Johnson v. Montgomery County Sheriff's Dept., Civ. A. No. 82-717-N.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1985
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-717-N.
• Citation: 604 F. Supp. 1346
• Parties: Lois JOHNSON, etc., Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

604 F. Supp. 1346

Lois JOHNSON, etc., Plaintiff, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-717-N.

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, N.D.

January 8, 1985.

Joan Van Almen, Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff.

Robert C. Black, Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, Montgomery, Ala., for Class Members Gayle, Hatfield, Stovall, Hidle, Chambliss, Robinson, Burrows and Jenkins.

Henry C. Chappell, Jr., Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, Montgomery, Ala., for defendants.

ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

This is a class action lawsuit alleging sex discrimination in employment at the Sheriff's Department of Montgomery County, Alabama. The cause is now before the court on the parties' joint request for approval of a proposed settlement. The court concludes that approval is warranted.

I.

Named plaintiff Lois Johnson, a female deputy sheriff in Montgomery County, brought this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S. C.A. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17, known as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Johnson alleged sex discrimination in a wide range of employment practices. On September 12, 1983, the court certified the cause as a class action according to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(2).¹ The court's memorandum opinion regarding class certification described the plaintiff class, the defendant Sheriff's Department and Johnson's allegations in detail.

Some time after class certification, the court learned from counsel that they had agreed on a proposed settlement and so ordered that they submit necessary settlement papers. The court provisionally approved the parties' joint order and decree² on October 16, 1984. The parties then notified plaintiff class members of the proposed settlement. On January 4, 1985, the court held a hearing regarding the proposed settlement. Eight plaintiff class members presented a single joint objection at this hearing.

The proposed settlement provides for widespread, specific opportunities for present and prospective female employees of the Sheriff's Department. The department offers to change its job descriptions and advertising efforts to recruit more women. It promises new hiring policies, subject to class approval, and commits itself to hiring women for the next six available positions and thereafter by a one-third ratio until twenty-five percent of deputy sheriffs are women. Similarly, the department will propose new promotion policies, subject to class approval, and reevaluate a previous promotion round in order to give female employees another, better chance; evidence of adverse impact against women will trigger further action with a possible court role. Finally, the proposed settlement provides detailed safeguards for equal treatment of women in job and shift assignments and transfers. In all areas, the department binds itself to federal guidelines and ongoing consultations with class counsel.

In addition to these class-wide provisions, the proposed settlement offers individual compensation to all class members. Two class members are to be promoted, including the named plaintiff with back pay. The other class members are to receive varying shares of a monetary fund.

The single objection to the proposed settlement concerned the allocation of this monetary fund. Those objecting questioned the basis of the allocation. By written response and a statement at the hearing, class counsel explained that the allocation was based on her calculation of certain factors in each individual case. These factors included: the history of alleged sex discrimination in the Sheriff's Department, worse in recent years in her judgment; class members' tenure in and, if applicable, date of departure from the department; class members' efforts to attain promotion; the department's steps in giving class members additional responsibility without promotion or compensation. For their part, those objecting stressed that they did not challenge, but supported the proposed settlement as a whole.

II.

Courts have stated many times that voluntary settlement is the preferred means of resolving class action employment discrimination disputes. See, e.g., Holmes v. Continental Can Co., 706 F.2d 1144, 1147 (11th Cir.1983); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157, 1215 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115, 99 S.Ct. 1020, 59 L.Ed.2d 74 (1979). However, it is well recognized that the class action "settlement process is more susceptible than adversarial adjudications to certain types of abuse. The interests of lawyer and class may diverge, as may the interest of different members of the class, and certain interests may be wrongfully compromised, betrayed, or `sold out' without drawing the attention of the court." Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1169. Therefore, the "proponents of class action settlements bear the burden of developing a record demonstrating that the settlement distribution is fair, reasonable and adequate." Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1147. At issue are the equities between the parties, as well as among the plaintiff class members. In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 669 F.2d 228, 238 (5th Cir.1982) (Unit B).

Here, no one contends that the proposed settlement is in any way inequitable as between the Sheriff's Department and the plaintiff class, nor would there appear any basis for such a contention. As described, the proposed settlement offers class members impressive opportunities in all employment areas. These are not vague avowals of good faith, but concrete commitments to specific measures. In addition, although the proposed relief is primarily class-wide and injunctive, every class member is to receive some individual compensation by promotion or remuneration.

The sole objection to the proposed settlement concerns the equities among the plaintiff class members, and this only as regards the less significant individual compensation, not the class-wide injunctive relief. The objectors have questioned the basis of the allocation of the monetary fund. They have maintained their objection after class counsel explained the basis of the allocation, though they stressed that they did not wish to upset the overall settlement.

In assessing a proposed settlement such as this, "the trial court is entitled to take account of the judgment of experienced counsel for the parties." Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1215. "If the attorney's decision in the face of such disagreement among the class members affects each class member more or less equally, and no allegation is made that the rights of a definable minority group within the class were sacrificed for the benefit of the majority, the attorney's views must be accorded great weight...." Id. at 1216. Even where there is a "disparate distribution" favoring the named plaintiffs, "the inference of unfairness may be rebutted by a factual showing that the higher allocations to certain parties are rationally based on legitimate considerations." Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1148.

Here, the allocation of the monetary fund does not sacrifice the rights of a definable minority. The objectors have shown no criterion that class counsel may have applied to single them out for smaller shares. In fact, several of the objectors are to receive greater shares than others not objecting. That class members receive different amounts of course is not necessarily unfair. Equal shares are as suspect as unequal ones since class members are rarely identical.

It would appear that the named plaintiff Johnson is to receive greater compensation than other class members. Although her monetary award consists of back pay in conjunction with her promotion to sergeant, rather than the straightforward award going to most other class members, she nevertheless will receive more than the only other class member to be promoted who gets no back pay, and the amount of her back pay award is significantly greater than any straightforward award. However, even applying the "careful judicial scrutiny" appropriate to a disparate distribution favoring the named plaintiff, the court sees no reason to disapprove the proposed settlement.

The court's concern that Johnson disproportionately benefits from the proposed settlement is dispelled first because no one objects to her individual compensation. At the hearing, the objectors made clear that they did not challenge Johnson's share. Second, individual compensation of class members is a minor aspect of the overall proposed settlement. Any extra benefit to Johnson is thus minimal overall. Third, class counsel stated that she calculated the allocation of individual compensation entirely on her own without Johnson's active participation and only sought her subsequent approval.

These same considerations also satisfy the court that the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate as regards the proposed allocation of the monetary fund among the other class members. The most significant feature of the proposed settlement is class-wide injunctive relief. There is no allegation or evidence of collusion between class counsel and those class members receiving greater shares. Finally, the sole objection is quite narrow and limited. See Women's Committee for Equal Opportunity v. National Broadcasting Co., 76 F.R.D. 173, 181-82 (S.D.N. Y.1977).

Most importantly, class counsel has shown that the allocation is "rationally based on legitimate considerations" such as would satisfy even the strictest scrutiny. Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1148. As described, class counsel explained her use of several factors in calculating the allocation. All these factors appear legitimate, and there are also no glaring omissions. Furthermore, class counsel stated that she examined the individual personnel files of all class members and spoke to many of them. Thus, unlike other counsel, she had considerable knowledge of the class members' individual claims. See Holmes, 706 F.2d at 1150. Since class counsel is experienced and able and, according to the...