Johnson v. Mossy Oak Props., Inc., Case No.: 7:11-CV-4205-RDP
| Decision Date | 27 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 7:11-CV-4205-RDP |
| Parties | KERRY JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MOSSY OAK PROPERTIES, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Before the court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #31), filed on June 12, 2012. The Motion (Doc. #31) has been fully briefed (Docs. #31, 33, 35) and was deemed submitted without oral argument on July 17, 2012. For the reasons outlined below, the court finds that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #31) is due to be granted.
Plaintiff Kerry Johnson ("Johnson" or "Plaintiff") commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Circuit Court of Sumter County on November 4, 2011. (Doc. #1, ¶ 1). The substance of Plaintiff's allegations relate to a contract dispute arising out of Plaintiff's business relationship with Defendants. (Doc. #1-1, Compl. at 1-11). Plaintiff's Complaint contains ten counts to relief. (Id. at 11-18). Plaintiff asserts various state law claims, including: breach of contract (Count I); violation of Ala. Code §§ 8-24-1 through 8-24-5 (1975) (Count II); fraud, misrepresentation, and suppression (Count III); promissory fraud (Count IV); equitable estoppel (Count V); quantum meruit (Count VI); unjust enrichment (Count VII); negligence and wantonness (Count VIII); accounting (Count IX); and conspiracy (Count X).
Defendants removed the action to federal court on December 14, 2011. (Doc. #1). In their notice of removal, Defendants asserted that diversity jurisdiction exists because the parties are completely diverse and the minimum amount in controversy is met. (Doc. #1, ¶ 10). For diversity of citizenship purposes, Plaintiff is a citizen of Missouri and Defendants are citizens of either Delaware or Mississippi. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 11-16). Defendants assert the amount in controversy is met based on the amount Plaintiff claims he is owed and based upon Plaintiff's claim under the Alabama State Sales Representative's Commission Contracts Act, Ala. Code § 8-24-1 et seq. (1975) (the "Act"), which trebles damages, attorney's fees, and costs.1 (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 22-23).
On December 21, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint alleging violations of the Act. (Doc. #5). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion to Remand on January 13, 2012. (Doc. #8). On January 24, 2012, Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition (Doc. #16) and a Motion to Strike (Doc. #15). After a scheduling conference on March 13, 2012, the court permitted the parties to conduct limited discovery on the issue presented in Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #5). The court ordered that the parties file all potentially dispositive motions directed to Count II of the Complaint by May 29, 2012. (Doc. #21). This deadline was subsequently extended to June 12, 2012 (Doc. #25) at which time Defendants filed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment currently under consideration. Defendants also filed evidence in support of the motion.2 (Docs. #31-32). On July 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the motion along with supporting evidence.3 (Doc. #33). Defendants filed a reply brief to Plaintiff's opposition on July 17, 2012. (Doc. #35).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings that the moving party believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met its burden, Rule 56(a) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324.
The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the nonmovant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023; Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine"if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. The method used by the party moving for summary judgment to discharge its initial burden depends on whether that party bears the burden of proof on the issue at trial. See Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-17 (citing United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)).
If the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, then it can only meet its initial burden on summary judgment by coming forward with positive evidence demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact (i.e. facts that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial). Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115. Once the moving party makes such a showing, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to produce significant, probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial.
If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment in either of two ways. First, the moving party may produce affirmative evidence negating a material fact, thus demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial. Once the moving party satisfies its burden using this method, the nonmoving party must respond with positive evidence sufficient to resist a motion for directed verdict at trial.
The second method by which the moving party who does not bear the burden of proof at trial can satisfy its initial burden on summary judgment is to affirmatively show the absence of evidence in the record to support a judgment for the nonmoving party on the issue in question. This method requires more than a simple statement that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden at trial but does not require evidence negating the nonmovant's claim; it simply requires the movant to point outto the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Fitzpatrick, 2 F.3d at 1115-16.
If the movant meets its initial burden by using this second method, the nonmoving party may either point out to the court record evidence, overlooked or ignored by the movant, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict, or the nonmoving party may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency. However, when responding, the nonmovant can no longer rest on mere allegations, but must set forth evidence of specific facts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 358 (1996) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)).
On September 28, 2006, Johnson entered into a Development Agent Agreement ("Agreement") with Defendant Mossy Oak Properties ("Mossy Oak"). (Doc. #33, Ex. A, Johnson Decl. at ¶ 1). Defendants Toxey Haas ("Haas") and Lonnie Wallace ("Wallace") were present at the time. (Id. at ¶ 2). Mossy Oak kept the original signed Agreement. (Doc. #33, Ex. 1, Agreement at 6-7). Sections 2 and 4 of the Agreement describe in detail Johnson's duties. (Doc. #33, Ex. 1, Agreement at 2, 4). In Section 2, the Agreement provides in part:
(Doc. #33, Ex. 1, Agreement at 2, 3). Additionally, in Section 4, the Agreement states that Johnson and Mossy Oak share the following duties:
To continue reading
Request your trial