Johnson v. Shreveport Garment Co.

• Decision Date: 18 November 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 74-494.
• Parties: Vivian JOHNSON and Dorothy Burton, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. SHREVEPORT GARMENT COMPANY and Delta Garment Corporation.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana

422 F. Supp. 526

Vivian JOHNSON and Dorothy Burton, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated v. SHREVEPORT GARMENT COMPANY and Delta Garment Corporation.

Civ. A. No. 74-494.

United States District Court, W. D. Louisiana, Shreveport Division.

November 18, 1976.

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COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frank E. Brown Jr., Piper & Brown, Shreveport, La., Okla Jones II, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.

John E. McFall, Kullman, Lang, Inman & Bee, P.C., New Orleans, La., for defendants.

OPINION

STAGG, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Vivian Johnson and Dorothy Burton brought this action against Shreveport Garment Manufacturers of Louisiana (Shreveport Garment) and Delta Garment Corporation (Delta Garment) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, in behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. Their cause of action rests on allegations of race and sex discrimination. The Court has jurisdiction over the action by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), (4), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Venue is proper in the Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport Division, because all parties reside in Shreveport, Louisiana.

Shreveport Garment and Delta Garment operate small cut-and-sew plants. They engage in the manufacture of work clothes and fashion jeans. The total employment in the two plants is less than 200 persons. Shreveport Garment operates with four departments: office, cutting, pressing and shipping. The latest figures for the plant show that over half of its employees are black and over half of them are females. Delta Garment operates with three departments: administrative, felled seam, and safety stitch. Well over half of its employees are black females.

The named plaintiffs sought to represent a class composed of (1) all blacks then employed at Shreveport Garment, (2) all blacks who had been discriminated against due to their race or color with respect to compensation or terms and conditions of employment at either facility, (3) all blacks who had been denied promotions at either facility due to their race or color, (4) all blacks who had been maintained in separate facilities due to their race or color, (5) all blacks who applied for work at either facility but were rejected due to their race or color, and (6) all blacks who would have applied for work at either facility but did not because of the reputation for racially or sexually discriminatory conduct. On January 15, 1976, the Court ruled that the action should be permitted to proceed as a class action. Due to possible problems with conflicting interests and manageability, the Court limited the class to (1) black females who sought employment at Shreveport Garment or Delta Garment and who were refused employment because of their sex, race or color and (2) black females who were or had been employed at either facility and were subjected to on-the-job discrimination because of their sex, race or color.

The complaint noted a number of allegedly unlawful acts by defendants. It alleged that the two facilities were maintained under separate name for the primary purpose of racial segregation. It alleged that defendants used discriminatory evaluations concerning hiring and promotions. The complaint stated that defendants paid black females less than their male or white counterparts for the same or similar work. Finally, the complaint alleged that defendants discriminated against plaintiffs with respect to working conditions, terms of employment and fringe benefits.

THE CLASS ACTION

Rule 23(c)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, states:

"(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."

The trial court has a measure of discretion to determine whether an action properly should progress as a class action. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Huff v. N. D. Cass Company of Alabama, 468 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1969). When the Court makes a determination of class status at an early stage in the proceeding, it should attempt to uphold class status. 7A Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1785 at 138 (1972) hereinafter cited as Wright & Miller; cf. Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972). In fact, the court in Jones v. Diamond, supra, stated that if an error should be made with regard to class status at an early stage, the court should err in favor of maintenance of a class action. The appellate court may find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying class certification without an evidentiary hearing, especially in civil rights cases. See Jones v. Diamond, supra, at 1099; Huff v. N. D. Cass Company of Alabama, supra, at 713.

A decision as to class certification is not immutable; if later events indicate that the decision should be reversed, Rule 23(c)(1), which allows alteration or amendment of certification prior to a decision on the merits, empowers the Court to act. Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1975); Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 466 F.2d 1374 (10th Cir. 1972); Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 159 (D.N.J.1974); 7 Wright & Miller § 1765 at 625-26. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), mandates that the trial court determine the propriety of class action status at the preliminary certification stage and after trial on the merits. Therefore, although this Court certified this action as a class action on January 15, 1976, it must re-examine Rule 23 and its requirements to determine whether the case should proceed as a class action.

Rule 23(b) specifies three types of cases in which a class action is proper. Subdivision (b)(2) concerns claims against a party that involve conduct affecting the purported class as a whole. At trial, plaintiffs produced weak proof of conduct toward the class as a whole, but the trial presentation does not justify reversing the January 15 ruling on that point. The action meets the requisites of Rule 23(b).

Similarly, in January this Court determined that the class met the requirements of Rule 23(a), numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of representation. No doubt the class, comprised of over 100 persons, still meets the numerosity test. On the points of commonality and typicality the plaintiffs lacked evidence, but the deficiency does not merit reversal of the earlier ruling on those points. A more difficult question arises with respect to the adequacy of the named plaintiffs' representation of the absent class members.

The requirement of adequate representation, the minimum protection that representation must effect, and the subsequent binding effect of the judgment are questions that strike to the very core of the class action device. The representation requirement for maintenance of a class action lies at the heart of the rationale supporting the class action. In its mandate that the trial court consider class status at two stages of the proceeding, the Court of Appeals, in Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973), made specific reference to effective representation. The history of the action points to the requirement of Rule 23(a)(4) as the most important aspect of the class status determination.

Prior to the nineteenth century, the English chancery courts developed a method to facilitate the adjudication of disputes concerning common questions and multiple parties in a single action. See 7 Wright & Miller § 1751 at 504. Professor Pomeroy explained:

"The earliest instances in which the court of chancery exercised its jurisdiction, avowedly upon the ground of preventing a multiplicity of suits, appear to have been called `bills of peace', of which there were two distinct kinds. One of these was brought to establish a general right between a single party on the one side, and numerous persons claiming distinct and individual interests on the other . . .." 1 Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 246 at 467-68 (5th ed. Symons 1941) hereinafter cited as Pomeroy.

The equity courts originally used the bill of peace to settle disputes between the lord and his tenants or copyholders over the customs of the manor. The jurisdiction then spread to analogous remedies, including situations in which several persons had claims against the same party and those in which a party claimed a common right against a number of persons. Pomeroy § 247 at 468-69 and § 246 at 467-68. See generally 7 Wright & Miller § 1751.

Equity courts took jurisdiction over bills of peace because the multiplicity of the claims and the possibility of inconsistent judgments made any remedy at law inadequate, even if the relief sought was entirely legal. From these principles sprang the equitable maxim, Equity will relieve the necessity of a multiplicity of suits. See Pomeroy § 250 at 459. Thus, a class could maintain a bill of peace if it could establish that the number of class members was so large that joinder of all of them was impracticable, that all members possessed a joint interest in the litigation, and that the named parties adequately would represent the absent parties. The bill bound all members of the class, absent or present, in the eventual judgment, preventing multiplicious litigation. 7 Wright & Miller § 1751 at 504.

The bill of peace migrated to the United States, gradually becoming the class action. As the class action device developed in the federal judiciary, courts differed over whether absent class members could be bound by a judgment obtained by self-appointed class advocates....