Johnson v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 12 May 1882
• Citation: 102 Ill. 655,1882 WL 10271
• Parties: WILLIAM T. JOHNSON, Collector,v.JAMES M. ROBERTS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

102 Ill. 655

1882 WL 10271 (Ill.)

WILLIAM T. JOHNSON, Collector,

v.JAMES M. ROBERTS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Ottawa May 12, 1882.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. WILLIAM H. BARNUM, Judge, presiding.

Mr. CONSIDER H. WILLETT, for the appellant:

The question is, has the legislature power to provide what property shall be called personal property, and what real, for the purposes of taxation. The demurrer admits that the boilers and steam engines assessed would, as between the owner and his grantee, be real estate, but the admission reaches no further. It does not admit, as a legal conclusion, that the Revenue law may not classify property at pleasure. The statute has required such property to be returned by the owner in his schedule as personal property. Rev. Stat. chap. 120, sec. 25.

Taxation is an exercise of legislative power, and the legislature may direct the mode of assessing property. Porter v. Railroad Co. 76 Ill. 573; Cooley on Taxation, 33.

Assessors act judicially in making assessments. Const. 1870, art. 9, sec. 1; Burroughs on Taxation, sec. 102, p. 238; Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollock, 75 Ill. 294; Porter v. Railroad Co. 66 Id. 594; Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 Id. 502; Railroad Co. v. Siders, 88 Id. 327.

The town board of review alone had power to review the action of the assessor. Spencer v. People, 68 Ill. 510; Republic Life Ins. Co. v. Pollock, 75 Id. 294; Adsit v. Lieb, 76 Id. 198; Madison County v. Smith, 95 Id. 335; People v. Big Muddy Iron Co. 89 Id. 116.

Mr. JONAS HUTCHINSON, for the appellee:

The boiler and engine were assessed as a part of the realty upon which appellee has paid the tax. To pay again on them as personalty is double taxation. Cooley on Taxation, 165.

The law says a boiler and engine, situate as these are, are a part of the realty. The tax books so declare the law, and this court has frequently so held. Jenney v. Jackson, 6 Bradw. 32; Thulman et al. v. Carr et al. 75 Ill. 385.

The demurrer admits that the boiler and engine are real estate, and this seems to us to be the end of the case. There is no exception to the rule in favor of the State. The statute was never intended to require real estate to be assessed and taxed as personalty.

Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was a bill to enjoin the collection of a tax. It alleges that complainant resides in South Chicago; that he made no return to the assessor of that town for the year 1880, but was assessed for personal property at his residence, and paid $21.14 thereon. He alleges that he owns the half of two lots situated in that town, upon which he paid a real estate tax of $808.59, for the year 1880; that he was assessed on personal property, machinery on the lots, $1300, upon which a tax was extended of $78.50; that the machinery did not exceed $200 in value, consisting in belting, pulleys, etc.; that the assessment included the engines and boilers in the building, but they were not worth more than $300; that the engines and boilers were permanently attached to and were a part of the realty, and were not personalty; that they were so attached as to constitute a part thereof, so far as the owner of the fee is concerned, and that any real estate tax as aforesaid is as much a tax on the engines and boilers as on the land; that they were improperly assessed as personal property; that personal property did not exist on the lots; that therefore the tax, except on the personal property of the value not to exceed $100, is inequitable, unjust, oppressive and illegal, and prays for an injunction perpetually restraining the collection of all but the tax on $100 of valuation. A demurrer was filed to the bill. On a hearing the demurrer was overruled, and a perpetual injunction decreed to prevent the collection of the tax on the engines and boilers, except taxes on the $100 valuation. An appeal is prosecuted to reverse the decree.

The demurrer admitted all facts properly pleaded, but did not admit arguments or legal conclusions, and its office is to determine whether the facts as stated constitute grounds for granting equitable relief. The bill, even if it otherwise stated grounds for equitable relief, is defective in not averring a tender of the amount of the tax that is admitted to be legal. Again, no equitable excuse is shown for not appearing before the town board of review, under section 86 of the Revenue law, or to the county board, under the 97th section of the same act. These boards were invested with full power to...