Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 13 July 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 78337,78337 |
| Citation | 660 So.2d 648 |
| Parties | 20 Fla. L. Weekly S347 Emanuel JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender; and Stephen Krosschell and Robert F. Moeller, Asst. Public Defenders, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the death penalty upon Emanuel Johnson. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
On September 22, 1988, Sarasota police found Jackie McCahon's body on a sidewalk in front of her residence. She had been stabbed nineteen times, and twelve of the wounds were fatal. A broken-off piece of a knife blade was found in her body. Blood spatter evidence suggested that McCahon had been attacked as she opened the door, or while inside a bathroom. Police at first suspected several men, but later turned their attention to a tenant of McCahon's named Emanuel Johnson. When first questioned, Johnson said he had heard police cars arrive and had gone out to see what was happening, but that he did not know McCahon was the victim until someone told him so the next day.
After a lengthy police interrogation, however, Johnson confessed. He said he had gone to McCahon's residence to say he needed to use her phone because his wife was about to give birth. McCahon knew that Johnson's wife was pregnant. When McCahon let Johnson in the door, he grabbed her and choked her to semi-consciousness. Then he found a knife, stabbed her several times, cut the phone cord, then took twenty dollars he found. Later, Johnson stated that he then went across the street to his apartment, but saw McCahon stagger out of her residence on to the sidewalk. At this point Johnson said he took a knife from his apartment, went out, and stabbed McCahon repeatedly. Police later found a broken knife handle where Johnson said he had thrown the second knife. It matched the broken blade found in the body.
Johnson was found guilty at trial of first degree murder and armed burglary. The jury recommended death by a vote of 10-to-2. The trial court found the following aggravating factors: (1) prior violent felony; (2) murder committed for pecuniary gain; (3) the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The trial court found the following mitigating factors: (1) Johnson was raised by the father in a single-parent household; (2) He had a deprived upbringing; (3) He had an excellent relationship with other family members; (4) He was a good son who provided for his mother; (5) He had an excellent employment history; (6) He had been a good husband and father; (7) He showed love and affection to his two children; (8) He cooperated with police and confessed; (9) He had demonstrated artistic and poetic talent; (10) "The age of the Defendant at the time of the crime"; (11) Johnson "has potential for rehabilitation and productivity in the prison system"; (12) "The Court can punish the Defendant by imposing life sentences"; (13) Johnson had no significant history of criminal activity before 1988; (14) He exhibited good behavior at trial; and (15) He suffered mental pressure not reaching the level of statutory mitigation.
Initially, we address a procedural matter raised by the parties. Johnson's brief relies upon cross-referenced briefs and the record from another case now pending in this Court, Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637 (1995). The attempt to cross-reference a brief from a separate case is impermissible under any circumstances because it may confuse factually inapposite cases, it leaves appellate courts the task of determining which issues are relevant (which is counsel's role), and it circumvents the page-limit requirements. Id. As a general rule, cross-referencing of records is contrary to the holdings in Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1012, 1019 (Fla.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1708, 131 L.Ed.2d 568 (1995), and in Jackson v. State, 575 So.2d 181, 193 (Fla.1991). In Jackson, for example, we stated:
This Court decides cases solely based on the record under review. We must blind ourselves to facts not presented in this record.
We recognize that the lower court, in a spirit of judicial efficiency, combined hearings in Johnson's various cases. Moreover, we earlier granted a motion to take judicial notice of a portion of the record in Johnson's other death appeal, though in that portion the trial court actually was addressing an issue in the present case.
Nevertheless, this motion was granted before it became clear how extensively the two Johnson records pending in this Court have become intertwined. One result is that this Court is confronted with two very lengthy but separate records that both cross-reference each other (though obviously not to specific page numbers) and that the parties have extensively cross-referenced in their briefs, in ways that at times are not entirely clear. We have read the entire record in both cases together and sua sponte have determined their relevance to one another. However, the intertwining of separate records evident here is not something to be encouraged.
Effective as of the date this opinion is released, we hold that the proper method of bringing relevant matters before this Court that are contained in separate records of pending cases is by way of a motion to supplement the record, 1 not by a request for the taking of judicial notice. In light of our prior order and the requirements of Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.200(f)(2), 2 we have read the two records together in this case and determined their relevance to one another. In the future, however, any attempt to cross-reference separate records of pending cases will constitute grounds for the opposing party to move to strike the cross reference under the holdings of Wuornos and Jackson. This Court likewise may strike such a cross reference sua sponte. Any order striking a cross reference shall constitute automatic notice to counsel that the record must be supplemented in keeping with rule 9.200(f)(2), and the failure to supplement then will work a procedural bar as to the matters at issue in the improperly cross-referenced material.
On the merits, Johnson's first argument is that the arrest warrant was defective on several grounds. In the proceedings below, the trial court found the underlying affidavit defective for failure to include a proper oath, though the State now argues the trial court erred in this regard. The parties agree that the affiant officer swore to the warrant before the issuing magistrate, but Johnson contends that the oath was invalid because it contained the reservation of truthfulness only "to [the officer's] best knowledge and belief" or "to the best of [the officer's] knowledge." Johnson argues that the reservation effectively shielded the officer from perjury prosecution for untruthful statements, thereby making the oath illusory.
Thus, the issue here is what constitutes a valid oath under the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, which states:
[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV. This general principle has been further illuminated by Court rule:
Each state and county judge is a committing magistrate and may issue a summons to, or a warrant for the arrest of, a person against whom a complaint is made in writing and sworn to before a person authorized to administer oaths, when the complaint states facts that show that such person violated a criminal law of this state within the jurisdiction of the magistrate to whom the complaint is presented.
Johnson principally relies on State v. Rodriguez, 523 So.2d 1141 (Fla.1988), and Scott v. State, 464 So.2d 1171 (Fla.1985), for the proposition that an affidavit including a reservation "to the best knowledge" is insufficient. However, these cases are readily distinguishable, because both dealt not with arrest warrants but with affidavits supporting trial pleadings. In Rodriguez and in Scott, the issue involved jurats containing the "best knowledge" reservation respectively attached to a motion to dismiss under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) and to a motion for postconviction relief filed under Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. In the instant case, the question was not the jurat attached to postconviction pleadings, but rather the jurat to an affidavit used to establish probable cause. Because the concept of probable cause is not relevant to the procedural constraints imposed on pleadings, the two cases cited above are inapposite to our determination today.
Turning to the true issue, we find that it must be governed by the good-faith exception announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), which is binding upon us under article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution. Perez v. State, 620 So.2d 1256 (Fla.1993). The pertinent holding of Leon was stated in the following terms:
It is the magistrate's responsibility to determine whether the officer's allegations establish probable cause and, if so, to issue a warrant comporting in form with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient.... Penalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.
Leon, 468 U.S. at 921, 104 S.Ct. at 3419. This conclusion rests on the principle that the exclusionary rule is meant to deter abuses by law enforcement, not to use law enforcement as the whipping boy for the magistrate's error. Officers are...
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