Johnson v. Quern

• Decision Date: 07 November 1980
• Docket Number: No. 16183,16183
• Citation: 45 Ill.Dec. 500,90 Ill.App.3d 151,412 N.E.2d 1082
• Parties: , 45 Ill.Dec. 500 Gussie JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur F. QUERN, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid; and Illinois Department of Public Aid, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1082

412 N.E.2d 1082

90 Ill.App.3d 151, 45 Ill.Dec. 500

Gussie JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Arthur F. QUERN, Director, Illinois Department of Public Aid; and Illinois Department of Public Aid Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16183.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District Nov. 7, 1980.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1980.

[45 Ill.Dec. 501] George Bell, Land of Lincoln Legal Assistance Foundation, Champaign, for plaintiff-appellant

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., State of Illinois, Chicago, for defendants-appellees; Imelda R. Terrazino, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

MILLS, Presiding Justice:

After wading through the sea of alphabet soup which typically surrounds governmental programs, we reverse.

This action comes before us through administrative review of a decision made by the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA), denying plaintiff's request for disability benefits under the Illinois program for Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD). The circuit court affirmed the IDPA's determination.

FACTS

On August 31, 1978, plaintiff filed an application with the IDPA in Champaign County for public assistance. Although our record does not contain a copy of the application, every indication we have is that plaintiff applied for only AABD. Again, although not explicitly evidenced here, it appears as if plaintiff also filed an application with the Social Security Administration (SSA) for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). (42 U.S.C.A. § 1381.) Our record does not indicate when the application Based solely on plaintiff's AABD application, plaintiff was put on presumptive eligibility status (PE), pending a determination of disability by the SSA. The County Department thus authorized, on October 18, 1978, interim assistance payments of $214.02.

[45 Ill.Dec. 502] was filed with the SSA or whether plaintiff filed this application at the direction of the IDPA.

On November 28, 1978, the IDPA was notified by the SSA that SSI payments had been denied to plaintiff because it was found she was not disabled. On the same date, the IDPA denied plaintiff's application on the basis that the SSA had determined that she was not disabled and terminated the interim assistance effective January of 1979.

On December 7, 1978, plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the IDPA and a hearing was held on January 10, 1979. At the hearing, the only question considered by the IDPA was whether SSA had in fact found that she was disabled. Counsel for the plaintiff attacked the policy of the IDPA which delegates the disability determination to the SSA. A final administrative decision denying the application for assistance was entered on February 1, 1979.

TRIAL COURT

On March 8, 1979, plaintiff filed a complaint under the Administrative Review Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 264 et seq.) In the complaint, plaintiff asserted: that she was sufficiently disabled to qualify for medical and financial assistance under the AABD program and that the decision to deny her application was erroneous; that she was denied due process of law by the IDPA's refusal to continue her assistance payments pending appeal; and, that she was denied due process since she was not allowed a hearing on the factual determination of her disability.

On March 3, 1980, the circuit court entered an order affirming the final administrative decision. The court framed two issues on appeal: whether the plaintiff had a statutory or administrative right to insist that Illinois make its own determination on the question of disability; and whether it was a violation of the IDPA's regulations or of due process for the IDPA to terminate the interim assistance without a hearing.

On the first question, the trial court concluded that Illinois had instituted a State program to supplement fully the Federal SSI program. The court indicated that the State Supplemental Payments (SSP) were mandated by section 3-13 of the Public Aid Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 23, par. 3-13), and that for all practical purposes SSP and AABD are now the same program. The court concluded that under section 3-13 of the Public Aid Code the IDPA has the power to make regulations governing a determination of disability which it has done by delegation to the SSA. The court noted that the plaintiff predicated her contention for a separate State determination of her disability upon sections 3-1 and 3-4 of the Public Aid Code. The court found, however, that the passage of sections 3-13 and 3-14 established a unified complementary Federal-State program for aid to the disabled. The court determined that an administrative appeal of an adverse determination is provided by the Social Security Administration under provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1383(c), and that an adequate safeguard is provided for the rights of the applicant.

On the second question, the trial court found that the Illinois Department makes a determination upon initial application that if the applicant is indeed determined to be disabled, then a certain monthly benefit would be applicable. Illinois then pays interim assistance but the applicant is not truly eligible until the determination of disability is made. The court also found that discontinuance of the interim payments is not a termination of a right or an entitlement when no disability is found. The court concluded that since the disability determination was being made by the Federal government, there was no requirement upon the State to continue presumptive payments during the time that an appeal is made of the Federal decision. ISSUES

The plaintiff now prosecutes this appeal, arguing that the IDPA was required by State statute, Federal regulations, and the Illinois and United States Constitutions to provide her with a hearing encompassing the question of her disability. She also argues that the State was required pursuant to IDPA policy, Federal regulations, and the Illinois and United States Constitutions to provide her with a hearing prior to termination of her benefits on a presumptive eligibility status. The Department claims that this case has been mooted due to the fact that plaintiff is now receiving benefits. We address this final claim first.

MOOTNESS

It is the duty of an appellate court to decide actual controversies which can be carried into effect and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions or to declare principles of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before the court. (Rasky v. Anderson (1978), 62 Ill.App.3d 633, 19 Ill.Dec. 486, 379 N.E.2d 1.) A moot question is one that existed but because of the happening of certain events has ceased to exist and no longer presents an actual controversy over the interest or rights of the party; an abstract question is one in existence but for which no effectual relief can be granted. (Harney v. Cahill (1965), 57 Ill.App.2d 1, 206 N.E.2d 500.) Where there are strange circumstances which render the issue on appeal moot, the appeal will be dismissed even though such facts do not appear in the record. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Thornton (1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 422, 339 N.E.2d 776; Spencer v. Community Hospital of Evanston (1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 285, 332 N.E.2d 525.

In her brief, plaintiff asserts that the "SSA finally decided on January 21, 1980, that the initial determination of no disability was erroneous and that the plaintiff had in fact been disabled since September 14, 1978, the date she applied for SSI." Defendant now focuses upon this language and argues that the case has become moot.

As plaintiff points out in her reply brief, however, even though she received retroactive SSI benefits, she has not received retroactive AABD benefits. Thus, while she is currently receiving benefits, she has not received benefits which were due from the time of her initial application. Should we grant the relief plaintiff requests, we would remand for a hearing to determine whether she was in fact disabled at the time of her initial application. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not feel that the appeal has been mooted. Having made this finding, we do not address plaintiff's contention that this court should consider the case under the "public interest" exception to the mootness rule. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm. (1979), 67 Ill.App.3d 616, 24 Ill.Dec. 392, 385 N.E.2d 159.

HEARING REQUIRED

We next consider the question of whether the IDPA was required to provide plaintiff with a hearing encompassing the question of disability upon the denial of her AABD application. Plaintiff argues that Illinois statutes, Federal statutes and regulations, and the Illinois and United States Constitutions require such a hearing. Without reaching the question of whether the hearing was required by Federal statutes or regulations or the Illinois or United States Constitutions, we find that plaintiff did indeed have a right to such a hearing on the question of disability pursuant to Illinois statutes.

Article III of the Public Aid Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 23, par. 3-1, et seq.) contains provisions creating a program to provide aid to the aged, blind or disabled. Specifically, section 3-1 provides:

" § 3-1. Eligibility Requirements. Financial aid in meeting basic maintenance requirements for a livelihood compatible with health and well-being shall be given under this Article to or in behalf of aged, blind, or disabled persons...