Johnson v. Ohio Bureau of Workers' Comp.
| Decision Date | 27 January 2014 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 1:13CV1199 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
| Parties | THOMAS E. JOHNSON, PLAINTIFF, v. OHIO BUREAU OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION, et al., DEFENDANTS. |
MEMORANDUM OPINION ANDORDER
In this action for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief, defendants, Ohio Attorney General ("AG") and Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC"), seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). (Doc. No. 9, AG Motion to Dismiss; Doc. No. 10, BWC Motion to Dismiss.) Plaintiff Thomas Johnson ("plaintiff" or "Johnson") opposes both motions (Doc. No. 15, Opposition to BWC's Motion; Doc. No. 16, Opposition to AG's Motion), and the AG has filed a reply (Doc. No. 17). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
The facts pertinent to the pending motions are not in dispute. On January 6, 2005, plaintiff "sustained permanent and serious injuries at a job site located on premises owned by and controlled by Republic Engineered Products ['Republic'] in Lorain County, Ohio[.]" (Doc. No. 1, Compl., at ¶ 6.) At the time of the accident,plaintiff was employed by Resco Products, Inc. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff sought and received workers' compensation benefits that were issued by the BWC. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.)
On February 9, 2005, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas against Republic, seeking damages for personal injury ("personal injury action"). On September 30, 2005, Republic filed a third-party complaint against Resco. On or about June 28, 2006, plaintiff settled his personal injury action, releasing Republic and Resco from liability with the specific exception of his workers' compensation claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 7-9.) The lawsuit remains pending in the state courts, as the trial court docket reveals that an appeal and cross-appeal have been filed with the court of appeals.1
On May 4, 2012, the BWC brought its own action in the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas ("subrogation action"), naming plaintiff and the Chubb Insurance Company as defendants, and seeking subrogation for benefits and compensation paid to Johnson.2 (Id. at ¶¶ 9-10.) On April 5, 2013—more than ten months after he filed his initial answer—Johnson sought leave to file an amended answer, counterclaim, and third-party complaint challenging the constitutionality of Ohio's subrogation statutes (Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4123.93 and 4123.931). BWC opposed the motion, and leave was ultimately denied by the state trial court on May 17, 2013. In denying the motion, the trial court found that Johnson had failed to establish justificationunder Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 13 for having failed to timely file his compulsory counterclaim. (Doc. No. 10-3.) The subrogation action remains pending in the trial court.
On the same day he attempted to amend his answer in state court (April 5, 2013), Johnson filed the present action in federal court. In his complaint, he alleges that Ohio's subrogation statutes violate the United States Constitution in two ways. First, he claims that subrogation in favor of the BWC will deprive him of his property interest in his personal injury claim without due process and equal protection of law. Second, he insists that the notice provision of Ohio Rev. Code § 4123.931, which requires a workers' compensation benefits claimant to notify the BWC of a potential tort claim, violates the First Amendment by "requir[ing] speech." (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 20.) Plaintiff requests a declaration that Ohio Rev. Code §§ 4123.93 and 4123.931 are unconstitutional, and he seeks an injunction prohibiting the BWC from pursuing or enforcing its subrogation rights.
In its motion to dismiss, the BWC argues that this Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in this case, pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), due to the pendency of the ongoing state subrogation action.3 Alternatively, the BWC argues that plaintiff's constitutional claims are barred by res judicata because plaintiff failed to timely bring these claims as compulsory counterclaims in state court. Turning to the merits, the BWC insists that Johnson has failed to state a claim for injunctive relief. The AG also believes that the Court shouldabstain from exercising its jurisdiction over the matter. He further posits that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for injunctive relief against him, owing to the absence of an actual controversy involving himself and plaintiff.
A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957). Although this pleading standard does not require great detail, the factual allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (citing authorities). In other words, "Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a 'showing,' rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Id. at 556, n.3 (). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. at 679.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may "consider the Complaint and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to defendant's motion to dismissso long as they are referred to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein." Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008); see Jones v. Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) ().
When faced with a threshold question of whether to apply Younger abstention, a court must first address the Younger issue prior to engaging in any analysis on the merits of the case. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6, n.4, 125 S. Ct. 1230, 161 L. Ed. 2d 82 (2005).
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not enjoin a pending state criminal proceeding unless "the danger of irreparable loss is both great and immediate." 401 U.S. at 45; see Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431, 102 S. Ct. 2515, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1982) () The Supreme Court extended Younger "to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved." Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432 (internal cite omitted). Younger abstention is appropriate in favor of a state proceeding if three criteria are met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the petitioner's federal constitutional claim. Id.; Squire v. Coughlan, 469 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2006)."[S]o long as the constitutional claims of [the plaintiff] can be determined in the state proceedings and so long as there is no showing of bad faith, harassment, or some other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention inappropriate, the federal courts should abstain." Berger v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Bar Ass'n, 983 F.2d 718, 723 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 435).
A proceeding that is judicial in nature "investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist." New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 370-71, 109 S. Ct. 2506, 105 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1989) (internal quote omitted). The Sixth Circuit has held that "if a state [judicial] proceeding is pending at the time the action is filed in federal court, the first criteria for Younger abstention is satisfied." Federal Express Corp. v. Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 925 F.2d 962, 969 (6th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff does not seriously dispute the pendency of the state subrogationaction inasmuch as his complaint seeks to enjoin these state proceedings.4 (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 12.) Instead, plaintiff underscores the fact that defendants do not dispute this Court's jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issues raised herein. (Doc. No. 15 at 148.) However, "Younger abstention is not a question of jurisdiction, but is rather based on 'strong policies counseling against the exercise of such jurisdiction.'" O'Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 641 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 471 U.S. 619, 626, 106 S. Ct. 2718, 91 L. Ed. 2d 512 (1986)). Because the record demonstrates the existence of a pending state judicial proceeding, the first Younger factor is met.5
The importance of the state's interest in its proceedings is measured, not by the state's interest in the outcome of the particular case, but by "the importance of the generic proceedings to the...
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