Johnson v. State, No. S94A1319
Court | Supreme Court of Georgia |
Writing for the Court | CARLEY |
Citation | 264 Ga. 590,449 S.E.2d 94 |
Docket Number | No. S94A1319 |
Decision Date | 31 October 1994 |
Parties | JOHNSON v. The STATE. |
Page 94
v.
The STATE.
Page 95
[264 Ga. 593] Steven A. Cook, Marietta, for Johnson.
Thomas J. Charron, Dist. Atty., D. Victor Reynolds, Debra Halpern Bernes, Nancy I. Jordan, Asst. Dist. Attys., Marietta, for State.
[264 Ga. 590] CARLEY, Justice.
Appellant was indicted for two offenses: Misdemeanor stalking as defined in OCGA § 16-5-90 and burglary, the intended felony being aggravated stalking as defined in OCGA § 16-5-91. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the two stalking statutes are [264 Ga. 591] unconstitutionally vague and over-broad, but the motion was denied. After a jury trial, guilty verdicts were returned. Appellant appeals from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered on the jury's guilty verdicts, enumerating as error the trial court's denial of his challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA §§ 16-5-90 and 16-5-91. 1
1. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice of the conduct which is prohibited and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Izzo v. State, 257 Ga. 109, 110(1), 356 S.E.2d 204 (1987). A statute is unconstitutionally over-broad if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally
Page 96
protected conduct. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673(2), 398 S.E.2d 547 (1990).Appellant initially urges that the two stalking statutes are unconstitutional because they proscribe, in relevant part, the act of "contact[ing] another person ... without the consent of the other person...." According to appellant, this language is so vague that it potentially criminalizes "many examples of conduct which society considers to be normal everyday living in constitutionally protected areas." However, neither stalking statute broadly proscribes the mere act of making non-consensual contact with another person. To the contrary, both OCGA §§ 16-5-90 and 16-5-91 require, in relevant part, that the proscribed act of making non-consensual contact with another person be "for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other person."
To "contact" is readily understood by people of ordinary intelligence as meaning "[t]o get in touch with; communicate with." American Heritage Dictionary (3d ed. 1992). Thus, the two stalking statutes do not prohibit the mere act of "get[ting] in touch with" or "communicat[ing] with" another person without consent, but plainly state that one is prohibited from doing so...
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