Johnson v. Palma

• Decision Date: 22 April 1991
• Docket Number: No. 515,D,515
• Parties: 55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1173, 56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,711, 59 USLW 2727 Leonard A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank PALMA, Individually and as representative of IUE Local 509 the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Defendants-Appellees. ocket 88-7846.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Page 203

931 F.2d 203

55 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1173,

56 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,711, 59 USLW 2727

Leonard A. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank PALMA, Individually and as representative of IUE Local 509 the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 515, Docket 88-7846.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.

Argued Dec. 14, 1990.

Decided April 22, 1991.

Georgene M. Vairo, New York City (Karl Pflanz, Avery Ryan, Legal Assts., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert Friedman, Washington, D.C. (Stephen D. Rogoff, Rochester, N.Y., of counsel), for defendants-appellees.

Before KEARSE, PIERCE and MINER, Circuit Judges.

MINER, Circuit Judge:

Appeal from a judgment, entered on August 25, 1988, in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Larimer, J.) dismissing Title VII claims against IUE Local 509 ("Local 509" or "union"). The district court found on motion for summary judgment that plaintiff-appellant Leonard A. Johnson had failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. (1988) against Local 509. The district court also found that, even if Johnson had made out a prima facie case, Local 509 had a legitimate reason for refusing to press forward with Johnson's grievance. Johnson's appeal also encompasses an earlier order, entered on March 15, 1988, dismissing his Title VII claims against the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (the "International Union") on the ground that neither the complaint filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights ("DHR") nor the complaint filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") named the International Union as a respondent. Finding the failure to name a party a jurisdictional defect, the court held that the action may not be maintained against the International Union.

On appeal, Johnson specifically challenges the district court's finding that he failed to establish a retaliatory motive on the part of the union and therefore failed to make out a prima facie case of retaliation. He also challenges the court's finding that the union's acquiescence in the policy of Johnson's employer, Delco Products ("Delco"), served as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to proceed with the grievance process. Regarding the dismissal of the claim against the International Union, Johnson maintains that the International Union had knowledge of the administrative complaint and thus may be sued for retaliation. We hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the union on the retaliation claim because Johnson presented a prima facie case and because the union failed to articulate a legitimate reason for its refusal to proceed with Johnson's grievance. We also conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the claims against the International Union because it was not named in the administrative agency charges.

BACKGROUND

Leonard A. Johnson was employed by Delco, a division of General Motors Corporation, for more than twenty years. During his term of employment, Johnson was a member of Local 509, a local affiliate of the International Union. On September 23, 1979, Delco suspended him for thirty days for "habitually reporting late for work." Johnson immediately filed a grievance, claiming that he had been treated unfairly. At the expiration of the thirty-day suspension period, Johnson returned to work. However, he was fired on December 10, 1979 for arriving late for work three times in one week. Shortly thereafter, Johnson filed a complaint with the DHR against Delco, alleging that he was fired on account of his race. See N.Y.Exec.Law Sec. 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp.1991).

Frank Palma was the "Chairman of the shop committee" of Local 509. He was responsible for handling grievances filed by union members at the more formal stages of the grievance process. The first two steps of the grievance procedure are informal in nature and are handled by Delco employees. The third and fourth steps, the more formal stages of the grievance process, as well as subsequent arbitrations, are handled by Palma.

After obtaining unfavorable results in the first three steps of the process, Johnson filed a notice of appeal to the fourth step. Delco had a policy that it would not proceed with the grievance procedure when a complaint was pending before the DHR. Palma informed Johnson that, because of Delco's policy, he would not take the grievance through the fourth step unless Johnson withdrew his complaint. Desiring to go forward with the grievance procedure, Johnson withdrew his DHR complaint. The grievance procedure then proceeded to the fourth step. On March 20, 1980, Johnson lost the fourth step. Palma proceeded to the fourth and a half step, in which the company and the union attempt to resolve the grievance through formal settlement discussions. At that point, Palma indicated to Johnson that Delco had agreed to reinstate Johnson without backpay or seniority, but Johnson refused to accept the offer. The union then decided that Johnson's grievance could not proceed successfully through arbitration and withdrew the grievance.

Meanwhile, on March 12, 1980, dissatisfied with the progress of the grievance procedure, Johnson had reinstated his DHR complaint against Delco and had filed a new DHR complaint against the union. In the complaint against the union, Johnson alleged that by refusing to proceed with the grievance process unless he withdrew his DHR complaint, the union had retaliated against him for engaging in protected activity. The complaint named "International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, Local 509" as respondent.

Johnson alleged that during a meeting with Palma and Delco employees, he was "pressured" by them to withdraw his new complaint against Delco. He also claimed that both before and during the fourth step, he was advised that he would not receive adequate union representation unless he withdrew the new complaint against Delco since "[the union] had established a good working relationship with representatives of the company and that such complaint ... against the company was 'bad form' and would not help them reach a resolution." Palma asserts that his decision not to proceed with the arbitration was made before learning that Johnson had filed a new complaint.

The DHR dismissed the complaint against Delco but not against Local 509. Thereafter, Johnson filed a charge with the EEOC. On February 13, 1986, the EEOC issued to Johnson a notice of right to sue. Johnson commenced an action in the district court against Palma, individually and as a representative of Local 509, Local 509 and the International Union, pleading claims under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1981, 1982, 1983 (1988), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e et seq. and pleading a violation of his fifth amendment rights, for retaliating against him for filing a complaint with the DHR based on racial discrimination by Delco. Johnson specifically alleged that the defendants committed two acts of retaliation. The first act involved the union's refusal to proceed with the grievance process through the fourth step unless Johnson withdrew his initial DHR complaint. The second retaliatory act allegedly occurred when the union decided not to take Johnson's grievance to arbitration until he withdrew his second complaint.

In a bench decision on a motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed, as against all defendants, the fifth amendment claim for lack of state or federal action and the section 1981, 1982 and 1983 claims for lack of state action and because they were barred by the New York statute of limitations. Finally, the court dismissed the complaint against the International Union and Palma on the Title VII claims on the grounds that neither the DHR nor the EEOC charge named the International Union or Palma as respondents; that there was no evidence that the International Union acted either alone or in concert with Local 509 in declining to process Johnson's grievance; and that no evidence was presented indicating that Local 509 acted as an agent for the International Union. The court reserved decision on the remaining Title VII claim against Local 509.

The district court, in a Decision and Order, granted summary judgment on the remaining claim in favor of Local 509 on the ground that Johnson "ha[d] failed to establish either directly or indirectly a causal connection between defendant's refusal to proceed with his grievance and his filing a complaint against Delco." The court found that the decision not to proceed with the grievance because of company policy was insufficient to establish retaliatory animus. Finally, the court concluded that even assuming Johnson had presented a prima facie case of retaliation, the decision not to proceed in light of company policy served as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not going forward with the grievance procedures. Johnson appeals from the judgment dismissing the Title VII claims against Local 509 and the International Union.

For the reasons that follow, we vacate the portion of the judgment dismissing the Title VII claim against Local 509, but affirm the portion of the judgment dismissing the Title VII claim against the International Union.

DISCUSSION

I. Dismissal of Title VII claim for failure to establish a prima facie case

Under Title VII, to make out a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show participation in protected activity known to the defendant, an employment action disadvantaging the person engaged in the protected activity, and a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir.1990); DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 821 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S....