Johnson v. Ryan
| Decision Date | 25 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. CV-16-00560-PHX-GMS (ESW),CV-16-00560-PHX-GMS (ESW) |
| Parties | Maurice Lamont Johnson, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Maurice Lamont Johnson's ("Petitioner") Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the "Petition") (Doc. 1). Respondents have answered (Doc. 11), and Petitioner has replied (Doc. 14). The matter is deemed ripe for consideration.
Petitioner presents two grounds for habeas relief in the Petition. The undersigned finds that Ground One, which raises a double jeopardy claim, is without merit. Regarding Ground Two, the undersigned finds that it does not sufficiently state a claim for habeas relief and is also procedurally defaulted. It is therefore recommended that the Petition (Doc. 1) be denied and dismissed with prejudice.
In May 2011, a City of Tempe police officer arrested Petitioner for possession of drug paraphernalia, false reporting to law enforcement, and possession of dangerous drugs. (Doc. 1 at 56). A criminal case was filed in the Municipal Court of the City of Tempe charging Petitioner with false reporting to law enforcement and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Bates No. 1).1 In a plea agreement, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to violating ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2907.01(A) (). The plea agreement stated the charge brought under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3415(A) () would be dismissed. (Doc. 1 at 55). Municipal Court records indicate that the possession of drug paraphernalia charge was dismissed. (Bates No. 1).
On September 16, 2011, the State filed in the Superior Court of Arizona in and for Maricopa County a two-count Complaint, which named the City of Tempe Police Department as the complainant. (Bates Nos. 3-4). On November 7, 2011, the State filed an Information against Petitioner. (Bates No. 8-9). The Information alleged that Petitioner (i) knowingly possessed or used methamphetamine on or about May 18, 20112 and (ii) unlawfully used or possessed with intent to use "a baggie, drug paraphernalia, to pack, repack, store, contain, or conceal methamphetamine" on or about May 18, 2011. (Id.).
Following trial, a jury found Petitioner guilty as charged. (Bates No. 29). The trial court further found that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner was convicted of prior felony offenses. (Bates No. 28). On January 23, 2015, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to 3.5 years on Count 1 (possession or use of methamphetamine) and 1.75 years on Count 2 (possession of drug paraphernalia). (Bates No. 29).
Petitioner's appellate attorney did not find any colorable claims to raise in a directappeal. (Bates Nos. 36-44). Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief. (Bates Nos. 52-58). On August 18, 2015, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. (Bates Nos. 61-65). On February 16, 2016, the Arizona Supreme Court denied Petitioner's request for further review. (Bates Nos. 66-77, 78). On February 29, 2016, Petitioner timely initiated this federal habeas proceeding challenging his convictions and sentences received in the Superior Court of Arizona case. (Doc. 1).
It is well-settled that a "state prisoner must normally exhaust available state remedies before a writ of habeas corpus can be granted by the federal courts." Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981); see also Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (). The rationale for the doctrine relates to the policy of federal-state comity. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275 (1971). The comity policy is designed to give a state the initial opportunity to review and correct alleged federal rights violations of its state prisoners. Id. In the U.S. Supreme Court's words, "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation." Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950).
The exhaustion doctrine is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254. That statute provides that a habeas petition may not be granted unless the petitioner has (i) "exhausted" the available state court remedies; (ii) shown that there is an "absence of available State corrective process"; or (iii) shown that "circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).
Case law has clarified that in order to "exhaust" state court remedies, a petitioner's federal claims must have been "fully and fairly presented" in state court. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014). To "fully and fairly present" afederal claim, a petitioner must present both (i) the operative facts and (ii) the federal legal theory on which his or her claim is based. This test turns on whether a petitioner "explicitly alerted" a state court that he or she was making a federal constitutional claim. Galvan v. Alaska Department of Corrections, 397 F.3d 1198, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 2005).
If a claim was presented in state court, and the court expressly invoked a state procedural rule in denying relief, then the claim is procedurally defaulted in a federal habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2001). Even if a claim was not presented in state court, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in a federal habeas proceeding if the claim would now be barred in state court under the state's procedural rules. See, e.g., Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002).
Similar to the rationale of the exhaustion doctrine, the procedural default doctrine is rooted in the general principle that federal courts will not disturb state court judgments based on adequate and independent state grounds. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004). A habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the state's procedural requirements for presenting his or her federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991).
As alluded to above, a procedural default determination requires a finding that the relevant state procedural rule is an adequate and independent rule. See id. at 729-30. An adequate and independent state rule is clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time of a petitioner's purported default. Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 797-98 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court (Hayes), 103 F.3d 72, 74-75 (9th Cir. 1996). An independent state rule cannot be interwoven with federal law. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985). The ultimate burden of proving the adequacy of a state procedural bar is on the state. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585-86 (9th Cir. 2003). If the state meets its burden, a petitioner may overcome a procedural default byproving one of two exceptions.
In the first exception, the petitioner must show cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate "cause," a petitioner must show that some objective factor external to the petitioner impeded his or her efforts to comply with the state's procedural rules. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004). To demonstrate "prejudice," the petitioner must show that the alleged constitutional violation "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982); see also Carrier, 477 U.S. at 494 ().
In the second exception, a petitioner must show that the failure to consider the federal claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780. This exception is rare and only applied in extraordinary cases. Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1118 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). The exception occurs where a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the offense that is the subject of the barred claim." Wood, 693 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327).
In reviewing the merits of a habeas petitioner's claims, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") requires federal courts to defer to the last reasoned state court decision. Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2014); Henry v. Ryan, 720 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013). To be entitled to relief, a state prisoner must show that the state court's adjudication of his or her claims either:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2); see also, e.g., Woods, 764 F.3d at 1120; Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2010); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011).
As to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), "clearly established federal law" refers to the holdings of the ...
To continue reading
Request your trial