Johnson v. Solomon

• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Writing for the Court: JOSEPH H. YOUNG
• Citation: Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F.Supp. 278 (D. Md. 1979)
• Decision Date: 17 August 1979
• Docket Number: Civ. No. Y-76-1903.
• Parties: Mark JOHNSON et al. v. Neil SOLOMON, etc., et al.

484 F. Supp. 278

Mark JOHNSON et al. v. Neil SOLOMON, etc., et al.

Civ. No. Y-76-1903.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

August 17, 1979.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charlotte M. Cooksey, Susan K. Gauvey, Albert J. Matricciani, Alan S. Davis, Richard L. North, Carol E. Smith, Lawrence B. Coshnear, Ethel Zelenske, Baltimore, Md., and the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., Baltimore, Md., for plaintiffs.

Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Md., Judith K. Sykes and Lee H. Ogburn, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants Neil Solomon, Stanley Platman, Gary Nyman, Rex Smith and Robert L. Karwacki.

Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Joel J. Rabin and John K. Anderson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants Richard A. Batterton and Richard W. Bateman.

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This class action¹ was instituted on behalf of 76 children confined in mental hospitals under the jurisdiction of the Maryland Juvenile Court. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in an effort to obtain rights which they claim are due them under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Maryland Juvenile Causes Act, § 3-801 et seq., of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code.

The amended complaint names as defendants the following State officials in their official and representative capacities: Neil Solomon, Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene; Stanley Platman, Assistant Secretary for Mental Hygiene and Addictions; Gary Nyman, Director of Mental Hygiene; Rex Smith, Director of the Juvenile Services Administration ("JSA"); Richard A. Batterton, Secretary of Human Resources; Richard W. Bateman, Director of the Maryland Social Services Administration ("SSA"); and Robert L. Karwacki, an Associate Judge of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

Plaintiffs allege that monetary damages are inadequate, and they seek declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 2201, and 2202.

In essence, plaintiffs seek relief in connection with four claims relating to various procedures and standards utilized in connection with the involuntary civil commitment of juveniles to mental institutions. First, plaintiffs allege that class members are committed to mental hospitals through constitutionally vague and inadequate standards. They argue that such commitments are unlawful under Md.Ann.Code art. 59, §§ 11 and 12. Second, once confined to these institutions, class members are denied periodic review as to whether continued hospitalization is necessary. Third, plaintiff class members do not always receive representation by legal counsel during all stages of the commitment process. Finally, once committed to mental facilities, plaintiff class members contend that they are denied appropriate medical, psychiatric, and rehabilitative treatment, and that the treatment they do receive is not within the scope of the least restrictive alternatives available.

In their pre-trial brief, plaintiffs have requested the Court to grant the following relief: to declare that the actions and omissions complained of in connection with the civil commitment of juveniles violate the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Juvenile Causes Act, Md.Cts. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. § 3-801 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; to issue an Order enjoining defendants from discriminating against plaintiff class members by denying them the same residential placements and other community-based health, welfare, and social services as afforded non-handicapped persons; to enjoin defendants from committing plaintiff class members to state mental institutions without appropriate hearing and dispositional procedures which embody constitutionally adequate commitability standards; to issue an Order requiring mandatory hearing procedures for the periodic review of commitment; to enjoin defendants from committing plaintiff class members without appropriate independent evaluations to define their present needs in light of the least restrictive appropriate placement; to enjoin further commitments until defendants present a plan for the creation or provision of sufficient appropriate less restrictive alternatives to hospital confinement; to appoint a Special Master and Expert Panel to assist in formulating and implementing the appropriate Decree; to order retroactive relief as to all rights requested; and, finally, to award plaintiffs and their class court costs and reasonable attorneys fees.

Defendants, on the other hand, maintain that the declaratory and injunctive relief requested by plaintiffs is unwarranted in light of actions already undertaken by the State to remedy the commitment inadequacies complained of by plaintiff class members. They further contend that the Court is precluded by Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), from granting the relief sought as to legal representation. Finally, since defendants characterize plaintiffs' requests as constituting essentially habeas corpus relief challenging the fact or duration of physical confinement rather than the conditions of such confinement,² defendants maintain that relief may not be obtained in this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This case began on December 13, 1976, and after almost two years of discovery, which included extensive deposition testimony, the case went to trial on December 15, 1978 and was concluded on December 28, 1978. The documentation amassed in this case demonstrates the thoroughness with which counsel for both sides prepared for trial. There were, for example, over 230 pages of Admissions of Fact totaling more than 600 individual admissions. Obviously, in a case of this complexity, the findings upon which the Court bases its conclusions cannot be exhaustive. In dealing with each of plaintiffs' four principal claims, the Court will present briefly those salient factual premises upon which its ultimate conclusions and legal remedies are based.

II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMITMENT STANDARDS

Plaintiffs argue that the standard for commitment of juveniles by the Juvenile Court to State mental hospitals is unconstitutional in that it is void for vagueness and violative of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. An additional argument advanced is that the State may not legitimately confine mentally ill juveniles without a finding that they are dangerous to themselves or others.

Maryland law provides two statutory bases for the civil commitment of juveniles to mental facilities. Article 59, § 11(g) of the Md.Ann.Code provides the following standard for the voluntary commitment of persons under eighteen years of age:

(g) Persons under 18 years of age. — With the exception of those facilities established under Article 59, § 31(a), any facility licensed by or under the jurisdiction of the Department may admit for the purposes of care or treatment, or both, any person under the age of 18 years who has any mental disorder which is susceptible of care or treatment and whose admission to such facility has been requested by at least one parent or his legal guardian. The person requesting such admission must, as a prerequisite to the admission, be able to understand the nature of the request. The admission request must be formal, written and assented to by an admitting physician at the facility. No person admitted pursuant to this subsection may be retained for more than three days, after the person who requested his admission requests his release, unless his admission status is changed pursuant to § 12 of this subtitle. No person admitted pursuant to this subsection may be retained by a facility for any period in excess of one year unless his admission status has been changed after initial admission or unless at the expiration of each one-year period of inpatient residence a new request is executed by a parent or the legal guardian of the patient. At those facilities established under Article 59, § 31(a), the admission of any person under 18 years of age shall be treated as an involuntary admission and shall be subject to the provisions of § 12 of this article, except that a minor who has attained the age of 16 years may consent to admission for the purpose of diagnosis and consultation pursuant to Article 43, § 135A. Additionally, the admission of a minor by a parent to a child or adolescent unit for the purpose of diagnosis and consultation which is assented to by two physicians may be treated as a voluntary admission for a period not to exceed 20 days.

The standard for involuntary commitment of adults to mental facilities is located in Md.Ann.Code, art. 59, § 12, and requires at a minimum that prior to admission a person must be found affirmatively to possess a mental disorder, requires commitment for the protection of himself or others, needs inpatient medical care or treatment, and is unwilling or unable to be admitted voluntarily.

Civil commitments can also be made pursuant to section 3-820 of the Juvenile Causes Act which allows the Juvenile Court to commit a child to a mental hospital without having made findings such as those required by art. 59, § 12, supra. According to plaintiffs, section 3-820 violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause since there is no rational basis justifying the difference between the two commitment standards. Under section 3-820, commitments can be made so long as the JCA's dispositional objectives are satisfied:

The overriding consideration in making a disposition is a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation best suited to the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child consistent with the public interest.

JCA § 3-820(b). Before applying the...