Johnson v. Reeves & Co

Citation72 So. 925,112 Miss. 227
PartiesJOHNSON, STATE REVENUE AGENT, v. REEVES & CO
Decision Date06 November 1916
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 1916

APPEAL from the circuit court of Warren county, HON. E. L. BRIEN Judge.

Suit by J. C. Johnson, State Revenue Agent, against Reeves & Company. From a judgment of the circuit court dismissing plaintiff's appeal from the decision of the board of supervisors and abating the suit, plaintiff appeals.

In May 1915, appellant, as state revenue agent, caused George P Reeves & Co., cotton buyers of Vicksburg, Miss., and appellees herein, to be back-assessed on a large number of bales of cotton for the years 1909 to 1914, both inclusive, in accordance with the provisions of section 4740, Code of 1906. Written objections were filed against said assessment by appellees, and upon hearing by and before the board of supervisors of Warren county the board "disallowed and discharged" the assessment thus attempted to be made by the revenue agent, and from this order of the board appellant prosecuted an appeal to the circuit court of Warren county. While this appeal was pending in the circuit court, and on March 21, 1916, the Legislature of the state of Mississippi passed an act, being Senate Bill No. 310, amending section 4750 of the Code, providing that the revenue agent at the expiration of his term of office should deliver the documents of his office to his successor and requiring the successor to allow all suits theretofore commenced to be conducted in the successor's name. Senate Bill No. 310 read as follows: "An act to amend section 4750 of the Code of 1906, providing for the delivery by the state revenue agent of documents to his successor, and the abatement and prosecution of assessments, suits and appeals instituted by him.

"Section 1. Be it enacted by the legislature of the State of Mississippi, that section 4750 of the Mississippi Code of 1906 be amended to read as follows:

"'4750 (4201). Deliver Documents to His Successor.--The state revenue agent, at the expiration of his term in office, shall deliver to his successor all books, papers and documents pertaining to the office. The successor shall allow all suits commenced, except suits or proceedings for collection or assessments of taxes on agricultural products, to be conducted in his name; but the person who commenced the suit shall pay all attorney's fees and expenses thereof, and receive the commissions, if any.

"'But all power and authority of the state revenue agent and his predecessors in office, to institute or prosecute any suit, appeal or proceeding to assess for taxation, or to collect taxes on agricultural products from or against the owners thereof, are hereby revoked and annulled, and all assessments for back taxes on agricultural products and all suits, appeals and proceedings of every kind to assess for back taxes or to collect back taxes on agricultural products heretofore begun or instituted or now pending shall abate from and after this date, and shall be dismissed.'

"Sec. 2. That this act be in effect and force from and after its passage.

"Approved March 21, 1916."

Thereafter, on April 24, 1916, during the regular term of the circuit court, appellant's appeal from the order of the board of supervisors was, by the court on its own motion and in pursuance of said act, dismissed. From the judgment of the circuit court dismissing the appeal and abating the suit appellant prosecutes this appeal, and thereby presents for the decision of this court the constitutionality of said Senate Bill No. 310.

Affirmed.

Tim E. Cooper and A. H. Longino, for appellant.

Catchings & Catchings, McLaurin & Arminstead, Brunini Hirsch & Griffeth Hirsch, Denton Landau, Watkins & Watkins and Gwin & Mounger, for appellees.

STEVENS J. COOK, P. J. dissenting.

OPINION

STEVENS, J.

(After stating the facts as above). Counsel leading the attack upon the constitutionality of Senate Bill No. 310 direct our attention to and rely upon the following sections of our Constitution, which they contend, are violated by the act in question, viz.: Sections 112, 87, 90 (h and o), 66, and 100. In presenting the case, they argue these several sections of the Constitution more collectively than separately, frankly conceding, however, "that it devolves upon the appellant here to put his hands upon the provisions of the Constitution which prohibit the exercise by the legislature of the power to pass the statute."

It must equally be conceded that in our form of government the power to legislate is vested in the legislature, and that, before the court can strike down the act in question as unconstitutional, we must put our hands upon the exact provision of the Constitution which denies to the legislature the power here exercised, and not only to point out the provision or provisions that are violated, but to hold beyond a reasonable doubt that the act in question conflicts with such provisions of our organic law. It is an elementary principle frequently announced by our court that the members of the legislature are the immediate representatives of the people, and that the expression of the legislative will by statute must be regarded as the expression of the will of the people in their sovereign capacity; and before the courts can interfere the will of the people as expressed in their law must necessarily conflict with their will as heretofore expressed in their Constitution. If there is any doubt about the constitutionality of the act in question, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the law. Our court has likewise frequently called attention to the fact that it has nothing to do with the wisdom or expediency of a statute. What, then, is the purpose and effect of the amendatory act in question? After full consideration of the oral arguments and the able briefs on file, we are forced to conclude that the statute here attacked violates neither the spirit nor the letter of any of the provisions of the Constitution relied upon.

In construing the act we are justified in looking to and considering its title. It amends the Code section providing for the delivery by the outgoing revenue agent of all documents that will be of service to his successor, requires the successor to allow all suits commenced by the outgoing officer to be conducted in the name of the successor "except suits or proceedings for the collection or assessment of taxes on agricultural products," and expressly abates such assessments, suits, and appeals as the revenue agent has instituted against or in reference to agricultural products. The act deals with the power and authority of the revenue agent as a fiscal officer of the state. It does not abate, and does not undertake to abate, any fixed liability of any person, firm or corporation for past-due taxes. The office of state revenue agent is a legislative and not a constitutional office. The legislature has the unquestioned right at any time to prescribe the duties of this officer or to curtail his power. Indeed, it may abolish the office altogether. It may here be stated also that an office is not a contract, and that the incumbent has no vested interest in the term, fees, or emoluments thereof. We are not called upon to search for the motives that may have inspired the amendment to section 4750 of the Code. It is sufficient to say that the legislature in its wisdom, and presumably after maturest deliberation, deemed it wise to trim the power of this officer a bit and to deny altogether the right of the successor to allow his name to be used in the prosecution of any proceedings for the assessment or collection of taxes on agricultural products. Were we, however, called upon to search for a reason, we might be justified, we think, in saying that the power of an out-going officer to prosecute such proceedings armed this official with unusual power; that in the exercise of this power the revenue agent had frequently instituted blanket assessments against millions of dollars worth of property, taxes upon which were being...

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