Johnson v. Pulidy

• Decision Date: 28 March 1933
• Citation: 116 Conn. 443,165 A. 355
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHNSON v. PULIDY.

165 A. 355

116 Conn. 443

JOHNSON v. PULIDY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 28, 1933

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Frederick M. Peasley Judge.

Action by Jeannette G. Johnson against Frank Pulidy for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, tried to a jury. A verdict was directed for the defendant, and plaintiff's motion to set aside the directed verdict was denied. From a judgment entered in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appeals.

Error and a new trial ordered.

Mere knowledge of conditions from which danger arose does not necessarily constitute knowledge or appreciation of danger but known conditions must be such that ordinarily prudent person would have appreciated danger.

William S. Locke and Reuben Sudarsky, both of Hartford (Ralph O. Wells and Charles Sudarsky, both of Hartford, on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph F. Berry and Julius G. Day, Jr., both of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, and AVERY, JJ.

HAINES, Justice.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff from a fall down the stairway of a restaurant maintained by the defendant. The jury disagreed, whereupon the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant and entered judgment accordingly. The appeal is from the action of the court in directing the verdict and refusing to set it aside on motion. From the action taken it is a necessary conclusion that the court felt either that the defendant was not negligent or that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, one or both, as matter of law. The only question for our decision therefore is whether this action by the court was justified by the record. If the evidence in a case presents such a situation that the mind of a fair and reasonable man could therefrom reach but one conclusion, there is no question for a jury, and the case should be decided by the judge as essentially a question of law, and he may direct a verdict; but if the evidence is such that honest and reasonable men could fairly differ and reach different conclusions, then the issues should go to the jury for determination. Farrell v. Waterbury Horse R. Co., 60 Conn. 230, 257, 21 A. 675, 22 A. 544; Bunnell v. Waterbury Hospital, 103 Conn. 520, 526, 131 A. 501; Sedita v. Steinberg, 105 Conn. 1, 5, 134 A. 243, 49 A.L.R. 154; Bernardo v. Hoffman, 109 Conn. 158, 159, 145 A. 884; Greenley v. Miller's, Incorporated, 111 Conn. 584, 589, 150 A. 500; Naveckas v. Jack, 112 Conn. 407, 410, 152 A. 580.

Upon the trial of this case the defendant offered no evidence. From the evidence produced by the plaintiff the jury could reasonably have found that, with a lady friend, she entered the defendant's restaurant on Trumbull street in the city of Hartford about 7 o'clock on the evening of January 13 1932, and had dinner there; that a stairway connected the street level with the floor level of the restaurant and that, about thirty inches back from the top of the stairway, the defendant had placed a show case for the display of articles for sale and designed to attract the attention of patrons; this show case was utilized as the paying counter, the cash register being placed and the cashier herself, who was the wife of the defendant, standing immediately back of the show case; the stairway had smooth walls with no railing of any kind, and extended from the street level upward in an easterly direction; its opening at the top was bounded on the north side by the wall of the building, and on the south side by a solid sheathed railing two and three-quarters feet high from the floor level, and extending about two inches beyond the opening to the east of the edge of the top step of the stairs, and this railing hid the stairway opening from the view of one coming from the tables which were further to the south. There was thus provided for patrons when paying their bill, a space of about thirty inches in which to stand, between the show case and the top stair, and while so doing, the patron faced the cashier, with the wall of the building at her left, the top stair immediately back of her, and the opening into the...