Johnson v. State

Decision Date06 April 1978
Docket NumberNo. 70,70
Citation384 A.2d 709,282 Md. 314
PartiesWade Iglehart JOHNSON v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Charles M. Carlson, Edgewater, for appellant.

Stephen B. Caplis, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. and Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, LEVINE, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and COLE, JJ.

LEVINE, Judge.

We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether voluntary incriminatory statements, given after a valid waiver of Miranda rights, are nevertheless inadmissible against an accused in a criminal prosecution, when such statements were obtained by police following an "unnecessary delay" in producing the accused before a judicial officer in violation of former Maryland District Rule 709 a. 1 After a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Carroll County, appellant was convicted on charges of armed robbery, assault with intent to murder, larceny, conspiracy and unlawful use of a handgun in connection with two holdups which took place in Annapolis, Maryland during the month of January 1975. 2 An appeal was taken to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed appellant's conviction. 36 Md.App. 162, 373 A.2d 300 (1977). Because we have concluded that the trial court erroneously admitted certain inculpatory statements of the appellant, we shall reverse and remand for a new trial.

I

The chronology of events which led to this appeal began on January 13, 1975, when a young black male matching appellant's description walked into the Rainbow Cleaners on West Street in Annapolis, pulled out a pistol and commanded Robin Woolford, a part-time counter clerk, to fill a brown paper bag with money from the cash register. After having instructed Woolford to lie down on the floor, the assailant shot him in the shoulder and then fled; Woolford was seriously wounded.

Later that month, on the evening of January 24, 1975, appellant allegedly drove two men, John Leonard and Charles Wilson, to the Acme Supermarket on Solomons Island Road in Annapolis. While appellant waited outside in his automobile, Leonard and Wilson entered the market, robbed Pam Simkunas, an employee, and in the process of escaping, shot Donald Dunbar, the store manager, just grazing his shoulder. Appellant then sped away carrying his co-defendants with him.

Warrants for appellant's arrest were secured by police on January 25, 1975. Unable to locate appellant, members of the Annapolis City Police Department contacted his family for the purpose of having them persuade appellant to surrender himself voluntarily. This effort proved successful and on January 30, 1975, at 3:15 p. m., appellant turned himself in to the police. Upon his arrival at the police station, appellant was immediately taken into custody and processed (fingerprinted and photographed). No arrest warrants were served on appellant, although the record reveals that appellant was informed orally that he was under arrest "for the investigation of armed robbery" at the Acme Supermarket. Police did not at this time attempt to take appellant to a commissioner for an initial appearance.

At approximately 3:20 p. m. appellant, after receiving his first set of Miranda warnings, waived his rights by initialing a standardized police form. He was then taken to an interrogation room by Officers Selman Wallace and Thomas Brown for questioning. No sooner had the interrogation commenced than appellant began to complain of stomach pains. Officers Wallace and Brown, observing the suspect's glassy eyes, unusually moist lips and deteriorating physical appearance, broke off the investigation and offered to take appellant to the hospital. For some reason appellant changed his mind and asked permission to rest. He was then taken to a stripped-down cell in the station house lockup where he spent the remainder of the day and night.

Interrogation resumed at 9:45 a. m. on the next day, January 31, after appellant's condition had improved to some extent. Once again Officers Wallace and Brown conducted the investigation, prefacing the interrogation with a recitation of the Miranda warnings. Appellant executed a written waiver and agreed to submit to questioning. This session lasted some six hours, culminating in a ten-page statement in which appellant all but confessed to his complicity in the Acme robbery. It appears that the statement was not actually signed until 3:45 p. m. on the 31st. There is no substantial evidence that this statement was coerced or elicited by deception on the part of the police.

At approximately 4:00 p. m. on the 31st, shortly after making his first statement, appellant was taken before a commissioner for the first time. At this point appellant had been in police custody for over 24 hours. It is undisputed that a commissioner had been available at all times and that his office was but a short distance from the station house. When asked at trial why appellant, after his arrest, had not been presented promptly before a commissioner, Officer Wallace replied:

"A. Because he hadn't been interrogated then, sir, and we were still investigating the case.

"Q. In other words you wanted to keep him at the Annapolis Police Department, in a detention cell there, until you had such time and opportunity to interrogate him, is that correct?

"A. And not only that, Anne Arundel County Detention Center will not admit or take anybody that is sick.

"Q. And you felt that (appellant) was sick enough then and if you took him to the Commissioner . . . they wouldn't accept him?

"A. That is their policy, sir."

Returning from his appearance before the commissioner, appellant was read the Miranda warnings for a third and final time. As he had done on the two prior occasions, appellant consented to questioning and at 6:55 p. m. confessed outright to the January 13th robbery and shooting at Rainbow Cleaners.

At a pretrial hearing on August 26, 1975, appellant sought to suppress the statements made to police on January 31st, arguing that they were obtained in contravention of former District Rules 706 and 709 a. Alternatively, appellant contended that the confessions were tainted by the illegal delay in presentment before a judicial officer and therefore inadmissible on the authority of Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 3 Rejecting these theories, the trial court overruled appellant's objections and admitted the statements.

II

Long before the adoption of the Maryland District Rules, this Court had held that police officers were under a common law duty "to convey the prisoner in a reasonable time, and without unnecessary delay, before a magistrate." Kirk & Son v. Garrett, 84 Md. 383, 407, 35 A. 1089, 1092 (1896); Twilley v. Perkins, 77 Md. 252, 265, 26 A. 286, 19 L.R.A. 632 (1893). See also Blackburn v. Copinger, 300 F.Supp. 1127, 1140 (D.Md.1969), aff'd per curiam, 421 F.2d 602 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 910, 90 S.Ct. 2202, 26 L.Ed.2d 564 (1970); Kauffman, The Law of Arrest in Maryland, 5 Md.L.Rev. 125, 130-31 (1941). Invoked primarily in the context of civil actions for false imprisonment, this doctrine portended the enactment of legislation guaranteeing detainees the right to prompt presentment in Baltimore City and Montgomery County. 4 It was not until July 1971, however, with the adoption of the predecessor to M.D.R. 723 a by this Court that the right to speedy production before a judicial officer was secured to defendants on a uniform statewide basis. As originally drafted, M.D.R. 723 a closely paralleled Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, requiring the presentment of an accused before a judicial officer "without unnecessary delay." See also Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure 311. In response to comments from state and local law enforcement officials, however, the proposed rule was modified to incorporate a presumption of illegality, which applies whenever an arrestee is detained by police beyond 24 hours or the first session of court following arrest without having been taken to a judicial officer. See 2 G. Liebmann, Maryland District Court Law and Practice § 941, at 142 (1976). Presumably, where the delay is less than the prescribed maximum, the rule anticipates that a determination as to the necessity and reasonableness of the delay will be made by courts on a case-by-case basis. No provision is made for the imposition of sanctions against police who violate the rule.

III

The State, echoing the reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals, Johnson v. State, 36 Md.App. at 172, 373 A.2d 300 contends that the provisions of M.D.R. 723 a are directory only being mere guidelines for the disposition of criminal defendants upon arrest. In its entirety Maryland District Rule 723 a provides:

"A defendant who is detained pursuant to an arrest shall be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay and in no event later than the earlier of (1) 24 hours after arrest or (2) the first session of court after the defendant's arrest upon a warrant or, where an arrest has been made without a warrant, the first session of court after the charging document is filed. A charging document shall be filed promptly after arrest if not already filed."

That M.D.R. 723 a was intended to be mandatory is evidenced in the first instance by the express terms of the rule itself. The rule declares in unequivocal language that a "defendant shall be taken . . . without unnecessary delay" to a judicial officer following arrest. (emphasis added). We have stated on numerous occasions that in the absence of a contrary contextual indication, the use of the word "shall" is presumed to have a mandatory meaning, Moss v. Director, 279 Md. 561, 564-65, 369 A.2d 1011 (1977), and thus denotes an imperative obligation inconsistent with the exercise of discretion. Bright v. Unsat. C. & J. Fund Bd., 275 Md. 165, 169, 338 A.2d 248 (1975).

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