Johnson v. Smits

Decision Date04 April 2023
Docket Number1:23-cv-95
PartiesBRANDON J. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MARISSA SMITS, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan
OPINION

PHILLIP J. GREEN United States Magistrate Judge.

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 5, PageID.66.)

This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604-05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant's relationship to the proceedings.

“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court's authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. [O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, [u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff's claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding-the plaintiff-at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov't, 212 Fed.Appx. 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).

Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States magistrate judge conducting all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that [u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case ....”

28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants. However, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).[1]

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim.

Discussion

T. Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Michigan Sex Offender Program (MSOP) Clinicians Marissa Smits and Emily Minnick, MSOP Unit Chief J. Athearn, and Warden Unknown MacCauley.

Plaintiff states that he was convicted of criminal sexual conduct in March of 2011 and was sentenced to 7 to 30 years in the MDOC. Plaintiff completed MSOP phase I on March 4, 2016, while at Brooks Correctional Facility. In July of 2019, Plaintiff was informed that he needed to complete MSOP before being considered for parole. Plaintiff was transferred to IBC and was enrolled in MSOP on August 18, 2020, but MSOP at IBC was closed because of COVID-19 safety protocols on August 27 2020, and remained so until May 11, 2021.

On May 11, 2021, Plaintiff was assessed by Defendant Smits who “raised his treatment level for phase 2-5 to a ‘high' based on the assertion that Plaintiff minimized his behavior when describing “how his offense transpired,” which required Plaintiff to have 12 to 18 months of therapy. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Plaintiff attended every MSOP group and individual session offered between May 10, 2021, and January 10, 2022, and was given credit for 98 hours. However, Plaintiff was not given credit for the mandated homework sessions, which amounted to 72 hours, nor was Plaintiff given credit for the monthly one-on-one sessions. Plaintiff received grades of good for 39 of his group sessions and fair for 10 of them. Plaintiff's homework was graded as satisfactory for 47 assignments and unsatisfactory for 2 of them. Plaintiff states that he also complied with self-help mandates that were not credited. On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff “filed a grievance about continuous suspensions [of MSOP, apparently due to COVID-19 outbreaks at the facility,] with no alternate options to progress.” (Id.; see ECF No. 1-5, PageID.23-25 (listing, inter alia, dates on which MSOP was cancelled due to COVID-19).)

On February 9, 2022, Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant Minnick, who informed him that she was aware of two misconducts he received on February 3, 2022, and that she had spoken to inmate Eubanks #671564 regarding the incidents. Defendant Minnick stated that if Plaintiff did not tell her the truth regarding the incidents, she was going to terminate him from MSOP. Plaintiff responded that he had received the misconduct for stepping across the threshold of another inmate's cell while passing to the commissary for a haircut and that a few hours later, inmate Such #829555 came to Plaintiff's cell to cut his hair. Plaintiff stated that Sergeant Ramirez saw him crossing into another prisoner's cell on camera so Plaintiff pleaded guilty and received 5 days' loss of privileges. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Minnick became hostile and called him a liar, stating that she had heard all about Plaintiff who was a “gang banging drug dealer, running around here fighting and extorting people, I guess you have amnesia people like you don't deserve to be free or in MSOP.” (Id.) Plaintiff responded that the allegations were false and that it was unprofessional to use rumors and gossip against Plaintiff. Defendant Smits stated that Plaintiff was continuing to minimize his behavior and that Plaintiff was continuing to challenge them. Defendant Minnick agreed. Defendants Smits and Minnick then terminated Plaintiff from MSOP. Plaintiff protested that it was unjust and would prevent him from receiving the therapy necessary to facilitate his release on parole and asked if he was the only prisoner being terminated from the program. Defendant Minnick replied yes, and Plaintiff complained that prisoner Eubanks had received the exact same tickets as Plaintiff on February 3, 2022.

Between February 9 and February 15 of 2022, Plaintiff was approached by other MSOP members who stated that they had also received multiple misconducts but had not been terminated from MSOP. On February 15, 2022, Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Smits and complained that he was being discriminated against because other prisoners with more severe rule infractions had not been terminated from MSOP. Defendant Smits responded that different decisions are appropriate for different people and that Plaintiff was being terminated for lack of progress and behavioral issues.

On February 23, 2022, Defendant Smits wrote the termination report, which Plaintiff claims contains several false entries that were unsubstantiated. Plaintiff states that the information was used by the Parole Board. This information included a statement that in August of 2021, an urban magazine addressed to Plaintiff was rejected because it contained information that was a possible risk factor for hostility toward women and sexual preoccupation. (Id., PageID.7.) In addition, the statement indicated that in September of 2021, Defendant Smits reported that Plaintiff had been in an argument with another inmate and that they were about to fight and that in December of 2021, a note was discovered with “Johnson,” “200,” and a dollar sign written on it. (Id., PageID.8.) The termination report also indicated that in January of 2022, contraband was found in Plain...

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