Johnson v. State
Citation | 120 So.3d 1130 |
Decision Date | 22 February 2013 |
Docket Number | CR–99–1349. |
Parties | Shonda Nicole JOHNSON v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Alabama Supreme Court 1091315.
Stephen H. Jones, Bessemer; and Edward S. Stoffregen III, Birmingham, for appellant.
William H. Pryor, Jr., and Troy King, attys. gen., and James R. Houts, Tracy Daniel, and Pamela Casey, asst. attys. gen., for appellee.
After Remand from Alabama Supreme Court
Shonda Nicole Johnson was convicted of capital murder, in violation of § 13A–5–40(14), Ala.Code 1975, for intentionally murdering Randy McCullar, who had testified or was to testify in a criminal proceeding, specifically a bigamy case, against Johnson, where the murder stemmed from his role as a witness in the bigamy case. Johnson was sentenced to death by the trial court following an advisory verdict by the jury of death by a vote of 11 in favor of death to 1 in favor of life without parole.1 This Court reversed and remanded Johnson's conviction because, although her prior bad acts and conviction were admissible as exceptions to the exclusionary rule, this Court held that the trial court should have given limiting instructions as to the jury's consideration of this evidence. Johnson v. State, 120 So.3d 1100 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). The Alabama Supreme Court reversed and remanded this Court's decision, finding that limiting instructions by the trial court were not necessary because the prior bad acts and conviction were admissible as substantive evidence and therefore no limiting instructions were warranted. Johnson v. State, 120 So.3d 1119 (Ala.2006).
Because these two referenced issues, concerning the admissibility of the prior bad acts and conviction of Johnson, as well as the necessity of limiting instructions therefor, have now been decided on appeal, they will not be revisited.
We also note that a full rendition of the facts established at trial was set forth in the original decision on appeal. See Johnson v. State, 120 So.3d at 1123–26, and will not be repeated.
Johnson argues that the trial court erred by failing to allow her to impeach Timothy Richards with evidence of his prior convictions, and further failing to allow her to admit evidence of these convictions during the penalty phase of her trial, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Alabama law. Johnson refers to two prior convictions for distributing harmful material to minors.
Timothy Richards, Johnson's codefendant in the present case, testified as to Johnson's and his roles in the shooting and murder of McCullar. During the cross-examination of Richards, defense counsel questioned him as follows:
“[Another Prosecutor]: Was there a conviction?
“[Another Defense Counsel]: I don't know.
(R. 576–578.)
Thereafter, the next day, the following transpired:
“[Another Defense Counsel]: We probably need to go ahead and take it up now.
“[Prosecutor]: Yes, it's the first time we've seen—
“[Another Defense Counsel]: It's not a felony, but it's a crime of moral turpitude we would argue.
“[Another Defense Counsel]: Sir?
“[Another Defense Counsel]: Judge, the Section 12–21–162 governs that issue.
“[Another Defense Counsel]: It says that in cross-examining a witness with regard to credibility, the witness can be examined, touching on a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.
“[Another Prosecutor]: Your Honor, I think it's been something that anyone might simply deny, talking about prior convictions and the standard now is no longer moral turpitude, but goes to the truthfulness or falsity of the statement, either more than a year imprisonment or any conviction, I think it's on the top of the next page, any conviction concerning truthfulness.
“THE COURT: Can you show me where y'alls case is in this?
“[Another Defense Counsel]: This is the statute.
“THE COURT: You're just using that word.
“[Another Defense Counsel]: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: You're just using the word moral turpitude.
“[Another Defense Counsel]: Yes, sir.
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