Johnson v. Sloan

• Citation: 116 N.E.3d 91,154 Ohio St.3d 476,2018 Ohio 2120
• Decision Date: 05 June 2018
• Docket Number: 2017–0272,Nos. 2016–1284,s. 2016–1284
• Parties: JOHNSON, Appellant, v. SLOAN, Appellee. The State ex rel. Johnson, Appellant, v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Appellee, et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

154 Ohio St.3d 476

116 N.E.3d 91

2018 Ohio 2120

JOHNSON, Appellant,

v.SLOAN, Appellee.

The State ex rel. Johnson, Appellant,

v.Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Appellee, et al.

Nos. 2016–1284

2017–0272

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted November 21, 2017

Decided June 5, 2018

Stephen P. Hanudel, Medina, for appellant.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Stephanie L. Watson, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Brigham Sloan.

Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and James E. Moss, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} These two appeals, which we consolidate for decision, arise out of the same underlying facts. In case No. 2016–1284, appellant, Robert L. Johnson, appeals the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. And in case No. 2017–0272, he appeals the judgment of the Eighth District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for writs of prohibition and mandamus. We affirm both judgments.

Background

{¶ 2} For purposes of reviewing the court of appeals' dismissals of Johnson's petitions, we accept the following factual allegations as true. See Coleman v. Portage Cty. Engineer , 133 Ohio St.3d 28, 2012-Ohio-3881, 975 N.E.2d 952, ¶ 2, fn. 1.

{¶ 3} In December 1986, when Johnson was 15 years old, he and his older brother Charles went on a crime spree. On December 12, they engaged in fraudulent transactions with the May Company. On December 23, they committed two armed robberies—one of the Lawson Milk Company and another of David Sotka. And on December 24, they murdered and robbed Christine Kozak.

{¶ 4} These offenses resulted in Johnson's convictions in two separate common-pleas-court cases: one case involving the offenses committed against Kozak ("the Kozak case") and the other case involving the robberies of Sotka and the Lawson Milk Company ("the Sotka case"). In his habeas petition, Johnson alleged that the general division of the common pleas court lacked jurisdiction in the Kozak case due to his allegedly defective transfer from the juvenile division. And in his prohibition-and-mandamus petition, Johnson challenged the jurisdiction of the general division of the common pleas court in the Sotka case, based on a different alleged bindover error.

The habeas petition (case No. 2016–1284)

Background

{¶ 5} When a child is arrested for committing a felony or misdemeanor, proceedings regarding the child must initially be held in juvenile court. R.C. 2152.03.¹ As a result, the juvenile court has "exclusive jurisdiction over children alleged to be delinquent for committing acts that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." In re M.P. , 124 Ohio St.3d 445, 2010-Ohio-599, 923 N.E.2d 584, ¶ 11.

{¶ 6} R.C. 2152.12(B) (formerly R.C. 2151.26(B) ) allows for the discretionary transfer of certain juveniles to adult court to face criminal charges. A juvenile-court judge has the discretion "to transfer or bind over to adult court certain juveniles who do not appear to be amenable to care or rehabilitation within the juvenile system or appear to be a threat to public safety." State v. Hanning , 89 Ohio St.3d 86, 90, 728 N.E.2d 1059 (2000). Before ordering a discretionary transfer, the juvenile court must conduct an investigation into whether the child is amenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile-justice system, and the investigation must include a mental examination of the child. R.C. 2152.12(C) ; State v. D.W. , 133 Ohio St.3d 434, 2012-Ohio-4544, 978 N.E.2d 894, ¶ 10–12. At the time of Johnson's offenses, the investigation also had to include a "physical examination of the child made by a public or private agency, or a person qualified to make the examination." Former R.C. 2151.26(A)(3), Am.S.B. No. 210, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 583, 586.²

{¶ 7} In January 1987, Johnson was charged with aggravated murder in the juvenile division of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas. On March 11, 1987, the juvenile court held a bindover hearing for Johnson and journalized an entry transferring him to the general division. Johnson alleges that he was never given the mandatory physical examination, even though the transfer order indicated that a physical examination had occurred.

{¶ 8} Once he had been transferred, Johnson was indicted in adult court on charges of aggravated murder and aggravated robbery in connection with the death of Kozak. He pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated murder with a felony-murder specification and one count of aggravated robbery, and the court accepted the state's recommendations to dismiss the remaining charges arising from the offenses committed against Kozak and to dismiss the charges relating to the fraudulent transactions with the May Company. Johnson was sentenced to a prison term of 20 years to life for aggravated murder, a concurrent prison term of 10 to 25 years for aggravated robbery, and a consecutive prison term of 3 years for the gun specification (for a total of 23 years to life).

{¶ 9} On September 19, 2016, he filed in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against appellee Brigham Sloan, warden of Lake Erie Correctional Institution. Johnson asserted that the adult court had lacked jurisdiction to sentence him, due to the juvenile court's failure to abide by the physical-examination requirement of the former bindover statute. And if the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction in the Kozak case, he alleged, then he is entitled to immediate release from prison, because he has served the entirety of his sentence for aggravated robbery in the Sotka case (which is the subject of Johnson's prohibition-and-mandamus petition, discussed below).

{¶ 10} On August 15, 2016, the court of appeals granted Sloan's motion to dismiss the habeas petition for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. According to the court of appeals, the juvenile court's bindover order reflects that

the requirements for a proper bindover were met; therefore, any alleged lack of jurisdiction was not "patent and unambiguous." Mr. Johnson possessed an adequate remedy at law to raise the physical examination issue in his direct appeal from his conviction and sentence, which he did not do. Therefore, even presuming these allegations as true, Mr. Johnson can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief, by means of a writ of habeas corpus, for lack of a physical examination prior to bindover.

Johnson v. Sloan , 2016-Ohio-5375, 2016 WL 4272244, ¶ 15.

{¶ 11} Johnson appealed to this court.

The request for oral argument

{¶ 12} Pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02, Johnson requests oral argument on the issue of when a defective or incorrect judicial entry is susceptible to collateral attack (i.e., the entry is void) and when such an entry may be challenged only by seeking a nunc pro tunc correction in the court that issued the entry (i.e., the entry is voidable). In cases such as this, we have discretion to grant or deny a request for oral argument, and in exercising that discretion, we will consider whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among the courts of appeals. State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd. , 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339, 855 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 15.

{¶ 13} We have considered the issue raised in this case on numerous occasions. See, e.g. , State v. Williams , 148 Ohio St.3d 403, 2016-Ohio-7658, 71 N.E.3d 234 ; State v. Wesson , 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575, 999 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 63–68. There is no reason to believe that additional oral argument on the issue will bring to light new facts or arguments that would help prevent the issue from recurring in the future. The motion for oral argument is therefore denied.

Analysis

{¶ 14} Absent a proper bindover, the juvenile court has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over any case concerning a child who is alleged to be delinquent. State v. Wilson , 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 44, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995). If the juvenile court fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of the bindover statute, its purported transfer to adult court is ineffective and any judgment issued by the adult court is void. Johnson v. Timmerman–Cooper , 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 617, 757 N.E.2d 1153 (2001). If the juvenile court fails to require a physical examination when required by statute, the resulting judgment in the adult court is void. State v. Golphin , 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 547, 692 N.E.2d 608 (1998).

{¶ 15} In Gaskins v. Shiplevy , 74 Ohio St.3d 149, 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282 (1995), an inmate sought a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been transferred from juvenile court to adult court without the mandatory physical and mental examinations. We held that if the bindover was improper, his conviction in adult court would be void and Gaskins would be entitled to habeas relief. Id. at 151, 656 N.E.2d 1282. We remanded the case to the court of appeals to determine whether the bindover was proper.

{¶ 16} On remand, the court of appeals ordered the warden to respond to Gaskins's petition and ultimately dismissed the petition based on a statement in the transfer order that Gaskins had waived his right to the physical and mental examinations. We affirmed, holding that

[s]ince Gaskins' claims of improper bindover below * * * are rebutted by the juvenile court journal entry incorporated in [the warden's response], the court of appeals did not err in denying his requested habeas corpus relief without first holding a hearing, waiting for the completion of discovery, or requiring Gaskins's presence before the court.

Gaskins v. Shiplevy , 76 Ohio St.3d 380, 382–383, 667 N.E.2d 1194 (1996) (" Gaskins II "). We also noted that habeas relief is not available to an inmate who has an adequate remedy at law and that Gaskins could have pursued other remedies to challenge the transfer order. Id. at 383, 667 N.E.2d 1194...