Johnson v. New York Co, No. 40

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtBLACK
Citation344 U.S. 48,73 S.Ct. 125,97 L.Ed. 77
PartiesJOHNSON v. NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO
Docket NumberNo. 40
Decision Date17 November 1952

344 U.S. 48
73 S.Ct. 125
97 L.Ed. 77
JOHNSON

v.

NEW YORK, N.H. & H. R. CO.

No. 40.
Argued Oct. 23, 24, 1952.
Decided Nov. 17, 1952.

Page 49

Jacquin Frank, New York City, for petitioner.

Mr. Robert M. Peet, New York City, for respondent.

Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises questions concerning the power of a Court of Appeals to render judgment for a defendant instead of merely ordering a new trial after it has set aside a jury verdict and trial court judgment for a plaintiff.

The petitioner sued the respondent railroad under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, for wrongful death of her husband. When the evidence was all in, the railroad moved to dismiss the complaint and also asked for a directed verdict in its favor on the grounds that no negligence had been proven and that the deceased had been responsible for his own death. The trial court reserved decision on the motion, submitted the case to the jury, a verdict of $20,000 was returned for petitioner, and judgment was entered on the verdict. Within ten days after reception of the verdict the railroad moved to have the verdict set aside on the ground that it was excessive, contrary to the law, to the evidence, to the weight of the evidence. More than two months later this motion was denied; in the same order denying that motion the court also denied the preverdict motions for dismissal and for a directed verdict on which action had been reserved prior to verdict. Holding that the motion for a directed verdict should have been granted, the Court of Appeals reversed. 194 F.2d 194. Both parties agree that this reversal requires the District Court to enter judgment for the railroad notwithstanding the verdict,

Page 50

thereby depriving petitioner of another trial. Whether the Court of Appeals could direct such a judgment consistently with Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A.,1 is the single question we granted certiorari to review. 343 U.S. 975, 72 S.Ct. 1073.

On several recent occasions we have considered Rule 50(b). We have said that in the absence of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made in the trial court within ten days after reception of a verdict the rule forbids the trial judge or an appellate court to enter such a judgment. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 67 S.Ct. 752, 91 L.Ed. 849. We repeated that construction of the rule in Globe Liquor Co. v. San Roman, 332 U.S. 571, 68 S.Ct. 246, 92 L.Ed. 177, and reemphasized it in Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 69 S.Ct. 754, 93 L.Ed. 971.

Although this respondent made several motions it did not as the rule requires move within ten days after verdict 'to have judgment entered in accordance with his (its) motion for a directed verdict'. We are told, however, in respondent's brief that its motion to set aside the verdict 'was intended to be a motion for judgment in its favor or for a new trial' and that '(o)bviously respondent did not merely want the verdict to be set aside but wanted the relief that invariably follows such a setting aside on the grounds urged: a judgment in its favor or a new

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trial.' The defect in this argument is that respondent's motions cannot be measured by its unexpressed intention or wants. Neither the trial judge nor the Court of Appeals appears to have treated the motion to set aside the verdict as asking for anything but that. And surely petitioner is not to have her opportunity to remedy any shortcomings in her case jeopardized by a failure to fathom the unspoken hopes of respondent's counsel. Respondent's motion should be treated as nothing but what it actually was, one to set aside the verdict—not one to enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Respondent separately argues that a trial judge's express reservation of decision on motion for a directed verdict relieves a party from any duty whatever under 50(b) to make a motion for judgment after verdict. This contention not only flies in the teeth of the rule's unambiguous language but if sustained would undermine safeguards for litigants some of which have been pointed out in prior cases. The rule carefully sets out the steps and procedures to be followed by the parties as a prerequisite to entry of judgments notwithstanding an adverse jury verdict. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 250, 61 S.Ct. 189, 193, 85 L.Ed. 147. It was adopted following confusion in this field brought about in part by three cases decided by this Court, Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879; Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc., v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 55 S.Ct. 890, 79 L.Ed. 1636; and Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, to Use of Bogash, 301 U.S. 389, 57 S.Ct. 809, 81 L.Ed. 1177. The Slocum case was understood to hold that the Seventh Amendment forbade United States courts to enter judgments in favor of one party after jury verdict in favor of the other. The Redman case tried in New York held that the Seventh Amendment did not forbid entry of judgment notwithstanding a verdict where, prior to the verdict, the trial judge, following New York procedure, had expressly reversed his decision on a motion for a directed verdict. The New York District Court was au-

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thorized to follow this state practice because of the Conformity Act, R.S.1878, § 914. Thus the Redman case did not purport to adopt New York procedure for the general guidance of federal courts. Later the Kennedy case cast doubt on the Redman holding, at least as to its scope. In the Kennedy case plaintiff's request for directed verdict had not been followed by a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as required by Pennsylvania law. Failure to conform to this Pennsylvania practice was a reason given by this Court for finding lack of power in the District Court to enter judgment contrary to the verdict.2

Rule 50(b) was designed to provide a precise plan to end the prevailing confusion about directed verdicts and motions for judgments notwithstanding verdicts. State procedure was no longer to control federal courts as it had in the Redman and Kennedy cases. Federal courts were to be guided by this new rule, which provided its own exclusive procedural program. It rejected the New York procedure applied in the Redman case, which permitted judgment to be set aside even though no motion to do so had been filed after verdict. Instead it approached more closely the Pennsylvania rule, relied

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on in the Kennedy case, under which judgments contrary to verdicts would not be awarded in the absence of specific timely motions for them. But Rule 50(b) departed from the New York and Pennsylvania procedures by making it wholly unnecessary for a judge to make an express reservation of his decision on a motion for directed verdict. The rule itself made the reservation automatic. A court is always 'deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to a later determination' of the right to a direct verdict if a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is made 'Within 10 days after the reception of a verdict * * *.' This requirement of a timely application for judgment after verdict is not an idle motion. This verdict solves factual questions against the postverdict movant and thus emphasizes the importance of the legal issues. The movant can also ask for a new trial either for errors of law or on discretionary grounds. The requirement for timely motion after verdict is thus an essential part of the rule, firmly grounded in principles of fairness. See Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., supra, 330 U.S. at pages 217—218, 67 S.Ct. at pages 755—756. Poor support for its abandonment would be afforded by the mere fact that a judge makes an express reservation of a decision which the rule reserves regardless of what the judge does.

Rule 50(b) as written and as construed by us is not difficult to understand or to observe. Rewriting the rule to fit counsel's unexpressed wants and intentions would make it easy to reintroduce the same type of confusion and uncertainty the rule was adopted to end. In 1946 this Court was asked to adopt an amendment to the rule which would have given appellate courts power to enter judgments for parties who, like this respondent, had made no timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We did not adopt the amendment then. 5 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1951) 50.01(7), 50.01(9), 50.11.

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No sufficiently persuasive reasons are presented why we should do so now under the guise of interpretation.

Respondent made a motion to set aside the verdict and for new trial within the time required by Rule 50(b). It failed to comply with permission given by 50(b) to move for judgment n.o.v. after the verdict. In this situation respondent is entitled only to a new trial, not to a judgment in its favor. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cause is remanded to it for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.3 It is so ordered.

Judgment of Court of Appeals vacated and cause remanded with directions.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice JACKSON, Mr. Justice BURTON and Mr. Justice MINTON join, dissenting.

If the Court's opinion in this case merely disposed of a particular litigation by finding error in a decision of the

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Court of Appeals that a judgment be entered for the defendant in a negligence suit, an expression of dissent, let alone a dissenting opinion, would not be justified. If that were all there were to it, neither would the Court have been justified in granting the petition for certiorari. The same considerations which made the case one of general importance for review here make it appropriate to spell out the grounds of dissent.

Not the least important business of this Court is to guide the lower courts and the Bar in the effective and economical conduct of litigation. That is what is...

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154 practice notes
  • Washburn ex rel. Estate of Roznowski v. City of Fed. Way, Mun. Corp., No. 87906–1.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • October 17, 2013
    ...the benefits of the renewal requirement in terms of judicial economy have been questioned. See Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 55–56, 60–62, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting). ¶ 42 We find no reason to depart from long-followed state rules prac......
  • Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., No. 10–1664.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • May 9, 2012
    ...requirement “ ‘is ... an essential part of the rule, firmly grounded in principles of fairness.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson, 344 U.S. at 53, 73 S.Ct. 125). We have recognized the import of Rule 50(b) and the Supreme Court's decision in Unitherm. In A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, 515 F......
  • Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, No. 79-3051
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • December 7, 1981
    ...instruments for doing justice between man and man in cases coming before the federal courts. Johnson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 344 U.S. 48, 55-56, 73 S.Ct. 125, 129-30, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis II. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL The 1964 Civil Rights Act provi......
  • A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Md, No. 06-2026.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • February 12, 2008
    ...denied that motion after the [jury] verdict was returned." Id. at 401, 126 S.Ct. 980 (citing Johnson v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952)). As Justice Thomas explained for the Court in Unitherm, a district court's denial of a party's Rule 50(a) m......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
154 cases
  • Washburn ex rel. Estate of Roznowski v. City of Fed. Way, Mun. Corp., No. 87906–1.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • October 17, 2013
    ...the benefits of the renewal requirement in terms of judicial economy have been questioned. See Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 48, 55–56, 60–62, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952) (Frankfurter, J, dissenting). ¶ 42 We find no reason to depart from long-followed state rules prac......
  • Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., No. 10–1664.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • May 9, 2012
    ...requirement “ ‘is ... an essential part of the rule, firmly grounded in principles of fairness.’ ” Id. (quoting Johnson, 344 U.S. at 53, 73 S.Ct. 125). We have recognized the import of Rule 50(b) and the Supreme Court's decision in Unitherm. In A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, 515 F......
  • Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. of San Diego, No. 79-3051
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • December 7, 1981
    ...instruments for doing justice between man and man in cases coming before the federal courts. Johnson v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 344 U.S. 48, 55-56, 73 S.Ct. 125, 129-30, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis II. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL The 1964 Civil Rights Act provi......
  • A Helping Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Md, No. 06-2026.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • February 12, 2008
    ...denied that motion after the [jury] verdict was returned." Id. at 401, 126 S.Ct. 980 (citing Johnson v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R., 344 U.S. 48, 73 S.Ct. 125, 97 L.Ed. 77 (1952)). As Justice Thomas explained for the Court in Unitherm, a district court's denial of a party's Rule 50(a) m......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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