Johnson v. Soo Line R. Co.

Citation463 N.W.2d 894
Decision Date28 December 1990
Docket NumberNo. C8-90-359,C8-90-359
PartiesMark W. JOHNSON, Petitioner, Appellant, v. SOO LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Respondent.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Syllabus by the Court

1. Plaintiff's mistake in naming the wrong corporation as defendant is not, under the facts of this case, correctable by a relation-back amendment under Minn.R.Civ.P. 15.03.

2. The phrase "within the period allowed by law for commencing the action" in Minn.R.Civ.P. 15.03 refers to the period allowed by the applicable statute of limitations, and it does not include the 60-day grace period granted the sheriff under Minn.R.Civ.P. 3.01 for service of timely delivered suit papers.

Don C. Aldrich, Gregory T. Yaeger, Yaeger & Yaeger, P.A., Minneapolis, for petitioner, appellant.

Megan K. Micke, Katherine T. Cavanor, Spence, Micke & Thurmer, P.A., St. Paul, for respondent.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

SIMONETT, Justice.

This case involves plaintiff's attempt to change the party defendant after the statute of limitations has run. The court of appeals held the change was not allowable under the relation-back provision of Minn.R.Civ.P. 15.03. We agree and affirm.

The period of limitation for plaintiff-appellant Mark W. Johnson's action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (a 3-year period) expired July 19, 1989. On July 14 plaintiff timely commenced his suit, naming Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company as defendant. Suit was commenced by delivering the summons and complaint to the sheriff for service. Under Minn.R.Civ.P. 3.01(c), the sheriff had 60 days to serve the papers. 1

On July 20, the day after the statute of limitations had expired, plaintiff discovered he had sued the wrong defendant and that he should have sued Soo Line Railroad Company. Plaintiff took two remedial steps. First, that same day he prepared a new summons and complaint naming the Soo Line as the defendant and personally served it on the Soo Line. It is conceded this effort was ineffective. Second, a day later on July 21, plaintiff prepared an amended summons and complaint naming the Soo Line as defendant and delivered it to the sheriff who had not yet served the original suit papers. Five days after the statute of limitations had run, on July 24, the sheriff served both the original suit papers and the amended summons and complaint on the Soo Line. The original suit papers were never served on Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company.

Plaintiff contends his amended complaint against the Soo Line should relate back to July 14, the date the original action was commenced. The trial court agreed and denied defendant Soo Line's motion for summary judgment. After the trial court refused to certify the question as important and doubtful, the Soo Line petitioned for discretionary review under Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103. The court of appeals granted the petition, ruled plaintiff's suit was time barred, and reversed the trial court. Johnson v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 454 N.W.2d 468 (Minn.App.1990). We granted plaintiff Johnson's petition for further review.

There are three parts to plaintiff-appellant's argument: (1) The action was timely commenced on July 14 prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations by delivery of the suit papers to the sheriff; (2) the action was "miscaptioned" because the named defendant, Chicago and Northwestern, was a "misnomer"; and (3) this misnomer may be corrected by amending the original pleadings to name the intended party defendant, Soo Line Railroad, and this amendment relates back to commencement of the original action.

Before we analyze plaintiff's argument, a brief look at our pertinent law is needed.

I.

Statutes of limitation eliminate stale claims, grant repose to liability that otherwise would linger on indefinitely, and permit the judicial system to husband its limited resources. To accomplish these policies, there must be a definite time period after which claims are barred. Even so, there are occasions when mistakes will happen that in fairness deserve a relaxation of the time-bar. Thus the common law is well settled that "misnomers" may be corrected nunc pro tunc notwithstanding the correction is made after the statute of limitations has expired. Nelson v. Glenwood Hills Hospitals, Inc., 240 Minn. 505, 62 N.W.2d 73 (1953); Wise v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. Co., Relief Dept., 133 Minn. 434, 158 N.W. 711 (1916). The same is true where there is an "identity of interest" between the parties giving the intended defendant either actual or constructive knowledge of the mistake in pleading. Buysse v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 448 N.W.2d 865 (Minn.1989).

In 1967, Minn.R.Civ.P. 15.03 was amended to cover those situations where relation-back amendments changing parties will be allowed after the statute of limitations against the new party has expired. Since 1967, Rule 15.03 allows a relation-back amendment where (1) the claim against the intended defendant arises out of the conduct or occurrence alleged in the original pleading; (2) the party to be added has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced; (3) the intended party knows or should have known the action against the wrong party was a mistake and that the action was meant to be brought against him; and (4) such notice and knowledge was received by the intended defendant "within the period provided by law for commencing the action against him." See footnote 2, infra.

The common law "misnomer" fits comfortably within the confines of Rule 15.03 and fulfills the requirements for relation back amendments. In the typical case, there is a misspelling of the intended defendant's name or a misdescription of the intended defendant; the intended defendant knows or should know the suit papers were meant for him; and the intended defendant knows this at the time the miscaptioned suit papers are served because the person served represents the intended defendant in some capacity. Nelson v. Glenwood Hills Hospitals, Inc., 240 Minn. 505, 62 N.W.2d 73 (1953), and Lange v. Johnson, 295 Minn. 320, 204 N.W.2d 205 (1973), are two such misnomer cases.

In Glenwood Hills the plaintiff sued Glenwood Hills Hospitals, Incorporated, when the correct defendant was Homewood Hospital, Incorporated. A relation-back amendment to correct the misnomer was allowed. The two hospitals used some of the same staff, exchanged patients, and Homewood had advertised it was "operated in connection with" Glenwood Hills. Some of the same people served as officers in both corporations. Some years earlier a former Homewood Hospital, Incorporated, had changed its name to Glenwood Hills Hospitals, Incorporated, and then a new Homewood Hospital Incorporated, the correct defendant, was created. The correct defendant knew of the misdirected lawsuit when the papers were served. It knew this because the suit papers had been served on an individual who was not only secretary of the board of Glenwood Hills but president of the board of Homewood; plus, Veronica Davidson, who was served as a codefendant, was also the secretary and general administrator of Homewood.

In Lange v. Johnson, plaintiff sued Earl Johnson, d.b.a. Lafayette Farm Service, and personal service was made on Earl Johnson. The correct defendant, however, was Lafayette Farm Services, Inc. This court approved an amendment of the pleadings and judgment nunc pro tunc to name the corporation as a defendant. The error in naming the sole proprietorship was an obvious technical mistake. The correct defendant had both notice and knowledge of the plaintiff's mistake at the time the action was commenced because, as we pointed out, Earl Johnson had been personally served with the original miscaptioned suit papers, and Johnson was an officer of the intended corporate defendant. Admittedly, a sole proprietorship and a corporation are two separate entities but, in a pleading context, mistaking one for the other may be seen as a technical and remedial deficiency.

An "identity of interests" between the wrong defendant and the intended defendant will also meet Rule 15.03 relation-back requirements. This typically occurs when two corporations share such an intimacy in their business operations and organization that service on one imputes notice to the other. Recently, in Buysse v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 448 N.W.2d 865, 871 (Minn.1984), we held the relationship between a parent corporation and its subsidiary created a sufficient identity of interests so that service on the parent permitted a relation-back amendment to name the subsidiary.

In the case now before us, the intended defendant, not the "wrong" defendant, was served with the miscaptioned summons and complaint after the limitation period had expired but within the grace period allowed by Rule 3.01(c) for the sheriff to make service of suit papers timely delivered to him. We now turn to an analysis of the case at hand.

II.

If (as is true in this case) the claim against the intended defendant arises out of the conduct or occurrence alleged in the original complaint, Rule 15.03 then adds two further requirements. First, the intended defendant must receive notice of the institution of the action and knowledge that but for a mistake in identity, the action would have been brought against him. Second, this notice and knowledge must be received "within the period provided by law for commencing the action." 2

First of all, this is not an "identity of interests" case. The Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company and the Soo Line Railroad Company are not in any way related. There is no corporate parent-subsidiary relationship, no special successor in interest connection. The two corporations are entirely separate entities and they share no intimacy in their operations or organizational make-up by which service on one imputes notice to the other. Neither are there any confusing facts or circumstances about the two corporate entities...

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