Johnson v. Packaging Corporation of America
| Decision Date | 28 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 18-613-SDD-EWD |
| Parties | MICHAEL JOHNSON, ET AL v. PACKAGING CORP. OF AMERICA, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Louisiana |
SHELLY D. DICK, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA.
This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment[1] filed by Defendants, Packaging Corporation of America (“PCA”), Boise Inc., Boise Packaging & Newsprint (“BPN”), and Rick Butterfield (“Butterfield”) (collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiffs, Michael Johnson Charles Cunningham, Jerry Bailey, Eric Woodard, Michael Darbonne, Michael McCullough, Demon Benjamin, Pamela Green and Christopher Harrington (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed an Opposition[2] to this Motion, to which Defendants filed a Reply.[3] For the following reasons the Court finds that Defendants' Motion should be granted in part and denied in part.
This is a workplace injury case. On February 8, 2017, an explosion occurred at a paper mill located in DeRidder, Louisiana.[4] The explosion was caused by welding above a foul condensate tank which ignited the volatile vapors in the tank. Two contractors, Elite Specialty Welding, LLC (“Elite”) and Top Deck, Inc. (“Top Deck”) were contracted to perform work at the mill at the time of the explosion.[5] Demon Benjamin and Pamela Green worked for Top Deck, while the remaining Plaintiffs worked for Elite.[6] One of the Defendants owned the mill, but it is disputed which.
One of Defendants (it is disputed which) requested services from Top Deck and Elite via purchase orders. Top Deck and PCA had a “Master Service Agreement for Construction” that governed their working relationship.[7] Elite and BPN had an “Annual Contractor Services Agreement” that governed their working relationship.[8] Despite being titled “Annual, ” the Elite/BPN contract had no fixed term, and there is no dispute that it was in effect at the time of the explosion.[9] The other relevant contractual document is PCA's “Order Terms and Conditions, ” which is incorporated by reference into each purchase order.[10]
The relationships between Defendants are also relevant. According to Defendants, and uncontroverted by Plaintiffs, PCA acquired Boise Inc. and its subsidiaries, including BPN, in 2013.[11] On July 1, 2017, BPN and Boise Inc. merged into PCA.[12] Butterfield was the Safety Manager at the mill at the time of the accident, but it is disputed which Defendant was his employer.[13]
The only issue for the purposes of this Motion is whether Defendants are entitled to statutory employer immunity as to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert tort claims against all Defendants. Defendants argue that they were the statutory employers of all Plaintiffs based on terms contained in the purchase orders, service agreements, and Terms and Conditions. Therefore, Defendants seek dismissal of all claims on the grounds that they are all immune from suit because they are all statutory employers of all Plaintiffs. However, as determined below, both groups of Plaintiffs were statutory employees of one of the Defendants-but not the others. Thus, some Defendants are immune from suit from some Plaintiffs, but no Defendant is immune from suit from every Plaintiff. Because Defendants' Motion does not go to the substance of any Plaintiffs' claims, the Court cannot reach any of the substantive issues in this case. Based on Defendants' requested relief, all the Court determines today is that the Elite Plaintiffs can sue Boise Inc. and PCA-but not BPN; and, the Top Deck Plaintiffs can sue BPN and Boise Inc-but not PCA.
In reviewing a party's motion for summary judgment, the Court will grant the motion if (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, and (2) the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.[14] This determination is made “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.”[15] A party moving for summary judgment “‘must “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, ” but need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.'”[16] If the moving party satisfies its burden, “the non-moving party must show that summary judgment is inappropriate by setting ‘forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue concerning every essential component of its case.'”[17]However, the non-moving party's burden “‘is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.'”[18]
Notably, “[a] genuine issue of material fact exists, ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'”[19] All reasonable factual inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.[20] However, [21] “Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts . . . will not prevent the award of summary judgment; ‘the plaintiffs [can]not rest on his allegations . . . to get to a jury without any “significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint.”'”[22]
The success of Defendants' Motion turns on the applicability of statutory employer immunity. Under Louisiana's Workers' Compensation Law, when a “principal” hires a contractor to perform work that is “a part” of the principal's “trade, business, or occupation, ” the principal is liable to pay workers' compensation benefits to any injured employee of the contractor.[24] In such instances, the principal is commonly referred to as the “statutory employer.” In exchange for the responsibility placed on statutory employers, the statute affords them immunity from tort liability to their statutory employees.[25] Thus, a principal is immune from tort liability if the contract work was a part of the principal's trade, business, or occupation.[26] The law further provides that a written contract establishes a rebuttable presumption of a statutory employee-employer relationship, which may be defeated by showing that “the work being performed is not an integral part of or essential to the ability of the principal to generate the individual principal's goods, products, or services.”[27] Statutory employer immunity does not apply if the principal “intentionally” caused the injury.[28]
As to Butterfield, the Safety Manager at the mill, it is relevant that workers' compensation benefits “are a statutory employee's exclusive remedy when injured by employees of the principal....”[29]
Plaintiffs assert that Defendants cannot connect a purchase order to each individual Plaintiff, and as such, Defendants cannot carry their burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether they are entitled to statutory employer immunity.[30] Defendants do not dispute this, and instead counter that every purchase order either has or incorporates statutory employer language, so regardless of which one applies, they are entitled to statutory employer protection.[31]
Plaintiffs assert that there is a factual dispute as to which entity issued the purchase orders.[32] Defendants proffer the purchase orders as summary judgment evidence that PCA issued them. Each purchase order bears a PCA logo in the lower-left hand corner. Each states that it is subject to PCA's Terms and Conditions. Contact information for a PCA employee is in the bottom right of each purchase order. Finally, each purchase order provides a PCA email address as contact information for invoicing. While some of the purchase orders direct the vendor to send the invoice to BPN, each one that does so explains the corporate relationship between PCA and BPN and states that the purchase order is executed by “Packaging Corporation of America and its wholly-owned subsidiary Boise Packaging & Newsprint, LLC.”[33] The Court finds that Defendants have produced summary judgment evidence that no genuine issue of material fact exists that PCA issued the purchase orders.
Plaintiffs attempt to create a genuine issue of material fact with summary judgment evidence that BPN owned the mill and employed nearly all onsite workers.[34] As such, argue Plaintiffs, it is unclear who issued the purchase orders. The purchase orders' veracity is undisputed, and based on the face of each purchase order, there are no indications that they were issued by any entity other than PCA. The Court finds that no rational trier of fact could find that PCA did not issue the purchase orders, regardless of which entity technically employed most of the mill employees.[35]
Next, the Court must detangle the complex interactions between the purchase orders, service agreements, and PCA's Terms and Conditions. The goal of contract interpretation is to determine the objective common intent of the parties.[36] “When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent.”[37] Contracts should be interpreted to give effect to each provision.[38] “Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.”[39] Specific provisions control over general.[40]
The Court finds that there is only one reasonable interpretation of the documents, so the issue is ripe for summary judgment.[41] Every purchase order purports to incorporate the Terms and Conditions.[42] The Terms and Conditions document specifies...
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