Johnson v. Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dep't of Veterans Affairs
| Decision Date | 19 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV-20-1248-R,CIV-20-1248-R |
| Parties | ERICA JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, ex rel. OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS; ROBERT ARRINGTON, in his individual capacity; RHONDA WADLEY, in her individual capacity; and KELLY FREDERICKS, in her individual capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma |
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 8) filed by Defendants Robert Arrington, Rhonda Wadley, and Kelly Fredericks, in their individual capacities. Plaintiff responded in opposition to the motion. (Doc. No. 10). Upon consideration of the parties' submissions, the Court finds as follows.1
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is properly granted when a complaint provides no "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain enough "facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" id. at 570, and the factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555 (citations omitted). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Id. at 563. For the purpose of making the determination, the Court accepts all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). However, the Court need not accept as true conclusory allegations. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2001).
Defendants' motion addresses Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, which alleges the following with regard to her employment and subsequent termination by the Oklahoma Department of Veterans Affairs. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant VA from July 7, 2014 until September 5, 2019. She was hired as a patient care assistant and promoted to a patient care II position on August 9, 2015. Plaintiff contends she was a satisfactory or better employee who received both a promotion and merit pay increases, as well as a perfect attendance certificate. Plaintiff contends that despite performing her job adequately, she was terminated on the heels of mediating an EEOC complaint. She further alleges that her termination was the result of her need for leave for treatment following a May 2019 car accident.
Specifically, in May 2018, Plaintiff filed an internal grievance asserting that her supervisor, Kelly Fredericks, discriminated against her on the basis of her national origin.The grievance was the result of an incident whereby two employees were asked to "float," that is, work a different hallway than their normal assignment. Each of those two employees refused without consequence. However, when Plaintiff was instructed to "float" when it was not her turn, she refused. Kelly Fredericks got angry, verbally reprimanded Plaintiff and had security escort her from the premises.
Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge in September 2018. During the pendency of the charge Plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident, resulting in injury to her shoulder, back, and neck, which exacerbated Plaintiff's arthritis and tendonitis. These injuries required Plaintiff, who was still employed at the VA, to take intermittent leave to undergo medical treatment. She provided medical notes as needed and continued to perform her job adequately.
On June 4, 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant mediated her charge of national origin discrimination before the EEOC. The parties reached a resolution and Defendant agreed that Plaintiff would not be subjected to retaliation or additional discrimination. Plaintiff contends that two weeks after the mediation concluded she was written up, unjustly, being falsely accused of patient abuse. In part, Plaintiff was written up by Fredericks, the supervisor who was the subject of the internal grievance for alleged violation of Defendant's leave policies, which Plaintiff was following with regard to the medical appointments necessary to treat her injuries. Plaintiff submitted a doctor's note ordering leave between June 17, 2019 and June 24, 2019. When she returned from leave, she was written up for leave abuse.
Plaintiff was also counseled that same day, June 25, 2019, for allegedly startling a co-worker by tossing a plastic cup into a sink. She alleged similarly situated co-workers who engaged in similar or more egregious conduct were not disciplined. She further alleged that on July 12, 2019, she was suspended, with pay, without reason. She was not permitted to return and was removed from the schedule.
On August 21, 2019, Plaintiff received a pre-termination hearing notice signed by Defendant Arrington, which asserted that Plaintiff violated leave policies. She was also accused in the notice of roughhousing a patient which she alleges was false, because it allegedly occurred on July 18, 2019 when she was on suspension. Plaintiff was informed of her termination on September 13, 2019, effective September 5, 2019, via a notice that alleged that she had abused or neglected two residents on July 18, 2019.2 The notice of termination was signed by Defendant Arrington. Plaintiff contends that Defendants Arrington, Wadley and Fredericks were all involved in the decision to terminate her employment. The individual Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff's claims against them as set forth herein.
With regard to Plaintiff's claims in Counts VII and VIII, interference with a contract and interference with a prospective economic advantage, respectively, Defendants argue that because they were each agents of the VA, and an agent of an employer cannot tortiously interfere with either a contract or the employment relationship, the claims must be dismissed. See Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 911 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Okla.1996)(employee or agent of a party to a contract cannot generally be held liable under a theory of tortious interference).3 Plaintiff argues that the individual Defendants can be held liable because she alleges their actions were malicious, without justification, excuse or privilege. See Amended Complaint, ¶ 72.
To state a claim for tortious or malicious interference with a business relationship, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts for the Court to infer "1) interference with a business or contractual right; 2) malicious and wrongful interference that is neither justified, privileged, nor excusable; and 3) damages proximately sustained as a result of the interference." Tuffy's, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 212 P.3d 1158, 1165 (Okla. 2009). A claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage is similar and requires a plaintiff to allege "(1) the existence of a valid business or expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy on the part of the interferor; (3) an intentional interference including or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy; and (4) resultant damage to the party whose relationship has been disrupted." Cohlmia v. St. John Medical Center, 693 F.3d 1269, 1286-87 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying Oklahoma law). Generally, such interference must come from a third party, which would exclude agents of a party to the contract. See Wilspec Technologies, Inc. v. DunAn Holding Group, Co., 204P.3d 69, 74 (Okla. 2009); Voiles v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 911 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Okla. 1996).4
An agent may, however, be held liable for tortious interference, if acting against the interests of the principal and in furtherance of his or her own interests.
[T]o show that the agent was acting in his own interests requires more than a showing of bad faith; plaintiff must show that the agent was acting contrary to the business interest of his employer and in furtherance of the agent's own, personal interests. See, Graham v. Cargill, Inc., 2011 WL 5429316, **3-4 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 9, 2011) (summary judgment stage); Taverna v. First Wave, Inc., 2010 WL 4930583, *14 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 30, 2010) (summary judgment stage); Sanders v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Comm., 2016 WL 1737135, *5 (W.D. Okla. May 2, 2016) ().
Although Plaintiff alleges that the individual employee Defendants acted maliciously, the Amended Complaint presents no factual allegations that would support the conclusion that Defendant Arrington or Wadley was acting in furtherance of his or her own interests. Accordingly, any such claims are hereby dismissed. With regard to Defendant Fredericks, however, the Court finds the allegations sufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges that she complained about national origin discrimination by Defendant Fredericks, which included the filing of an EEOC charge, and that after conciliation of theEEOC charge Defendant Fredericks began issuing unwarranted disciplinary actions against Plaintiff. The Court finds these allegations sufficient to state a tortious interference claim. The Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Counts VII and VIII of the Amended Complaint and Defendants Arrington and Wadley, and denied as to Defendant Fredericks.
Plaintiff also seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated her right to free speech under the First Amendment and her substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants acted in response to her 2018 complaints of discrimination—both her May 2, 2018 allegation of discrimination against Defendant Fredericks and her November 19, 2018 EEOC charge asserting the same claim of race and national origin discrimination. Defendants seek qualified immunity on Plain...
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