Johnson v. State
| Citation | 201 N.E.3d 1198 |
| Decision Date | 24 January 2023 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-CR-427 |
| Parties | Keesha R. JOHNSON, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Indiana |
Attorney for Appellant: Christopher Taylor-Price, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Appellate Division, Indianapolis, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Evan M. Comer, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Keesha R. Johnson was convicted in Marion Superior Court of Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness. Johnson appeals her conviction and raises one issue for our review: whether she was denied her federal and state constitutional rights to confront her accusers face-to-face because the witnesses wore face masks during her trial.
[2] We affirm.1
[3] Jeffrey Johnson and Shanetra Bonds have three children together but had not been involved in a romantic relationship for approximately ten years. Jeffrey continued to help Shanetra with the children and home repairs. On January 29, 2019, Jeffrey changed the locks on Shanetra's house at her request, but he forgot to leave her new keys with her. Shanetra attempted to call Jeffrey to ask him to bring her the keys, but he did not answer his phone. The next day, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Shanetra went to Jeffrey's house, where he lived with Johnson and their children.
[4] Shanetra believed that Jeffrey likely left her keys in his van, which was parked behind his house. The van was unlocked, and Shanetra began to look inside the van for her keys. Shanetra did not tell anyone inside the Johnsons’ home that she was on their property.
[5] After Shanetra was unable to find her keys, she shouted Jeffrey's name. No one responded, and she shouted his name a second time. At that point, a light inside the house turned on and the balcony door swung open. Johnson appeared on the balcony with a gun in her hand. She pointed the gun in Shanetra's direction but over her head and fired two shots. Johnson then said "bye" and reentered her home. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 13. Shanetra left the Johnsons’ home and drove to the police station where she filed a police report.
[6] Johnson's neighbors, Angela and Carl Hawkins, heard the gunshots. Angela was so startled she fell down her stairs. Carl called 9-1-1 to report the gunshots. The Hawkins then discovered that the bullets had pierced the exterior walls of their home, which damaged interior walls and a door.
[7] On February 26, the State charged Johnson with Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. During the final pretrial conference held on December 7, 2021, Johnson's counsel asked the court if clear face shields would be available for witnesses. The court and parties discussed obtaining clear shields for trial. Counsel stated that he wanted "to make sure that everyone's faces can be seen by the jurors." Tr. Vol. 2, p. 113. The court reporter stated that she would try to obtain six face shields but would notify counsel if she was not able to do so. Id. at 114. It is not clear on the record whether face shields were available on the date of Johnson's trial.
In re Admin. Rule 17 Emergency Relief for Ind. Trial Cts. Relating to the 2019 Novel Coronavirus , 155 N.E.3d 1191, 1192 (Ind. 2020), available at https://www.in.gov/courts/files/order-other-2020-20S-CB-123o.pdf.
[9] The trial court read the Marion County policy to exclude the use of face shields and to mandate the use of face masks. The court thus ordered the witnesses at Johnson's trial to testify while wearing opaque face masks. Johnson objected and argued that permitting the witnesses to wear opaque masks violated her Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 confrontation rights. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 135. Johnson requested the use of transparent face shields in lieu of masks. The court denied Johnson's request. The trial court stated, Id. at 138. Johnson decided not to file a motion to continue her jury trial.
[10] During her jury trial, Johnson testified and did not deny shooting her gun twice on January 30, 2019. Johnson testified that she fired the gun because she believed that someone was trying to vandalize or break into her house. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 90. Johnson claimed she pointed the gun towards the sky as she pulled the trigger. Id. at 92. She testified that she did not realize that the person making noise was Shanetra until Johnson saw her get into her vehicle to drive away from Johnson's property. Id. at 93. Johnson admitted that she deliberately fired the first shot but stated that when she turned to go back into her home, she slipped and accidently fired a second shot. Id. at 94. The State argued that Johnson failed to prove that she was defending her property, and that her actions were reckless under the facts presented in the case.
[11] The jury found Johnson guilty of Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court granted Johnson's request to reduce her conviction to a Class A misdemeanor. The court then imposed a forty-day sentence.
[12] Johnson now appeals.
[13] The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against [them]." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as guaranteeing "the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact." Coy v. Iowa , 487 U.S. 1012, 1016, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2801, 101 L. Ed. 2d 857 (1988). The Supreme Court has also held that the right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute; however, that "does not ... mean that it may easily be dispensed with." Maryland v. Craig , 497 U.S. 836, 850, 110 S. Ct. 3157, 3166, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666 (1990).
[14] "The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact." Id. at 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157. Importantly, the word confront, "means a clashing of forces or ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of adversariness." Id. In its earliest case interpreting the Confrontation Clause, the Court observed:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Id. at 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (citation omitted).
Id. at 845-46, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (emphasis added; citation and footnote omitted).
[16] "Literal face-to-face confrontation is not the sine qua non of the confrontation right." Id. at 847, 110 S.Ct. 3157. And "physical confrontation may constitutionally be denied where the denial is necessary to further an important public policy and ‘the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured.’ " Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, face-to-face confrontation at trial is preferred, but that preference ... "must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case[.]" Id. at 849, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (citations omitted). For this reason, the Confrontation Clause must "be interpreted in the context of the necessities of trial and the adversary process." Id. at 850, 110 S.Ct. 3157.
[17] Before the right to face-to-face confrontation can be abridged there must be a finding of necessity. Id. at 855, 110 S.Ct. 3157. In Coy , the defendant challenged the constitutionality of an Iowa statute that allowed child victims of sexual abuse to "testify either via closed-circuit television or behind a screen." 487 U.S. at 1014, 108 S.Ct. 2798. The Court held that this statute's creation of...
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