Johnson v. North Carolina
| Decision Date | 30 January 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 4:14-CV-50-FL,4:14-CV-50-FL |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina |
| Parties | STEVEN GLENN: JOHNSON and STEVEN GLENN JOHNSON Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and THE FEDERAL RESERVE, And all those similarly situated, Defendants. |
This matter comes now before the court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendants United States of America ("United States") and the Federal Reserve ("Federal Reserve") (collectively, "Federal Defendants") (DE 10). The motion has bee fully briefed, and the issues raised are ripe for adjudication. For reasons given, the court grants the motion to dismiss, and directs plaintiff to file a particularized amended complaint.
Filing pro se, plaintiff commenced this action on March 28, 2014, with a 75 page "Counter Claim & Cross Claim," construed as a complaint, alleging defendants' use of a "series of claims/causes . . . either to deprive [plaintiff] of his rights to life, liberty and property . . . or in the extreme, plunder" the plaintiff. (Compl., ¶ 6(c). On June 4, 2014, Federal Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) (DE 9).Plaintiff has responded in opposition, and Federal Defendants replied. On June 28, 2014, plaintiff filed an addendum to his affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
As is relevant to Federal Defendants, the complaint alleges that plaintiff was "immediately deprived of all property" upon his birth in 1967, by virtue of the Emergency Banking Act of 1933. (Compl. at ¶ III.6(c)). He further alleges that, while defendant Federal Reserve has "plundered the people of this nation . . . by deceitfully forming a monopoly in banking," in fact "an American who issues a promissory note is also a 'bank' and a 'banker' and if he/she is an American National then that person is a 'national bank' and that person's promissory notes are National Bank Notes authorized under 31 U.S.C. [§] 5103 to be 'legal tender.'" (Id. at ¶ III.6(d)). Plaintiff alleges that he exercised his right to "just compensation" by issuing his own negotiable instruments and promissory notes, but was prevented from doing so by defendants. (Id.). Plaintiff further alleges that defendant United States "has arrested, jailed, prosecuted and sentenced to prison [plaintiff] through methods of coercion." (Id. at ¶ III.6(e)).
Plaintiff's complaint asserts 52 "causes of action" pertaining to these activities. "Causes" 15-18 and 24-52 all appear to be directed at defendant North Carolina or its agents. On those causes at issue in the instant motion, plaintiff alleges that defendant Federal Reserve engaged in a series of fraudulent activities by reversing plaintiff's payments for child support, automotive services, and the purchase of a motorcycle, ranging from December 2008 to January 2009. Plaintiff also alleges that he is party to a contract with defendants, and that defendants violated the contract "by failing to acknowledge the validity of the negotiable instruments issued by [plaintiff] and by further prosecuting [plaintiff]." (Compl., ¶ IV.26).
Plaintiff, who alleges that he has type 1 diabetes, also states that defendant United States, through its agents, "failed to allow or refused to allow" him to receive insulin until he agreed to state that he understood the charges made against him.1 (Id. ¶ IV.23). Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant United States, through the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"), denied him eye care, dental care, and insulin for his diabetes, and refused to allow him to communicate with his father before his father died.2
Plaintiff asserts 22 "claims" related to these "causes," including misprision of a felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4; violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; criminal conspiracy to deprive rights, 18 U.S.C. § 241; deprivation of rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. § 242; violations of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988; abuse of process, assault, battery, excessive bail, false accusation, failure to identify, fraudulentbond, intentional infliction of emotional and financial distress, malicious prosecution, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and unlawful seizure of property. (Id. at ¶ III.6(w)). He does not specify how these "claims" are linked to his 52 "causes."
For his injuries, plaintiff seeks relief including that the court order Federal Defendants to recognize plaintiff "as their Creditor with all rights due a Creditor," (Compl. ¶ XXX(b)), to honor his promissory notes, and to expunge past charges. Plaintiff also seeks damages approximating $28 billion, and asks that the court grant "such other and further relief as to the Court may seem just and proper." (Compl., ¶ XXX(m)).
The public record provides some context for the complaint.3 Plaintiff is a convicted felon, having pleaded guilty on March 14, 2011, to one count of mail fraud for using the mail to place a counterfeit money order to North Carolina Child Support Centralized Collections. United States v. Johnson, No. 4:10-CR-95, E.D.N.C. Plaintiff was sentenced July 7, 2011, to 16 months' imprisonment with credit for time served in state custody. His active federal sentence was discharged September 4, 2012, and he is presently on supervised release. Plaintiff did not appeal his conviction or sentence. Rather, he filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which was dismissed on March 25, 2014.
Plaintiff also has two state court convictions, for obtaining property by false pretense, and forgery of an instrument and worthless check, related to a transaction involving a motorcycle in 2009. North Carolina v. Johnson, No. 09-CRS-52519 and No. 09-CRS-52520 (Iredell Cnty. Sup. Ct.).
A Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction is appropriate when challenged by the defendant. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982). Such a motion may either assert the complaint fails to state facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction may be based or attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, apart from the complaint. Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219. The latter type of attack is used when a court's limited jurisdiction precludes hearing the case brought. Id. Since the court's power to hear the case is at issue in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court is free to weigh the evidence to determine the existence of jurisdiction. Id. This includes exhibits outside the pleadings. Williams v. United States, 50 F.3d 299, 304 (4th Cir. 1995).
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint but "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). A complaint states a claim if it contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Asking for plausible grounds . . . does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal [the] evidence" required to prove the claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Furthermore, the complaint need not set forth "detailed factual allegations," but instead must simply "plead sufficient facts to allow a court, drawing on 'judicial experience and common sense,' to infer 'more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'" Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). In evaluating the complaint, "[the] court accepts all well-pled facts as true and construes these facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff," but does not consider "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, . . . bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement[,] . . . unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Id. at 255 (citations omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must keep in mind the principle that "a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir.1994). Nevertheless, Erickson does not undermine the requirement that a pleading contain "more than labels and conclusions." Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Furthermore, while a pro se complaint must be construed liberally, it is not the court's obligation "to discern the unexpressed intent of the plaintiff." Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 413 n. 3 (4th Cir. 2006).
As a sovereign, defendant United States is immune from all suits absent an express waiver of immunity from Congress. Welch v. United States, 409 F.3d 646, 650 (4th Cir. 2005); Radin v. United States, 699 F.2d 681, 684-85 (4th Cir. 1983). Sovereign immunity extends to defendant Federal Reserve as well. See Research Triangle Inst. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,132 F.3d 985, 987 (4th Cir. 1997). Waivers are strictly construed in favor of the sovereign. Id. Plaintiff has the burden of pointing to an "unequivocal waiver of immunity." Williams, 50 F.3d at 304. "If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, then the claim must be dismissed." Welch, 409...
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