdings appear to ignore the plain language o......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT