Johnson v. Rockaway Bus Corp.

• Citation: 140 A.2d 708,145 Conn. 204
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 03 April 1958
• Parties: William JOHNSON, Administrator c.t.a. (Estate of Carl Johanson) v. ROCKAWAY BUS CORPORATION et al. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 708

140 A.2d 708

145 Conn. 204

William JOHNSON, Administrator c.t.a. (Estate of Carl Johanson) v. ROCKAWAY BUS CORPORATION et al.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 3, 1958.

William T. Holleran, New Haven, with whom, on the brief, was David E. Fitz-Gerald, Jr., New Haven, for appellant (defendant Newell).

David Goldstein and Robert J. Harris, Bridgeport, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before WYNNE, C. J., and BALDWIN, DALY, KING and MURPHY, JJ. KING, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff's decedent, Carl Johanson, while crossing Fairfield Avenue in Bridgeport on foot, was struck by the front end of a bus owned by the named defendant and then being operated by its authorized agent, the defendant Wallace, easterly along Fairfield Avenue. That avenue, except within intersections, is divided by a center esplanade. Courtland Avenue intersects Fairfield Avenue from the south but does not cross it. A little west of Courtland Avenue if projected, and forming a slightly irregular continuaction thereof, is Davidson Street, which intersects Fairfield Avenue from the north but does not cross it. Prior to the arrival of the bus at this intersection of Fairfield Avenue with Davidson Street and Courtland Avenue, the defendant Newell, coming along Fairfield Avenue from the opposite direction, had brought his car to a stop to permit east-bound traffic to pass through the intersection and then had driven diagonally across the intersection and westerly along the south (his left) side of Fairfield Avenue in order to turn into his gasoline station, which was located on the southwesterly corner of the intersection. There were three entrances to the station, one on Courtland Avenue and two on Fairfield Avenue. The easterly end of the more easterly Fairfield Avenue entrance was twenty feet from Courtland Avenue, and this entrance, which was the one Newell chose to use, was twenty-two feet wide. There was no contract between his car and the bus, which was then approaching the intersection from the west.

In oral argument in this court the defendant Newell conceded that in operating his car westerly along the south side of the esplanade on Fairfield Avenue he was chargeable with statutory negligence. He denied, however, that this negligence could have been found to be a proximate cause of the collision between the bus and the plaintiff's decedent. The jury were warranted in finding that the decedent successfully crossed southerly from the northeasterly corner of the intersection, that is, from the corner of Davidson Street and Fairfield Avenue, to a safety zone at the westerly end of the esplanade located in the middle of Fairfield Avenue east of the intersection and stood there until traffic moving in an easterly direction had passed; that he then continued southerly and was about midway of the twenty-eight foot distance between the south edge of the esplanade and the south curb of Fairfield Avenue when he was struck by the front end of the bus. The accident occurred at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of a clear bright July day and the pavements were dry. It was the plaintiff's claim that Newell's statutory negligence in deliberately operating his car on the wrong side of the esplanade was a proximate cause of the accident because that negligence created a sudden emergency which caused the driver of the approaching bus, prior to its arrival at the intersection, to swerve to his left to avoid a head-on collision with the Newell car and this change of course caused the bus, even after it had crossed the intersection, to strike the decedent. The jury returned a verdict against all three defendants. From the judgment on the verdict, the defendant Newell, only, appealed. Four of the assignments of error were abandoned during the argument.

One assignment of error attacks the charge because of a comment by the judge to the effect that although his recollection of the testimony was not entirely clear, he did not think that there was 'too much in the direct evidence in connection with the claims by each of the defendants that the other defendant was the real cause of the accident * * * [although that question was] inherent in the case.' This was immediately followed in the charge with a statement, reiterated later on in a supplemental charge given in response to a question from the foreman as to the right of the jury to apportion damages as between the defendant Newell and the other defendants, to the effect that they could bring in a verdict only against a defendant who had been proven chargeable with actionable negligence, that is, with negligence alleged as to him in the complaint and which constituted a proximate...