Johnson v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 10425

• Citation: 338 N.W.2d 622
• Decision Date: 29 September 1983
• Docket Number: No. 10425,10425
• Parties: Linda JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NORTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Civ.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Dakota

Page 622

338 N.W.2d 622

Linda JOHNSON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. NORTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. No. 10425.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Sept. 29, 1983.

Wickham Corwin [argued], of Conmy, Feste, Bossart, Hubbard & Corwin, Fargo, for defendant and appellant.

Rauleigh D. Robinson [argued], of Vogel Law Firm, Mandan, for plaintiff and appellee.

PAULSON, Surrogate Justice. ^*

This is an appeal by Northwestern Bell Telephone Company [Bell] from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict in favor of Linda Johnson [Johnson] and from a denial of Bell's alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial affirmed.

Johnson was an employee of Bell from 1974 until the events complained of in this action. In 1979, while an employee of Bell, Johnson became pregnant. As a result of this pregnancy and the subsequent birth of her child, Johnson applied for and received a variety of leaves from her employment, culminating with an extension of her leave of absence for the care of newborn children. Prior to deciding to apply for the final extension of her child care leave, Johnson consulted documents provided by her employer which purported to summarize the child care leave and job reinstatement provisions of the contract negotiated between her union, Communication Workers of America [CWA] and Bell. Johnson also referred to the leave application forms provided by Bell and spoke with Rosemary Glaspell [Glaspell], a Bell supervisor, before extending her child care leave. Approximately seven months after the birth of her child, Johnson notified Bell that she was ready to return to work and accordingly applied for reinstatement. She was subsequently advised, however, that no appropriate positions were available. Johnson then commenced this action against Bell.

Prior to trial, Johnson relied on three separate theories of liability:

1. Under the terms of the agreement between Bell and her union, Johnson was entitled to receive a maximum of 12 months of child care leave, with guaranteed job reinstatement at any point during that 12 months. Bell breached the terms of this agreement by failing to reinstate Johnson when she applied for reinstatement in August of 1980.

2. Through the terms of various Bell publications and through the oral representations of one of its supervisors Bell misrepresented the terms of the child care leave program by assuring Johnson that she was entitled to a maximum of 12 months of leave with guaranteed job reinstatement at any point during that 12 month period. Bell should thereby be estopped from asserting the terms of the union agreement which in fact limited Johnson's period of guaranteed reinstatement to six months from the date of delivery.

3. Bell was contractually bound to make a "reasonable effort" to reinstate employees requesting to return from child care leave more than 6 months but less than 12 months from the date of delivery. Bell did not make a reasonable effort to reinstate Johnson.

Prior to commencement of trial, Bell sought summary judgment on the first (contract) and second (estoppel) liability theories. The trial court ruled that Johnson's contractual rights, including reinstatement rights, were governed by the terms of the agreement negotiated between Bell and CWA. The trial court concluded that the contract was clear and unambiguous and that, by its terms, Bell employees returning from child care leave were guaranteed reinstatement only during the initial six months following delivery of their babies. Accordingly, the trial court ordered judgment for Bell on the contractual liability theory. Bell's motion for summary judgment on the estoppel theory, however, was denied and the remaining two theories were tried to a jury.

The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Johnson. She was awarded compensatory damages of $45,000 and punitive damages of $15,000. Following the jury's verdict Bell filed alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The judge denied Bell's motions and this appeal followed.

Bell presents the following issues for our determination on appeal:

1. Does the documentary evidence which Johnson relied on to establish her estoppel claim entitle Bell to judgment in its favor on that issue as a matter of law?

2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdict on either liability theory?

3. Does a determination that either or both of the alternative liability theories were erroneously submitted to the jury mandate reversal?

4. Is there a basis for the jury's award of punitive damages?

5. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error in certain of its evidentiary rulings?

We will discuss these issues in the order listed.

I

Bell contends, because written documents such as the summary pamphlets and leave application forms constitute the basis of Johnson's estoppel claim, that the claim should have been resolved as a matter of law. Bell also argues that it was entitled to judgment on the estoppel issue as a matter of law because the evidence presented in support of that theory was insufficient to present a question of fact for the jury. Bell points in particular to two elements of equitable estoppel which, in its view, Johnson failed to prove.

Section 31-11-06 of the North Dakota Century Code is North Dakota's statutory restatement of the principle of equitable estoppel. Cranston v. Winters, 238 N.W.2d 647, 652 (N.D.1976). Section 31-11-06, N.D.C.C., provides that:

"When a party, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately has led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he shall not be permitted to falsify it in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act, or omission."

In Farmers Cooperative Association of Churchs Ferry v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D.1976), we set forth the elements of an estoppel applicable to non-real estate matters such as that before us here:

"Based as it is upon a consideration of the facts in light of public policy, fair dealing, and the like, the basic elements of an equitable estoppel, insofar as it relates to the person being estopped, are: (1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such conduct will be acted upon by or will influence, the other party or persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. Insofar as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the elements are: (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based thereon, of such a character as to change the position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice."

Id. at 813. We have held this statement to be consistent with our statute and the principles contained therein. Id.

The burden of proving each element of an estoppel is on the party asserting it. Aune v. City of Mandan, 167 N.W.2d 754, 759 (N.D.1969). Bell argues that Johnson has failed to prove: (1) that Bell made false or misleading representations; and (2) that Johnson lacked the means of knowledge of the truth regarding her reinstatement rights.

This court's review of questions of fact is limited to consideration of whether or not there is substantial evidence to sustain the jury's verdict. In reviewing the evidence, we view it in the light most favorable to the verdict. Powers v. Martinson, 313 N.W.2d 720, 728 (N.D.1981). In so doing, however, we note that unless clearly warranted by the facts of the case, estoppel is not favored. Knauss v. Miles Homes, Inc., 173 N.W.2d 896, 905 (N.D.1970).

We turn first to the question of whether there is substantial evidence which, when viewed in the light most favorable to Johnson, would support the jury's verdict. Bell points to the undisputed fact that Johnson had access to a copy of the memorandum of understanding which set forth her reinstatement rights; that the trial court found this contract to be clear and unambiguous and guaranteed reinstatement only during the first six months following delivery; that at no time prior to applying for the extension to her leave of absence for care of newborn children did she approach a Bell management person and ask, point blank, what her reinstatement rights were. Bell argues that she, instead, relied on her own inferences from the summaries, the leave application forms, and the statements of Glaspell. We find it significant that none of the documents relied upon by Johnson specifically guarantee her a position of lesser status if she should apply for reinstatement more than six months after delivery of her child. Glaspell's statements to Johnson in regard to the consequences of staying on leave longer than six months do, however, contain a logical implication that Johnson was risking only her status, not her employment, if she were to do so. The documents referred to by Johnson, when read in light of Glaspell's statements, might also be determined to contain the logical implication that she would be reinstated after six months, although to a position of lesser status. It should also be noted that Johnson was referred to Glaspell by her supervisor because Glaspell "was usually up on these things".

In 31 C.J.S. Estoppel Sec. 71, it is said that "[o]ne relying on an estoppel must have exercised such reasonable diligence to acquire knowledge of the real facts as the circumstances of the case require. If he conducts himself with a careless indifference to means of...