Johnson v. Quander

Decision Date21 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. Civ.A. 04-448(RBW).,Civ.A. 04-448(RBW).
Citation370 F.Supp.2d 79
PartiesLamar JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Paul A. QUANDER, Director, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia

Lamar Johnson, Baltimore, MD, pro se.

Todd A. Cox, Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Jane M. Lyons, United States Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

WALTON, District Judge.

The plaintiff brings this action alleging that the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 14135b, ("the DNA Act") and D.C.Code § 22-4151, which was enacted by the District of Columbia to implement in the District of Columbia the objectives of the DNA Act, violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the Ex Post Facto Clauses of Article 1, sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution; the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d to d-8; and the International Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Complaint ("Compl.") ¶¶ 14-20. The defendants, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), have filed a motion to dismiss this action. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 1. Currently before the Court are the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss ("Defs.' Mem."); the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n"); and the Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss ("Defs.' Reply"). For the reasons set forth below, this Court grants the defendants' motion.

I. Background
(A) Statutory History

Under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("1994 Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 14132, "Congress authorized the FBI to create a national index of [deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")] samples taken from convicted offenders, crime scenes and victims of crime, and unidentified human remains." H.R.Rep. No. 106-900 at 8 (2000). In response to this congressional mandate, the FBI established the Combined DNA Index System ("CODIS"). Id. The CODIS database provides a means for State and local forensic laboratories to share DNA profiles in an attempt to "link evidence from crime scenes for which there are no suspects to DNA samples of convicted offenders on file in the system."1 Id. However, the 1994 Act was interpreted by the FBI to only permit the creation of the CODIS, not the taking of DNA samples of persons convicted of federal offenses for input into the system. Id. Thus, "the FBI requested that Congress enact statutory authority to allow the taking of DNA samples from persons committing Federal crimes of violence, robbery, and burglary, or similar crimes in the District of Columbia or while in the military, and authorizing them to be included in CODIS." Id.

Accordingly, Congress passed the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 ("DNA Act"), 42 U.S.C. § 14135 et seq., which authorizes the "Attorney General to make grants to eligible States ... to carry out, for the inclusion in the Combined DNA Index System of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, DNA analyses of samples taken from individuals convicted of a qualifying State offenses." 42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)(1). Moreover, the DNA Act provides that "[t]he Director of the Bureau of Prisons shall collect a DNA sample from each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense" and that "the probation office responsible for the supervision under Federal law of an individual on probation, parole, or supervised release shall collect a DNA sample from each such individual who is or has been, convicted of a qualifying Federal offense." 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)-(2). In addition, Congress has mandated the collection of DNA samples from "each individual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons who is, or has been convicted of a qualifying District of Columbia offense" or any "individual under the supervision of the Agency who is on supervised release, parole, or probation who is, or has been convicted of a qualifying District of Columbia offense." 42 U.S.C. § 14135b(a)(1)-(2). Congress left to the District of Columbia the responsibility of determining which offenses under the District of Columbia Code should be deemed qualifying offenses. 42 U.S.C. § 14135b(d). The District of Columbia has determined that forty-nine separate offense qualify for collection under the DNA Act. See, D.C.Code § 22-4151(1)(46). These qualifying offense include, for example, arson, aggravated assault, burglary, kidnaping, robbery, attempted robber and carjacking. Id.

Once a DNA sample is entered into the CODIS database, the information can only be released (1) "to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identification purposes;" (2) "in judicial proceedings;" (3) "for criminal defense purposes, to a defendant, who shall have access to samples and analyses performed in connection with the case in which such defendant is charged;" or (4) "if personally identifiable information is removed, for a population statistics database, for identification research and protocol development purposes, or for quality control purposes." 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(3). In addition, the DNA Act imposes criminal penalties for individuals who improperly disclose sample results or improperly obtains or uses DNA samples. 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(c).

(B) Factual Background

On December 20, 2001, the plaintiff, Lamar Johnson, was convicted in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia of two counts of unarmed robbery in violation of D.C.Code § 22-2801. Compl. ¶ 4. On March 15, 2002, the plaintiff was sentenced to a one year prison sentence and placed on two years supervised release for each conviction. Id. However, execution of both sentences were suspended and the plaintiff was placed on two years probation for each offense, which were designated to run concurrently. Id. On or around February 18, 2004, prior to the expiration of the plaintiff's probationary term, the defendants, pursuant to the DNA Act and D.C.Code § 22-4151, demanded that the plaintiff provide a sample of his DNA for inclusion in the CODIS because he had been convicted of a predicate offense. Id. ¶ 9; see also Compl., Ex. A; D.C.Code § 22-4151(27) (listing violations of D.C.Code § 22-2801 (robbery) as a qualifying offense). The plaintiff refused to provide a DNA sample, and a judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia ordered the plaintiff to show cause why his probation should not be revoked because of this refusal. Compl., Ex. B (Show Cause Order signed by Judge Campbell, Associate Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia).

On March 18, 2004, the plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court, seeking a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to prevent the defendants from requiring that he provide a DNA sample. Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order at 1. Before this Court could resolve the TRO, the parties filed a Motion to Resolve Certain Preliminary Matters, which proposed to resolve the need for emergency injunctive relief. In the motion, the plaintiff agreed to provide a blood sample to the defendants, and the defendants agreed to delay processing that sample until after the plaintiff's claims in this action and any subsequent appeals had been resolved. The motion was granted by this Court and the motion for a TRO was denied. The parties then filed their papers which are the subject of this opinion.

II. Standards of Review

Under Rule 12(b)(1), which governs motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, "[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion to establish subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence." Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 27 F.Supp.2d 15, 19 (D.D.C.1998). In reviewing such a motion, this Court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). Additionally, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, it is well established in this Circuit that a court is not limited to the allegations in the complaint, but may also consider material outside of the pleadings in its effort to determine whether the court has jurisdiction in the case. See EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624-25 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1997); Herbert v. Nat'l Academy of Sciences., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992); Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C.Cir.1987); Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 14 (D.D.C.2001).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this Court must construe the allegations and facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the alleged facts. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citing Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994)). However, the Court need not accept inferences or conclusory allegations that are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court can only consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference into the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice. St. Francis, 117 F.3d at 624-25. The Court will dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if the defendant can demonstrate "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
37 cases
  • Word v. U.S. Probation Dept., C/A No. 3: 05-2689-GRA.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • July 13, 2006
    ...testing has been held not to be punitive and not, in itself, a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.; see also Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 96-97 (D.D.C.2005); Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 485-86 (4th Cir.1993). Several other courts similarly have held that the federal DNA Ac......
  • Wilson v. Wilkinson, Case No. 2:04-CV-918.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • March 6, 2007
    ...the plaintiffs claim must be evaluated. The plaintiffs substantive due process claim must therefore be dismissed. Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 90 (D.D.C.2005), aff'd, 440 F.3d 489 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 945, 127 S.Ct. 103, 166 L.Ed.2d 255 (2006). See also Quander, 440 F......
  • Runkle v. Gonzales
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
    • September 28, 2005
    ...testimony regarding federal employee's mental health because HIPAA provides no private right of action); see also Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79, 99-101 (D.D.C.2005) (dismissing HIPAA claim involving disclosure of DNA information because no private right of action exists under HIPAA).......
  • Rzayeva v. U.S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • May 31, 2007
    ...also, e.g., Cassidy v. Nicolo, No. 03-CV-6603-CJS, 2005 WL 3334523, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34160 (W.D.N.Y. Dec.7, 2005); Johnson v. Quander, 370 F.Supp.2d 79 (D.D.C.2005). Accordingly, Plaintiffs HIPAA claim must be 4. Claim for Loss of Society of Plaintiffs' Mother Defendants Isenberg, CCCI......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT