Johnson v. State

Citation992 N.E.2d 955
Decision Date20 August 2013
Docket NumberNo. 49A02–1301–CR–28.,49A02–1301–CR–28.
PartiesGregory JOHNSON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Indiana

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Suzy St. John, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, George Sherman, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BARNES, Judge.

Case Summary

Gregory Johnson appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. We affirm.

Issue

The sole issue is whether the trial court properly admitted evidence recovered as a result of a traffic stop of Johnson's vehicle.

Facts

On May 29, 2012, Officer Keith Minch of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department pulled over a Dodge Caravan minivan driven by Johnson because of Officer Minch's belief that the rear window of the vehicle was too darkly tinted, so that he “could not see through it clearly enough to identify the occupants inside and describe them to the point that the law allows.” Tr. p. 7. After receiving identification from Johnson, Officer Minch discovered that Johnson's driver's license was suspended. Officer Minch then placed Johnson under arrest. During a pat down search incident to arrest, Officer Minch found several bags of marijuana inside a pocket of Johnson's pants.

The State charged Johnson with Class A misdemeanor dealing in marijuana and Class A misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Johnson filed a motion to suppress the marijuana, arguing that the initial stop of his vehicle was illegal because his windows were not illegally tinted. The trial court did not hold a separate motion to suppress hearing but considered it during Johnson's bench trial, which was held on December 17, 2012. During that trial, Johnson presented uncontradicted evidence that the tint on the minivan was factory standard for Dodge Caravans for that year and of that type.1 The trial court refused to suppress the marijuana; it acquitted Johnson of dealing in marijuana and convicted him of possession of marijuana. Johnson now appeals.

Analysis

The trial court here essentially held a hearing on Johnson's motion to suppress in conjunction with his trial and seemed to rule on the matter as a question of admissibility of evidence. We review a ruling concerning the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. We cannot reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and must consider conflicting evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Lindsey v. State, 916 N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. It also is well-settled that when reviewing the constitutionality of a search or seizure, we must also examine “any uncontested evidence favorable to the appellant.” Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind.1993).2 “Although a trial court's determination of historical facts is entitled to deferential review, we employ a de novo standard when reviewing the trial court's ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause.” Lindsey, 916 N.E.2d at 238. In other words, when a trial court has admitted evidence alleged to have been discovered as the result of an illegal search or seizure, we generally will assume the trial court accepted the evidence presented by the State and will not reweigh that evidence, but we owe no deference as to whether that evidence established the constitutionality of a search or seizure.

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a seizure in the form of a traffic stop is permissible if an officer has at least reasonable suspicionthat a traffic law, or other law, has been violated. Sanders v. State, 989 N.E.2d 332, 335 (Ind.2013). Whether reasonable suspicion for a seizure existed requires examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detaining officer had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing. L.W. v. State, 926 N.E.2d 52, 55 (Ind.Ct.App.2010). The reasonable suspicion requirement is met where the facts known to the officer, together with the reasonable inferences arising from such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe illegal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Id. Reasonable suspicion cannot be based only upon an officer's general “hunches” or unparticularized suspicions. Id.

Recently, in Sanders, our supreme court highlighted the deference to be given to police officers who have pulled over a vehicle for a perceived violation of Indiana Code Section 9–19–19–4, the Indiana Window Tint Statute.3 The statute provides in part:

A person may not drive a motor vehicle that has a:

(1) windshield;

(2) side wing;

(3) side window that is part of a front door; or

(4) rear back window;

that is covered by or treated with sunscreening material or is tinted to the extent or manufactured in a way that the occupants of the vehicle cannot be easily identified or recognized through that window from outside the vehicle. However, it is a defense if the sunscreening material applied to those windows has a total solar reflectance of visible light of not more than twenty-five percent (25%) as measured on the nonfilm side and light transmittance of at least thirty percent (30%) in the visible light range.

Ind.Code § 9–19–19–4(c). In Sanders, Officer Minch pulled over a vehicle with tinted windows when he was unable to clearly recognize or identify the occupants, but later testing revealed that the windows were not in fact in violation of the Window Tint Statute because they permitted a light transmittance of 38%. The court held that although this testing would absolve the driver of liability for violating the Window Tint Statute, it did not make the stop illegal, in light of the officer's testimony that established reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Sanders, 989 N.E.2d at 335–36. It also stated, “Although the officer was ultimately mistaken in his belief that a violation occurred, the traffic stop was based upon a good faith, reasonable belief that a statutory infraction had occurred and thus we are unable to say that the traffic stop was not lawful.” Id. at 336.

Even if we were to assume that the tinting on the windows of the minivan Johnson was driving was legal,4 that does not negate Officer Minch's testified-to observation that, at the time of the stop, he could not clearly identify the vehicle's occupants. Likewise, we are precluded from accepting Johnson's invitation to consider photographic evidence presented during trial that he argues shows the tinting on his rear window was not excessive and, in fact, was no darker than other similar Dodge Caravans. To do so at the expense of Officer Minch's testimony of what he observed at the time of the traffic stop would constitute reweighing the evidence, which we cannot do. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, even if Officer Minch was mistaken about whether the rear window of the minivan violated the Window Tint Statute, his testimony establishes that it was a good faith mistake and that there was reasonable suspicion to make the stop. See id.

The defendant in Sanders did not make an argument under the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 334 n. 2. Johnson does make such an argument. The legality of a search or seizure under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution turns on the reasonableness of the police conduct under the totality of the circumstances. Lacey v. State, 946 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Ind.2011). Although there may be other relevant considerations depending on the circumstances, the reasonableness of a search or seizure turns on a balancing of: “1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind.2005).

We will admit that the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that Johnson was committing a traffic violation was not overwhelming. Unlike running a red light or turning without signaling or speeding as measured by a radar gun, there is much subjectivity that goes into deciding whether a window of a moving car is too dark under the Window Tint Statute. And, again, the State does not dispute that the minivan's windows were factory standard. Still, the degree of suspicion was not non-existent. We also will acknowledge that the State's interest in enforcing the Window Tint Statute is not an overwhelmingly pressing public safety concern. Again, the red light, failure to signal, and speeding examples are all more inherently dangerous than having overly-tinted windows....

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