Johnson v. Smith

• Decision Date: 07 February 2012
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 1:09 CV 02221
• Parties: EDWIN JOHNSON, JR., Petitioner, v. KEITH SMITH, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

EDWIN JOHNSON, JR., Petitioner,

v.KEITH SMITH, Warden, Respondent.

CASE NO. 1:09 CV 02221

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

Dated February 7, 2012

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE'S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING THE HABEAS PETITION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE LESLEY WELLS

Petitioner Edwin Johnson, Jr., through counsel, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.¹ (Doc. 1). In a thorough Report and Recommendation ("R&R") United States Magistrate Judge David S. Perelman recommended denying the petition on each of Johnson's five claims for relief. (Doc. 15). Through counsel, Johnson filed a timely objection to the R&R, challenging the recommendations as to each of the five grounds for relief. (Doc. 16).

The parties have fully briefed all issues and the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary. See Rule 8(a) of Rules Governing 2254 Proceedings; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). For the following reasons, the Court adopts the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and denies Johnson's habeas petition.

I. Background

In reviewing the record de novo, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("R&R), and the Petitioner's timely objections, the Court will rely upon, and not repeat here, the state appellate court's findings of fact as enunciated in the R&R. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1981) (finding a presumption of correctness applies to the factual findings of a state appellate court based on the state trial record).

After a jury returned verdicts finding Johnson guilty of aggravated murder, tampering with evidence, and gross abuse of a corpse, in the death of his reputed wife and mother of his two children, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of five years in prison for tampering with evidence and one year in prison for gross abuse of a corpse to be served consecutively with a sentence of fifteen years to life in prison for the conviction of aggravated murder. State of Ohio v. Johnson, CR-05-471456.

As discussed and reviewed in the Magistrate Judge's R&R, Johnson's federal habeas petition asserts five grounds for relief:

1. Ground One: The improper admission of "other acts" evidence not inextricably related to the murder denied Petitioner a fair trial under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.2. Ground Two: Prosecutorial misconduct denied Petitioner a fair trial under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

3. Ground Three: Violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution when the State's case in chief elicited testimony that Petitioner's failure to deny killing the victim was substantive evidence of guilt.

4. Ground Four: Cumulative effects of the errors at trial exemplified in Grounds One, Two, and Three, deprived Petitioner of a fair trial in violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

5. Ground Five: Evidence insufficient to sustain the convictions and the convictions violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

(Doc. 1).

Johnson has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's R&R, challenging the reasoning and recommendation as to each of the five grounds of his habeas petition.

II. Standard of Review

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254 , was signed into law on April 24, 1996. The United States Supreme Court has held that the provisions of the AEDPA apply to habeas corpus petitions filed after that effective date. See Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 210, 123 S. Ct. 1398, 155 L. Ed.2d 363 (2003); Barker v. Yukins, 199 F. 3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1999). Johnson's petition was filed after AEDPA's effective date.

AEDPA was enacted "to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases, and 'to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.' " Woodford, 538 U.S. at 206 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 386, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed.2d 389 (2000)). In advancing those goals, Section 2254(d) placed new constraints on "the power of a federal habeas court to grant a stateprisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Section 2254(d) provides:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The United States Supreme Court outlined the proper application of § 2254(d) in Williams v. Taylor, supra. To justify a grant of habeas relief under the "contrary to" clause, "a federal court must find a violation of law clearly established by holdings of the Supreme Court, as opposed to its dicta, as of the time of the relevant state court decision." Miller v. Francis, 269 F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, supra). "[U]nder the 'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Williams 120 S. Ct at 1523. The Sixth Circuit has held that, even if a federal court could determine that a state court incorrectly applied federal law, the court still could not grant relief unless it also finds that the state court ruling was unreasonable. Simpson v. Jones, 238 F. 3d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 2000).

When objections are received to a Magistrate Judge's R&R on a dispositive matter, the District Court "shall make a de novo determination ... of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made...." Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). Upon review, the Court "may accept, reject or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B). General objections are insufficient to preserve any issues for review; "[a] general objection to the entirety of the magistrate's report has the same effects as would a failure to object." Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 932 F. 2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

III. Law and Argument

In parallel with the underlying R&R, and the structure of Johnson's brief in opposition, the Court will address each of the Petitioner's objections in seriatim.

A. Ground One: Improper Admission of "other acts" evidence.

The Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation of dismissal of ground one. Johnson again claims that the admission of "other acts" evidence, including "unsubstantiated claims of previous choking incidents; the extramarital affairs of Mr. Johnson; his alleged failure to properly provide for his children; the alleged marriage by Mr. Johnson to another woman and then his marriage to the victim without legally terminating the previous marriage; and his purchase of an engagement ring for his alleged lover shortly before his wife's death," combined to deprive the Petitioner of a fair trial.

As an initial matter the Court notes that verbatim restatements of arguments already addressed by the Magistrate Judge do not amount to proper objections. With regard to Johnson's objections to the R&R's recommendation to dismiss his first claim of relief the Petitioner's "Objections" amount to mere recitations of his Petition and Traverse. Such "general objections" do not serve the purposes of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), which requires the Court to conduct a de novo review only of the portions of the Magistrate Judge's R & R to which a party objects. See Cvijetinovic v. Eberlin, 617 F.Supp.2d 620, 631 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (citing Jones v. Moore, No. 3:04CV7584, 2006 WL 903199, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Apr.7 2006)); Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.Supp.2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich.2004) ("An 'objection' that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate's suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an 'objection' as that term is used in this context."); see also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Olsten Corp. Health & Welfare Benefit Plan, 617 F.Supp.2d 131, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (characterizing arguments copied verbatim from prior briefs and labeled "objections" as a "regurgitation" of arguments made to the magistrate judge and finding that they were not proper objections necessitating de novo review); see generally 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur Miller, & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Prac. & Proc. § 3070.1, n. 4 (2d ed.2010) (citing numerous cases in various jurisdictions for the principle that "regurgitating" or "rehashing" arguments already submitted to and addressed by the magistrate judge is not an objection sufficient to trigger de novo review of the R & R based on the efficiency purpose of a magistrate judge's role). Accordingly, the Court will address only the objections that Johnson raisedin response to the R & R itself—it will not address all of the arguments analyzed in the R&R that are reasserted verbatim in the Petitioner's Objections.

Magistrate Judge Perelman's R&R urges dismissal of the first ground for relief because questions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence, even if admitted in violation of Ohio law, are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d 496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003). The R&R reviewed the ruling of the state appellate court...