Johnson v. Scott, Case No: 2:13-cv-500-FtM-38UAM
| Decision Date | 01 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:13-cv-500-FtM-38UAM |
| Parties | ADAM J. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MIKE SCOTT, THOMAS W. COLE and UNKNOWN SHERIFFS DEPUTY(S), Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #10) filed on September 23, 2013. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition. (Doc. #14). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for the Court's review.
Plaintiff Adam J. Johnson is a resident of Fort Myers, Florida within Lee County Florida. (Doc. #1, ¶1). Defendant Mike Scott is the Lee County Sheriff (Doc. #1, ¶3), Defendant Thomas W. Cole and Defendant Unknown Sheriff Deputy(s) were deputies at all times relevant. (Doc. #1, ¶¶4-5). Plaintiff filed his four count Complaint on July 9,2013, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various state law claims arising out of the arrest and subsequent detention of Plaintiff by Defendants.
The Complaint alleges on or about October 29, 2009, Defendants negligently investigated a burglary. (Doc. #1, ¶¶15, 32). This burglary encompassed the theft of personal property including several firearms. (Doc. #1, ¶15). Defendants arrested several suspects and then recorded their interviews with these suspects. (Doc. #1,¶16). A witness was shown a picture lineup of white males that included a picture of Plaintiff. (Doc. #1, ¶17). However, Plaintiff was distinctly represented in this picture lineup because Plaintiff's picture contained his face but not his shoulders unlike the other pictures.2 (Doc. #1, ¶17). Also, the lineup picture of Plaintiff filed in the investigative file was circled as if Plaintiff was identified by a witness during the lineup. (Doc. #1, ¶18). Plaintiff asserts video evidence reveals Plaintiff was not identified during this lineup process. (Doc. #1, ¶18).
Defendant Thomas W. Cole "issued" a warrant for the arrest of Plaintiff after learning that an individual with the name "Adam" was seen loading stolen property on his truck. (Doc. #1, ¶16). Thereafter, Plaintiff was arrested at home, placed inside a Sheriff's cruiser, and held in jail. (Doc. #1, ¶¶16, 22). Plaintiff was released from jail after a month and eventually his charges were deemed nolle prosequi. (Doc. #1, ¶19).
The four counts in the Complaint are as follows: Count I - Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants; Count II - False Imprisonmentagainst all Defendants; Count III - Negligence against all Defendants; and Count IV - Negligent Hiring and Training against Defendant Scott as Sheriff. Defendants seek to dismiss all four counts.
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 406, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 153 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2002). Under Rule 8, stating a claim upon which relief may be granted requires that enough factual matter is pled to make relief plausible. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 561-63, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (aboragating Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1957)). Although detailed factual allegations are not required, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitlement" to relief requires more than labels, conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the cause of action's elements. Id. at 561-63. Thus, a complaint must state more than an unadorned, "the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)).
Additionally, unwarranted deductions of fact in a complaint are not admitted as true for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of the allegations. Id. (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005)). Accordingly, the facts as pled must state a claim for relief that is plausible on the face of the pleading. Id. (citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
The Court will now consider each count in the Complaint based on the foregoing standard of review in the order of Defendants' arguments.
Defendants contend Plaintiff's claims in Count I are vague and conclusory. Defendants state that municipalities and political subdivisions may not be held liable under theories of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Further, Defendants contend the Complaint does not meet the higher standard required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants contend Plaintiff alleges no specific facts and alleges no connection between the alleged policies and conduct of Defendants.
Plaintiff responds by arguing the Complaint has more than mere conclusory allegations related to this claim. Plaintiff believes he gave specific allegations of what Defendants did and did not do in regards to the police policies. Plaintiff directs the Court to paragraphs 4, 5, 12, and 13 of the Complaint.
Only two allegations are required to state a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, that some person has deprived him of a federal right and second, that the person who has deprived him of that right acted under color of state or territorial law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). A Sheriff has the final policymaking authority for his agency and accordingly may render a municipality liable under Section 1983. Hemmings. v. Jenne, No. 10-61126-CIV, 2010 WL 4005333, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 12, 2010) (citing Hill v. Clinton, 74 F.3d 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 1996); Lucas v. O'Loughlin, 831 F.2d 232, 235 (11th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 485 U.S. 1035 (1988)). However, a Sheriff cannot be held liable based on a respondeat superior theory. Hartleyv. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999). Instead, a "plaintiff must establish a direct causal connection between a custom policy, practice, or procedure and the alleged constitutional deprivation." Hemmings, 2010 WL 4005333, at *2 (citing Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1997); Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978)). A plaintiff can do so by either identifying an official promulgated policy or by identifying an unofficial custom or practice shown through the repeated acts of the final policymaker of the entity. Grech v. Clayton County, Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1320-30 (11th Cir. 2003). An isolated incident is not sufficient to establish a de facto policy. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Also, a plaintiff must establish that through deliberate conduct, the municipality was the moving force behind the alleged injury. Grech, 335 F.3d at 1330; Hemmings, 2010 WL 4005333, at *2. There is no heightened pleading requirement for such claims. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010) ( ).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged Defendant, in his official capacity as Sherriff of Lee County, had customs and de facto policies which were the moving force behind the deprivation of his Constitutional due process rights. The Complaint states the Sheriffhad customs and policies that entailed not supervising the deputies in the course of criminal investigations and tolerating wrongful arrests of citizens. (Doc. #1, ¶¶12-13). However, the Complaint does not describe any of Defendant Scott's customs or policies. The allegations regarding Defendants are such broad statements as "[t]he SHERIFF'S custom and de facto policy of not supervising or regulating their officers' in the court of their criminal investigations was deliberately indifferent to JOHNSON'S constitutional rights," (doc. #1, ¶12), and "failure to properly investigate and have proper probable cause, the SHERIFF knew or should have known that its custom and de facto policy would eventually cause the constitutional rights of a citizen within its jurisdiction, such as JOHNSON, to be violated by one of its deputies or detectives," (Doc. #1, ¶12). Plaintiff mentions no complaint or documentation of other instances when any of the Defendants acted improperly in the past. Instead, Plaintiff states only general and conclusory statements. Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," "mere labels and conclusions" do not meet Plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds for his entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Count I against Defendant Scott for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Defendants state Plaintiff does not allege he was arrested without probable cause. Moreover, Defendants contend Plaintiff's claim for wrongful arrest against the Deputies cannot viably stand whether or not there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Further, Defendants state even if there was only arguable cause to arrest Plaintiff, then the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity. In response, Plaintiff contends that hestated he was arrested without probable cause. Specifically, Plaintiff points to paragraphs 1 of page 4 and page...
To continue reading
Request your trial