Johnson v. Roskosci
| Decision Date | 02 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-CV-1232 |
| Parties | ARMONI JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. SERGEANT MICHAEL ROSKOSCI, Defendant |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Nealon)
On June 23, 2015, Plaintiff instituted the above-captioned matter by filing a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant, Sergeant Michael Rostkowski.1 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated Plaintiff's right to "freedom of religion" secured by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and rights under the Fourth Amendment when Defendant "illegally seized" Plaintiff's "religious property," specifically Plaintiff's "religious cultural tribal beads." (Id. at p. 2). Additionally, Plaintiff claims that he was the victim of Defendant's discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. (Id.); (Doc. 1-1, pp. 3, 5, 8). Plaintiff seeks one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000.00) from Defendant for "pain and suffering from such deprivation of religious rights and from the sadness such deprivation or infringement into [Plaintiff's] freedom ofreligion has caused."2 (Doc. 1, p. 3). On January 13, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and brief in support. (Docs. 21, 22). On March 11, 2016, the Court, having not received Plaintiff's brief in opposition, issued an Order directing Plaintiff to file a brief in opposition on or before March 31, 2016. (Doc. 26). On April 4, 2016, Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition. (Doc. 27).3 To date, Defendant has not filed a reply to Plaintiff's brief in opposition, and the time for filing such has passed. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.7. As a result, Defendant's motion to dismiss is ripe for disposition. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal ofcomplaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). "When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must 'accept as true all [factual] allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Altland v. Wetzel, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124787, at *2 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (Conner, J.) (alterations in original) (quoting Kanter v. Barella, 489 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2007)). "Although the court is generally limited in its review to the facts contained in the complaint, it 'may also consider matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case.'" Id. (quoting Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994); citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).
"Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide 'the defendant notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Id. (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008)). "To test the sufficiency of the complaint in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must conduct a three-step inquiry." Id. (citing Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010)). At the first step, "the court must '[t]ake note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.'" Santiago, 629 F.3d at130-31 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). At the second step, "the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated; well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded." Altland, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124787, at *2-3 (citing Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130-31; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyshide, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009)). Then, "[o]nce the well-pleaded factual allegations have been isolated, the court must determine whether they are sufficient to show a 'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at *3 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (). A complaint must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if it fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The non-moving party must aver "factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
"However, even 'if a complaint is subject to Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.'" Payne v. Duncan, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10969, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2016) (Mariani, J.) (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 245). TheUnited States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that:
even when plaintiff does not seek leave to amend his complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss it, unless the district court finds that amendment would be inequitable or futile, the court must inform the plaintiff that he or she has leave to amend the complaint within a set period of time.
In addition, given that he was granted in forma pauperis status to pursue this suit, see (Doc. 7), the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) apply. The court's obligation to dismiss a complaint under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act's ("PLRA") screening provisions for complaints that fail to state a claim is not excused even after a defendant has filed a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000). Hence, if there is a ground for dismissal which was not relied upon by a defendant in a motion to dismiss, the court may nonetheless sua sponte rest its dismissal upon such ground pursuant to the screening provisions of the PLRA. See Id.; Dare v. U.S., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45040 (W.D. Pa. 2007), aff'd, 264 F. App'x 183 (3d Cir. 2008).
Finally, "[t]he obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings is well-established." Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d 333, 339 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of N.J., 588 F.3d 180,184 n.1 (3d Cir. 2009)). Therefore, the allegations advanced by Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, will be liberally construed.
On April 5, 2015, Plaintiff, a "practicing Muslim," was "not bothering anyone, but about to offer prayer inside [his] jail cell." (Doc. 1-1, pp. 1, 3). Defendant came to Plaintiff's cell and asked Plaintiff "why [his] religious cultural be[a]ds did not have crosses on them and to give [the beads] to him." (Id. at p. 3). Defendant then seized Plaintiff's "religious cultural be[a]ds." (Id. at pp. 1, 3). Defendant stated that he was seizing Plaintiff's beads because "they did not have crosses on them and" were altered. (Id. at p. 1). Plaintiff does "not practice the belief of wearing a cross or calling be[a]ds Rosemary (sic) be[a]ds." (Id.). "[I]t is [Plaintiff's] personal religious beliefs to pray with [his] religious cultural be[a]ds (jewels) around [his] neck and has been [his] common religious practice for years." (Id. at p. 2). According to Plaintiff, "[m]aterial that is not prohibited in facility such as white and black be[a]ds is of religious material of [Plaintiff's] beliefs." (Id. at p. 6). He also alleges that Defendant has been "writing false reports against" Plaintiff. (Id. at p. 5).
Also on April 5, 2015, Defendant cited Plaintiff for misconduct claiming Plaintiff altered his property and refused to obey an oral order. (Id. at p. 3); see(Doc. 1, Exhibit 1). Defendant claimed that he observed Plaintiff wearing two (2) altered "rosaries." (Doc. 1, Exhibit 1). Specifically, Defendant stated that the "rosaries" had "the crosses taken off." (Id.). Defendant then claimed that he "gave [Plaintiff] a direct order to hand them to" Defendant, but Plaintiff did not obey the order. (Id.). Ultimately, Defendant confiscated Plaintiff's religious beads. See (Doc. 1).
On April 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance regarding the seizure of his religious beads. (Id. at Exhibit 2). On April 7, 2015, the grievance officer, Captain Kevin J. Gallagher, responded to Plaintiff's grievance. (Id.). Captain Gallagher stated in his response that, inter alia, Plaintiff's "beads were altered," and that Defendant was "correct for seizing the beads." (Id.). Captain Gallagher also stated that Plaintiff was given a "misconduct for this incident," and Plaintiff could "state [his] case to the hearing examiner." (Id.).
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code offers private citizens a cause of action for violations of federal law by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, anycitizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see also Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284-85 (2002); Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1996). "To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 'the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.'" Altland, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124787, at *12 (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
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