Johnson v. Pennyrile Allied Cmty. Servs.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:20-CV-71-TBR-LLK |
| Parties | THERESSA JOHNSON and DEBORAH JOHNSON PLAINTIFFS v. PENNYRILE ALLIED COMMUNITY SERVICES et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky |
This matter is before the Court on two motions: Plaintiffs Theressa Johnson and Deborah Johnson's Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against Defendant Cabinet for Health and Family Services ("CHFS"), [DN 12]; and Defendant Cabinet for Health and Family Services' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or alternatively, Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, and response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Default Judgment, [DN 15]. Plaintiffs responded to Defendants' Motion, [DN 21], and Defendant replied, [DN 23]. This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default Judgment against Defendant CHFS, [DN 12], is DENIED; and Defendant CHFS's Motion to Dismiss, [DN 15], is GRANTED.
Plaintiffs Theressa Johnson and Deborah Johnson are African American women over the age of forty (40). [DN 1 at 4]. Both Theressa and Deborah hold Master's Degrees in the field of social services. Id. Theressa Johnson was a full-time employee at Defendant Pennyrile Allied Community Services ("PACS") from December 1, 2009 to March 26, 2019 and again from April 8, 2019 to August 19, 2019. Id. Theressa worked as a Family Preservation Specialist and waseventually promoted to Diversion Supervisor for the Family Preservation Program. Id. Deborah Johnson was a full-time employee at Defendant PACS from June 15, 2019 to October 31, 2019. Deborah worked as a Family Preservation Specialist for the Family Preservation Program. Id. In their complaint, Plaintiffs state that they were "targets of abuse, including false accusations, harassment and multiple adverse employment actions because of their race and age." Id. at 2. Plaintiffs further state that despite being overly qualified for their respective positions and maintaining clean employment records, both women were ultimately terminated and replaced by younger, less qualified white employees who received higher salaries than Plaintiffs. Id.
CHFS, pursuant to its statutory duties, entered into a contract with PACS, whereby PACS provides family preservation and reunification services to Kentucky citizens and receives federal grant money in exchange. [DN 15 at 75; DN 15-1 (Excerpts from Contract, Section 2.0)]. Defendant CHFS's Department for Community Based Services ("DCBS") monitors PACS to ensure it complies with state regulations and contractual obligations—which includes ensuring that individuals who perform services possess minimum qualifications and requirements for the work performed and approving employment actions by PACS. [DN 15 at 75; DN 15-1; DN 1 at 3]. As such, Plaintiffs contend that because "CHFS's DCBS approved all of the employment actions by PACS, CHFS is liable for the actions of PACS through vicarious or imputed liability, cat's paw theory, and Respondeat Superior." [DN 1 at 3].
Theressa Johnson filed an EEOC charge of discrimination against PACS on January 14, 2020. [DN 15-2]. The EEOC issued Theressa a Notice of Right to Sue on January 28, 2020. [DN 1 at 5]. Deborah Johnson filed an EEOC charge of discrimination against PACS on February 24, 2020. [DN 15-3]. The EEOC issued Deborah a Notice of Right to Sue on March 11, 2020. [DN 1 at 5]. Subsequently, on April 27, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Defendants PennyrileAllied Community Services ("PACS"), Roy Brunner, Cabinet for Health and Family Services ("CHFS"), and Doe(s) 1-50 individually and in their official capacities. [DN 1].
The Complaint lists eleven (11) causes of action, nine (9) of which are against CHFS. Those nine causes of action are Count I discrimination, retaliation, harassment, and wrongful termination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Count II racial discrimination pursuant to KRS 344.050; Count III age discrimination pursuant to KRS 344.050; Count IV retaliation pursuant to KRS 344.050; Count VI common law negligent infliction of emotional distress; Count VII common law intentional infliction of emotional distress; Count VIII common law negligent hiring retention and supervision; Count IX common law wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and Count XI racial discrimination pursuant to Title VII. [DN 1]. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages based on lost wages and pain and suffering from CHFS under federal statutes, Kentucky statues, and common law tort. Id. at 2.
On September 22, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an Application for Entry of Default Judgment against Defendant CHFS. [DN 12]. Subsequently, on October 12, 2020, Defendant CHFS filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), (4), (5), and (6) and 4(m). [DN 15].
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant CHFS contends that Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims, KRS Chapter 344 claims, and common law claims against CHFS must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. [DN 15 at 68]. CHFS states that Plaintiffs' Title VII claim must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted based on Plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies and enlarging its Title VII charge beyond its EEOC Complaint. [Id. at 68, 74]. Additionally, CHFS asserts that Plaintiffs' claims against itshould dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), (4), and (5) and Rule 4(m), for insufficient process, insufficient service of process, lack of personal jurisdiction due to process deficiency, and for failure to serve within 90 days. [Id. at 80]. Lastly, CHFS asserts that because Plaintiffs failed to properly serve CHFS in this matter the Court should direct the clerk to not enter a default judgment against it. [Id.]
The standards for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) differ in the Sixth Circuit. Mooneyham v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 720, 722-23 (W.D. Ky. 2015) (citing RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996)). Threshold challenges to subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) should generally be decided before any ruling on the merits under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See id. (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). In most circumstances, a plaintiff bears the burden to survive Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
A motion to dismiss based on a state's immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is essentially a motion to dismiss for "lack of subject-matter jurisdiction." In re Foss Mar. Co., No. 5:12-CV-00121, 2013 WL 4096296, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 13, 2013) ()); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh theevidence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists." In re Foss Mar. Co., 2013 WL 4096296, at *2 (quoting DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 2004)). "A facial attack on the subject-matter jurisdiction alleged in the complaint questions merely the sufficiency of the pleading." Id. (quoting Gentek Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Steel Peel Litig., 491 F.3d 320, 330 (6th Cir.2007)). The defense of sovereign immunity raises a facial challenge to the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Kentucky Mist Moonshine, Inc. v. Univ. of Kentucky, 192 F. Supp. 3d 772, 780 (E.D. Ky. 2016) (citing Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 46 F.Supp.2d 736, 737 (S.D. Ohio 1999), aff'd 219 F.3d 559 (6th Cir. 2000)). "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Here, Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) on sovereign immunity grounds. Sovereign immunity may serve as a basis for a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol, 741 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2013). "'[W]hile the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the sense that it is a limitation on the federal court's judicial power,' the defense 'is not coextensive with the limitations on judicial power in Article III.'" Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n. 2, 118 S.Ct. 1694, 140 L.Ed.2d 970 (1998)). "[U]nlike subject-matter jurisdiction, 'the entity asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity has the burden to show that it is entitled to immunity.'" Id. (citation omitted); see also Mooneyham v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 720, 722-23 (W.D. Ky. 2015).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that pleadings, including complaints, contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint may be attacked for failure "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts analyzing challenges under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) "must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to plaintiff [ ]. . ." League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir.2007). In order to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a party must "plead enough factual matter to raise a...
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