Johnson v. State
Citation | 294 So.2d 69 |
Decision Date | 28 February 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 43228,43228 |
Parties | Prince Albert JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender; and Lewis S. Kimler, Asst. Public Defender, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and William L. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
The petition for writ of certiorari reflected that the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Johnson v. State, 268 So.2d 544 (Fla.App.1972) conflicted with State v. Graham, 240 So.2d 486 (Fla.App.1970) and Perkins v. State, 228 So.2d 382 (Fla.1969), and accordingly, we granted certiorari.
Subsequent to the granting of certiorari, this Court rendered its decision in McDole v. State, 283 So.2d 553 (Fla.1973), receding from its earlier decision in Perkins v. State, supra, and the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in State v. Graham, supra, which decision relied on Perkins v. State.
Sub judice, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, determined that the voluntariness of defendant's statement and the waiver by the defendant of right to counsel at the interrogation were established by a Preponderance of the evidence. In State v. Graham, supra, the District Court held that the standard of proof for determining whether a confession is voluntary and whether a waiver was knowing and intelligent is that of clear and convincing evidence. This Court in Perkins v. State, supra, opined:
(e.s.)
However, in McDole v. State, supra, pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972), we adopted the lesser standard of proof by preponderance of the evidence. Therein, this Court explained:
The instant decision is in accord with our pronouncement in McDole v. State, supra.
Accordingly, conflict having been dispelled, the petition for writ of certiorari is hereby discharged.
It is so ordered.
Two questions are raised for conflict certiorari review herein: (1) Whether a 16-year-old juvenile defendant accused of first degree murder, for whom the court appointed counsel, may thereafter be questioned while incarcerated by police officers and his written statement taken inculpating him of the murder when his counsel was not present, Miranda warning of his rights having been given him and one of the interrogating officers testifying thereafter that he was without knowledge defendant had counsel; and (2) whether in respect to the situation related in question (1) the District Court was correct in holding that the trial court could apply the rule of preponderance of the evidence in denying defendant's motion to suppress his written statement rather than by clear and convincing evidence.
The first question should be answered in the negative and the second question in the affirmative as hereinafter explained.
In the particular circumstances of this case, I cannot agree that the police officers could interrogate a juvenile defendant for whom counsel has been appointed without securing an express voluntary waiver from defendant, supported by a preponderance of the evidence that he agreed his counsel need not be present during the interrogation. The record in this case is devoid of that degree of evidence establishing such a waiver. The testimony of the two officers on the point is manifestly inconclusive. See footnote, pages 546 and 547 of 268 So.2d. The fact that one of the interrogating policemen testified that he was without knowledge defendant had counsel is not sufficient. The other...
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Roth v. State, 76-2357
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