Johnson v. Meehan, 14556

• Decision Date: 11 May 1993
• Docket Number: No. 14556,14556
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Douglas E. JOHNSON v. James F. MEEHAN, Commissioner of Revenue Services, et al.

Page 244

626 A.2d 244

225 Conn. 528

Douglas E. JOHNSON v. James F. MEEHAN, Commissioner of Revenue Services, et al.

No. 14556.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 27, 1992.

Decided May 11, 1993.

David D. Legere, with whom was William H. Narwold, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Aaron S. Bayer, Deputy Atty. Gen., with whom were Robert L. Klein and Robert F. Vacchelli, Asst. Attys. Gen., and, on the brief, Richard Blumenthal, Atty. Gen., for appellees (defendants).

Before CALLAHAN, BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT and SANTANIELLO, JJ.

CALLAHAN, Associate Justice.

The principal issue in this appeal is the constitutionality of the Connecticut excise tax on cigarettes purchased by state correctional institutions. The plaintiff, an inmate at the Connecticut correctional institution at Somers, brought an action against the defendants, James F. Meehan, commissioner of revenue services, and Larry R. Meachum, commissioner of correction (hereinafter correction), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ¹ and General Statutes §§ 52-1 ² and 52-29, ³ challenging the constitutionality of General Statutes § 12-297 as amended by No. 89-16, § 28, of the 1989 Public Acts. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing and collecting taxes pursuant to the statute, and an award of costs and attorney's fees. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from a judgment of the trial court granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. We transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199(c). We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Prior to 1989, General Statutes § 12-297 ⁴ provided that cigarettes sold to all state institutions for distribution to patients and inmates housed in those facilities were exempt from the excise tax imposed by General Statutes § 12-296. ⁵ As a result of the amendment to § 12-297 by § 28 of Public Act 89-16, effective April 1, 1989, the exemption no longer applies to cigarettes sold to "correctional institutions." ⁶ Prior to April 1, 1989, the price of cigarettes purchased by inmates housed at the state's correctional institutions was approximately eighty-five cents per pack for brand name cigarettes and sixty cents per pack for generic cigarettes. As a result of the amendment to the statute, on or about April 1, 1989, the price of cigarettes sold to inmates at correctional institutions rose to approximately $1.50 per pack for brand name cigarettes and $1.10 per pack for generic cigarettes. At that same time, the price of cigarettes at other state institutions ranged from $1.80 per pack for name brands and $1.45 per pack for generic cigarettes at the Veterans Home and Hospital, to $1.25 per pack for brand name cigarettes and $1 per pack for generic cigarettes at Whiting Forensic Institute. ⁷

For the period of April 1, 1989, through December 31, 1989, the department of revenue services collected approximately $390,352 in taxes from correctional institution inmates pursuant to § 12-297 as amended. From December 1, 1990, to March 31, 1991, 519,000 packs of cigarettes were purchased by correction inmates. ⁸ It was estimated, at the time this action was filed, that correction's annual sales of cigarettes for 1991 would be 1,550,000 packs, which would result in net cigarette tax revenues of $613,800. The plaintiff is serving a sentence of eighty-five years and ninety days, for convictions of murder, arson and larceny. He works in a special "Private Sector Prison Industries Program," established pursuant to General Statutes § 18-90b, ⁹ that produces baseball caps for a Maryland company. In March, 1991, he earned $639 gross income and $430 net income for the month. ¹⁰ He used this money to purchase cigarettes, envelopes, personal hygiene products, food items, and to pay for child support. He smokes approximately two packs of cigarettes per day, and purchases his cigarettes through the prison commissary.

In his complaint, the plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of § 12-297 on two grounds. He claimed that it impermissibly: (1) requires the plaintiff, but not others similarly situated, to pay a tax on cigarettes in violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions; and (2) impinges upon his right or privilege to possess or purchase cigarettes while housed in a correctional institution, thereby violating the due process clauses of the United States and Connecticut constitutions. He pursues these same two claims in this appeal. We find both claims unpersuasive and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment because § 12-297 as amended violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution ¹¹ and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution. ¹² Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the statute unreasonably and arbitrarily distinguishes between inmates who reside in state correctional institutions, to whom the cigarette tax applies, and other similarly situated individuals, who reside in other state institutions and who are exempt from the tax. We do not agree.

In the trial court, the plaintiff and the defendants both filed cross motions for summary judgment with supporting statements of undisputed facts and affidavits. The court concluded that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts belied the plaintiff's contention that § 12-297 is unconstitutional. Concerning the plaintiff's equal protection challenge, the trial court found that there existed several rational bases justifying the legislature's repeal of the cigarette tax exemption as it applies to correction facilities.

Practice Book § 384 provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See Connecticut Bank & Trust Co. v. Carriage Lane Associates, 219 Conn. 772, 780-81, 595 A.2d 334 (1991).

In reviewing the plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, we recognize that "[i]n deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., supra. We also recognize, however, that the trial court ruled on the defendants' motion for summary judgment in light of the evidentiary presumption that "[a] party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt." Perry v. Perry, 222 Conn. 799, 810, 611 A.2d 400 (1992); Connecticut Building Wrecking Co. v. Carothers, 218 Conn. 580, 590, 590 A.2d 447 (1991); Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 217 Conn. 671, 675, 587 A.2d 1014 (1991); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ("in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden").

Because the plaintiff advances an equal protection claim, we must also ascertain whether the rational basis test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test need be used to assess the constitutionality of § 12-297. In the context of an equal protection challenge to social and economic legislation that does not infringe upon a fundamental right or affect a suspect group, the classification drawn by the statute will not violate the equal protection clause if it is rationally related to a legitimate public interest. Nordlinger v. Hahn, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439-41, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254-55, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). The parties agree that Public Act 89-16, § 28, by repealing the exemption to the cigarette excise tax for correctional institutions, is social and economic legislation that does not infringe upon a fundamental right or affect a suspect group. Thus they agree that the rational basis test applies.

The United States Supreme Court has recently summarized the rational basis test as applied to social and economic legislation that does not infringe upon a fundamental right or affect a suspect group. Nordlinger v. Hahn, supra, --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2332. "In general, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied so long as there is a plausible policy reason for the classification, see United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174, 179 [101 S.Ct. 453, 459, 461-62, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980), reh. denied, 450 U.S. 960, 101 S.Ct. 1421, 67 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981) ], the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based rationally may have been considered to be true by the government decisionmaker, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 [101 S.Ct. 715, 724, 66 L.Ed.2d 659, reh. denied, 450 U.S. 1027, 101 S.Ct. 1735, 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981), and the relationship of the classification to its goal is not so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational, see Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., [supra, 473 U.S. at 446, 105 S.Ct. at 3257-58]." Nordlinger v. Hahn, supra.

Moreover, § 12-297 is a tax statute. In the context of tax legislation, a party challenging a statute on equal protection grounds has an even greater burden than equal protection challenges to other social and economic statutes that do not infringe upon a fundamental right or affect a suspect group. "In tax matters, more so than in other fields, legislatures possess considerable liberty in classification." Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 221 Conn. 166, 181, 602...