Johnson v. Rapid Sheet Metal, LLC
| Decision Date | 16 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 20-cv-160-LM |
| Citation | 560 F.Supp.3d 623 |
| Parties | John L. JOHNSON, Jr. v. RAPID SHEET METAL, LLC |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Kirk C. Simoneau, Nixon Vogelman Slawsky & Simoneau PA, Manchester, NH, for John L. Johnson, Jr.
J. Daniel Marr, Hamblett & Kerrigan, PA, Nashua, NH, for Rapid Sheet Metal, LLC.
Landya McCafferty, United States District Judge In this employment discrimination action, John L. Johnson, Jr. ("plaintiff"), claims that his former employer, Rapid Sheet Metal, LLC ("defendant") failed to reasonably accommodate his disability and retaliated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings (doc. no. 11) as to: (1) plaintiff's right to recover punitive damages and certain forms of injunctive relief; and (2) plaintiff's retaliation claim. For the reasons below, the court denies defendant's motion as to punitive damages and injunctive relief and partially grants defendant's motion as to the retaliation claim. The retaliation claim is dismissed without prejudice, and plaintiff may file an amended complaint on or before November 19, 2020, to correct deficiencies in his allegations of retaliation.
"Judgment on the pleadings is proper ‘only if the uncontested and properly considered facts conclusively establish the movant's entitlement to a favorable judgment.’ " Zipperer v. Raytheon Co., Inc., 493 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Aponte-Torres v. Univ. of P.R., 445 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) ). "The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." Frappier v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 750 F.3d 91, 96 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007) ); accord Petrello v. City of Manchester, Civ. No. 16-cv-008-LM, 2017 WL 1080932, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar. 21, 2017).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and "determine whether the factual allegations in the plaintiff's complaint set forth a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted." Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 71, 75 (1st Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Where, as here, a plaintiff proceeds pro se, "this standard of review must be applied with due regard for plaintiff's pro se status," in recognition of the fact that pro se complaints are liberally construed "to avoid inappropriately stringent rules and unnecessary dismissals." Bourne v. Arruda, Civ. No. 10-cv-393-LM, 2011 WL 2357504, at *3 (D.N.H. June 10, 2011).
In conducting a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis, "a court should employ a two-pronged approach." Id. at *2 (quoting Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) ). First, the court must "isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements." Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012). Statements constituting "legal conclusions, labels, or naked assertions, ‘devoid of ... factual enhancement’ " must not be credited. Bourne, 2011 WL 2357504, at *2 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). And "even a pro se plaintiff is required to ‘set forth factual allegations’ " in support of his claims. Tierney v. Town of Framingham, 292 F. Supp. 3d 534, 541 (D. Mass. 2018) (italics omitted) (quoting Wright v. Town of Southbridge, Civ. No. 07-40305-FDS, 2009 WL 415506, at *2 (D. Mass. Jan. 15, 2009) ).
Second, the court must "take the facts of the complaint as true, ‘drawing all reasonable inferences in [plaintiff's] favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.’ " Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad de Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d 711, 718 (1st Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55 ). If the complaint's factual allegations, taken as true, allow the court " ‘to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). The First Circuit has stated that "plausible," in the Rule 12(b)(6) context, "means something more than merely possible," Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55, and a complaint that "pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability ... ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility." Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).
Where, as here, succeeding on a claim involves proving a prima facie case, the elements of the prima facie case inform the court's plausibility assessment. See Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 718 ; Arroyo-Ruiz v. Triple-S Mgmt. Grp., 206 F. Supp. 3d 701, 710-11 (D.P.R. 2016). While the prima facie standard is an evidentiary rather than a pleading standard, and the complaint need not set forth sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case, "reference to the prima facie elements can help a court determine whether the ‘cumulative effect of the complaint's factual allegations’ is a plausible claim for relief." Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 718 (italics omitted) (quoting Rodríguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2013) ).
The following facts are drawn from plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff worked for defendant from 2006 until 2015. During his time at the company, he repeatedly requested that defendant provide him with an American Sign Language ("ASL") interpreter so that he could better understand and communicate with other employees. The company ignored his requests. Without an interpreter, plaintiff had difficulty understanding what was happening at company meetings and within the company. This hindered plaintiff from advancing in his career.
Defendant terminated plaintiff's employment in 2015. The complaint asserts that plaintiff's termination was in retaliation for his numerous requests for an ASL interpreter. However, the complaint also alleges that plaintiff's termination was the result of a coworker's false report. The complaint provides no details about this report.
On or about April 1, 2016, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights ("the Commission"), alleging claims of disability discrimination and retaliation under the ADA and New Hampshire's Law Against Discrimination. See RSA ch. 354-A. In 2019, after concluding its investigation of the charge, the Commission found probable cause on claims of failure to accommodate and retaliation.
Defendant thereafter requested that the Commission transfer plaintiff's case to New Hampshire Superior Court. See RSA 354-A:21-a, I ("Any party alleged to have committed any practice made unlawful under this chapter may, in any case in which a determination of probable cause has been made by the investigating commissioner, remove said complaint to superior court for trial."). Soon after the case was transferred to Superior Court, defendant filed a notice of removal in this court, premising jurisdiction on plaintiff's ADA claims. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a), 2000e-5(f)(3).
Plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint,1 alleging that defendant violated ADA2 by failing to reasonably accommodate him with an ASL interpreter and by terminating his employment in retaliation for his numerous requests. The complaint seeks multiple forms of monetary and injunctive relief, including, as relevant to defendant's motion, an order directing defendant to fire the persons responsible for plaintiff's termination. Finally, while the complaint does not specifically request punitive damages, it does state that it "is up to the court on punishment [for] disrespecting the ADA." Doc. no. 7-1 pg. 4.
Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings as to: (1) plaintiff's entitlement to punitive damages; (2) the complaint's request that the court order defendant to terminate the employees responsible for plaintiff's termination; and (3) plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim. Because the first two arguments ultimately turn on the same issue, the court addresses them together before analyzing whether plaintiff has plausibly alleged a claim of retaliation.
Defendant argues that plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to recover punitive damages. Under the ADA, a plaintiff may recover punitive damages if he or she demonstrates that the defendant "engaged in a discriminatory practice ... with malice or reckless indifference to the [plaintiff's] federally protected rights." 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2), (b)(1). Defendant contends that, because plaintiff's complaint does not allege that defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference, defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings as to any claim for punitive damages.
The court notes that plaintiff's complaint does not specifically request punitive damages. Plaintiff seeks multiple types of damages as well as several forms of injunctive relief, but he does not request an award of punitive damages. This raises a threshold question of whether defendant can seek judgment on the pleadings as to a type of relief that has not been pled.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides that final judgments, except for default judgments, "should grant the relief to which each party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief ...
To continue reading
Request your trial