Johnson v. Smith
| Decision Date | 30 August 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 01-71810.,01-71810. |
| Citation | 219 F.Supp.2d 871 |
| Parties | Khori JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. David SMITH, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Khori Johnson, Ryan Correctional Facility, Detroit, MI, pro se.
William C. Campbell, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, for Respondent.
Petitioner Khori Johnson, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Ryan Correctional Facility in Detroit, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition.
Following a jury trial in Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and two counts of assault with intent to murder. On July 13, 1994, Petitioner was sentenced to twenty to forty years imprisonment for each of the convictions, to be served concurrently.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claims:
I. Was defendant Johnson denied his federal and state constitutional right to due process and a fair trial when the trial judge gave an erroneous definition of murder in the second degree which eliminated the essential element of an intent to commit murder?
II. Must defendant's convictions for assault with intent to murder be reversed because the trial court's instruction allowed for conviction on less than an intent to kill?
III. Was defendant deprived of his liberty without due process of law when the trial court gave erroneous or incomplete instructions on the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, the use of out-of-court statements, the defense of mere presence, and by instructing the jury on first degree murder when defendant was only charged with second degree murder?
IV. Was defendant Johnson denied a fair trial when a prosecution witness was allowed over objection to testify to hearsay from an unidentified person?
V. Is defendant entitled to be resentenced because: (A) the trial judge imposed the sentence on the assumption that he was guilty of first degree murder; (B) the sentence of 20 to 40 years was not proportionate to defendant's role in the offense and as a first offender; and (C) the judge imposed the sentence on the materially false information that defendant had abused his pregnant girlfriend?
The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. People v. Johnson, No. 178608, 1996 WL 33362361 (Mich.Ct.App. June 21, 1996).
Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Johnson, No. 106959, 1997 WL 324095 .
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court, presenting the same claims presented on direct review, and the following additional claims:
VI. Defendant was denied the right to a properly instructed jury under state and federal guarantees of due process, when the trial court omitted an essential element of the primary charge of second-degree murder rendering the charge to the jury fundamentally unfair.
VII. The trial court's instructions on second-degree murder impermissibly shifted the burden of proving malice and instead required the defendant to prove its absence in violation of his state and federal right of due process of law.
VIII. Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel when both trial and appellate counsel failed to perform to the standard of counsel guaranteed defendant under the state and United States Constitutions.
The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment. People v. Johnson, No. 94-000493 (Wayne County Circuit Court Dec. 15, 1998). Petitioner then filed applications for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for relief from judgment in the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court, both of which denied leave to appeal. People v. Johnson, No. 224087 (Mich.Ct.App. June 9, 2000); People v. Johnson, No. 117172, 2001 WL 96737 (Mich. Jan. 30, 2001).
Petitioner then filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the following claims:
I. Petitioner Johnson was denied his federal and state constitutional right to due process and a fair trial when the trial judge's erroneous instruction on murder in the second-degree essentially eliminated the element of an intent to commit murder which was tantamount to directing a verdict on the charged offense.
II. Petitioner was denied the right to a properly instructed jury under state and federal guarantees of due process. When the trial court omitted an essential element of the primary charge of second-degree murder rendering the charge to the jury fundamentally unfair.
III. The trial court's instructions on second-degree murder impermissibly shifted the burden of proving malice and instead required the Petitioner to prove its absence in violation of his state and federal right to due process of law.
IV. Petitioner's convictions for assault with intent to murder must be reversed because the trial court's instruction allowed for conviction on less than an intent to kill.
V. Petitioner was deprived of his right to a trial before an unbiased tribunal when the trial court gave erroneous or incomplete instructions on the burden of proof, reasonable doubt, the use of out-of-court statements, the defense of mere presence, and by instructing the jury on first-degree murder when Petitioner was only charged with second-degree murder.
VI. Petitioner Johnson was denied a fair trial when a prosecution witness was allowed over objection to testify to hearsay from an unidentified person.
VII. Petitioner is entitled to be resentenced because: (A) the trial judge imposed the sentence on the assumption that he was guilty of first-degree murder; (B) the sentence of 20 to 40 years was not proportionate to Petitioner's role in the offense and as a first offender; and (C) the judge imposed the sentence based on the materially false information that Petitioner had abused his pregnant girlfriend.
VIII. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel when both trial and appellate counsel failed to perform to the standard of counsel guaranteed Petitioner under the state [and] United States Constitutions.
Petitioner's conviction arises out of the shooting death of Christopher Glass on December 27, 1993. The Michigan Court of Appeals, on direct appeal, set forth the circumstances leading to the shooting as follows:
On or about December 25, 1993, defendant Johnson was approached by Tyrone Edmond, Antoine Edmond, and Shaunte Dobbs regarding his treatment of their sister, Tambra Edmond, who was defendant Johnson's girlfriend. The three Edmond siblings were accompanied by the decedent, Christopher Glass, who was a friend of the family. On the night of December 26 or the early morning of December 27, 1993, defendant Johnson arrived at the home where the Edmond siblings, their mother Betty Gray and her husband Aulton Gray resided. Accompanying defendant Johnson was defendant Bunnell [who was tried separately, but whose case was consolidated with Petitioner's for purposes of appeal], DuJuan Turner, and two other individuals. One of the individuals accompanying defendants knocked on the door and asked for Tyrone Edmond and Shaunte Dobbs. After Aulton Gray stated that Tyrone Edmond and Shaunte Dobbs were not home, bullets were fired at the house. Members of the household testified that they witnessed defendants shooting at the house, but defendant Johnson testified that DuJuan Tuner was solely responsible for the gunfire. Defendant Johnson claimed to have no previous knowledge that Turner was carrying a weapon. Christopher Glass, who was visiting the Gray house, was fatally wounded by two of the bullets fired at the house during the incident.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA") altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir.1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)1; see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir.1995) (...
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