Johnson v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 06 April 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION 13-0431-WS-M
• Parties: MONICA JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MOBILE INFIRMARY MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama

MONICA JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MOBILE INFIRMARY MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION 13-0431-WS-M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

April 6, 2015

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 42). The Motion has been briefed and is now ripe for disposition. Also pending is defendant's Motion to Strike (doc. 63).¹

I. Nature of the Action.

Plaintiff, Monica Johnson, is an African-American female and a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church. Johnson brought this action against her employer, Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, alleging violations of various federal statutes arising from a scheduling fracasthat occurred in January 2013. In Count I of the Second Amended Complaint (doc. 32), Johnson alleges that Mobile Infirmary scheduled her to work in a manner that conflicted with her religious beliefs, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Count II alleges that Mobile Infirmary discriminated against Johnson based on her race, in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, "[b]y forcing Plaintiff to make up miss [sic] work days and not require [sic] the same of white employees who miss their regularly scheduled work days." (Doc. 32, ¶ 31.) In Count III, Johnson asserts that Mobile Infirmary violated the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. ("FMLA"), "[b]y forcing Plaintiff to work her regular shift when she sought time off to care for a seriously ill minor child." (Doc. 32, ¶ 32.) The final two causes of action sound in theories of retaliation. Specifically, in Count IV, Johnson maintains that Mobile Infirmary violated the FMLA's anti-retaliation provisions by failing to allow her to take leave and then taking "punitive action against her due to her complaints." (Id., ¶ 33.) Finally, Count V alleges that Mobile Infirmary unlawfully retaliated against Johnson, in violation of Title VII and § 1981, for complaining about the way her supervisor was treating her. Defendant now moves for summary judgment as to all causes of action.

II. Motion to Strike.

Before proceeding any further, the Court pauses to address defendant's Motion to Strike (doc. 63), and plaintiff's Response (doc. 64) to same.² On summary judgment, record facts and factual inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, GA, 485 F.3d 1130, 1136 (11^th Cir. 2007). Thus, Johnson's evidence is taken as true and all justifiable inferences are drawn in her favor. In its Motion to Strike, however, Mobile Infirmary requests that portions of the record (including certain facts on which Johnson relies) be stricken. The contours of the summary judgment record - and, hence, the factual backdrop against which the Rule 56 Motion is measured - cannot be discerned without first adjudicating the Motion to Strike. There are five discrete components to that Motion, each of which will be addressed in turn. The net result is that the Motion to Strike is denied.

First, Mobile Infirmary objects to Johnson's use of exhibits (including screen shots, policy documents, medical reports and the like) that have not been authenticated. This objection is overruled. Whether these exhibits are presently in admissible form is of no consequence. See Rule 56(c)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. ("A party may object that the material cited to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.") (emphasis added). It is well settled that exhibits are properly considered for summary judgment purposes as long as they may be reduced to admissible form at trial. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ("We do not mean that the nonmoving party must produce evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment."); Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11^th Cir. 2012) ("a district court may consider a hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary judgment if the statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form").³ Mobile Infirmary does not suggest that these exhibits are incapable of being reduced to admissible form at trial; therefore, the "lack of authentication" argument fails.

Second, Mobile Infirmary asks that certain statements in plaintiff's declaration attributed to Faith Lawshe be stricken as hearsay. In particular, the Johnson Declaration recounts Lawshe's purported remarks on May 31, 2013 about her husband's medical condition, her reasons for visiting the nursing unit when she was off work, and the like. (Johnson Decl. (doc. 59), at 11.) In its Motion to Strike, Mobile Infirmary observes, "It is unclear what relevance this encounter has to any aspect of the case at hand." (Doc. 63, at 5.) The Court agrees. Inclusion or exclusion of the portion of Johnson's Declaration reciting Lawshe's statements of May 31, 2013 would have no perceptible impact on the summary judgment analysis; therefore, the Court does not reach this objection. The Motion to Strike is moot as to the Lawshe statements.

Third, Mobile Infirmary interposes a hearsay objection to plaintiff's Exhibit B, a six-line handwritten document purportedly prepared by Phuong Ly on January 15, 2013. (See Doc. 57,Exh. B.) This exhibit relates to an incident in which Ly came into work for Johnson, but was immediately sent home because there were already six nurses on duty. Defendant asserts that this exhibit and references to same in Johnson's brief must be stricken as hearsay. However, Mobile Infirmary does not argue that this statement is incapable of being presented in admissible form at trial, and Johnson shows that it can indeed be reduced to admissible form. As such, Exhibit B is properly considered on summary judgment and defendant's objection is overruled. See, e.g., Jones, 683 F.3d at 1293-94 ("a district court may consider a hearsay statement in passing on a motion for summary judgment if the statement could be reduced to admissible evidence at trial or reduced to admissible form") (citation omitted); Pritchard v. Southern Co. Services, 92 F.3d 1130, 1135 (11^th Cir. 1996) ("[i]t is true that inadmissable hearsay may sometimes be considered by a court when ruling on a summary judgment motion," where such evidence is "reducible to admissible form at trial").

Fourth, Mobile Infirmary's Motion to Strike takes aim at portions of Johnson's Declaration specifying the time and attendance records of Jason Thompson, Faith Lawshe and Diana Kennedy in painstaking detail by listing specific dates, clock-in times and notations on time sheets. (Johnson Dec., at 10, 12.) Mobile Infirmary insists that "there is no legitimate way that Johnson has knowledge of such comprehensive employment attendance records." (Doc. 63, at 6.) In a supplemental declaration, however, Johnson explains this mystery and demonstrates her personal knowledge of this information because (i) Mobile Infirmary publicly posts work schedules for RNs in the unit; (ii) when a nurse comes in late or fails to report to work, supervisors make notations on those publicly posted schedules; (iii) Johnson examined and made notes from these business records on an ongoing basis to track the attendance histories of her co-workers; and (iv) Johnson also personally observed and recorded the attendance shortcomings of these individuals. (Johnson Decl. II (doc. 64-1), ¶¶ 5-6, 12.)

On the strength of this showing, the Court is satisfied that Johnson has demonstrated a basis for personal knowledge for her detailed averments about the alleged time and attendance violations of Thompson, Lawshe and Kennedy. Accordingly, this evidence comports with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's mandate that a summary judgment declaration "must be made on personal knowledge ... and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on thematters stated." Rule 56(c)(4), Fed.R.Civ.P.⁴ As to the portions of the Johnson Declaration identifying the time and attendance histories of Thompson, Lawshe and Kennedy, then, the Motion to Strike is denied.

Fifth, Mobile Infirmary contends that two statements in the Johnson Declaration concerning her supervisor, Stefanie Willis-Turner, should be stricken as "inadmissible hearsay and ... conclusory statements made without personal knowledge." (Doc. 63, at 7.) In particular, defendant objects to the portion of the Johnson Declaration recounting conversations in which she told Willis-Turner that she (Johnson) could not work from Friday sundown to Saturday sundown because of her religious observances. Defendant also objects to the portion of the Johnson Declaration reflecting that Willis-Turner advised her that light duty was not available. Mobile Infirmary's hearsay and personal knowledge objections to these statements are unfounded. What Johnson may have informed Willis-Turner about her religious observances is not hearsay because it would not be offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather to show that the words were spoken to Willis-Turner. And Willis-Turner's statements appear to fit comfortably within the boundaries of Rule 801(d)(2)(D), Fed.R.Evid. The Motion to Strike is denied as to these portions of the Johnson Declaration.

III. Relevant Factual Background.⁵

Monica Johnson has worked for Mobile Infirmary Medical Center as a Registered Nurse in the Telemetry Unit since 2002. (Johnson Decl., at 1.) At the outset of her employment, Johnson notified Mobile Infirmary of her status as a Seventh Day Adventist and her resulting unavailability between the hours of sunset on Friday evenings and sunset on Saturday evenings in observance of her Sabbath. (Id.) By all appearances, Mobile Infirmary successfully accommodated Johnson's religious beliefs for many years by not scheduling her to work during her Sabbath observances.

A. History of Working Relationship between Plaintiff and...